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The cover shows details of a local fan made from daun lontar – the leaves of the palm, Barassus 
sp. Three of the pictures (pages 45, 53, and 63) used to illustrate the report show large decorative 
fans after the Bali style but made in Jambi. Miniature embroidered fans (page 55) are presented to 
wedding guests by the bride and groom as part of a Palembang tradition. The remainder of the fans 
(pages 1, 3, 19, and 31) are ‘working fans’ used to cool people or to draught c oking fires into life. 
An oil palm appears on the recently issued Rp 1 000 coin (page 18), a choic that emphasises the 
importance of the crop to the national economy.
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FFPCP will publish a report on the 1999 vegetation fires which will also contain additional 
information on the themes developed in earlier NOAA reports.  
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Copies of these reports are available in English and Bahasa Indonesia, and can be obtained from; 
 
The Project Leader, FFPCP, PO Box 1229, Palembang 30000, Indonesia. 
Fax number: +62 711 417 137  
or 
The Counsellor (Development), Representation of the European Commission, PO. Box 6465 
JKPDS, Jakarta 10220, Indonesia. 
Fax number: +62 21 570 6075 
 
Summaries of the reports, together with a daily overview map of the locationsvegetation fires in Sumatra, 
can be found on the Project homepage: http://www.mdp.co.id/ffpcp.htm 
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FOREWORD 
 
 
Head of Representation of the European Commission in Indonesia 
  
Tropical rain forests cover less than six percent of the surface of the earth, but contain 
more than 50 percent of the world’s biodiversity. Indonesia’s forests are considered to be 
one of the biodiversity centres of the world. However, these vital areas are under threat 
from over-exploitation, encroachment and destruction because of fire. 
 
The seriousness of the threat to Indonesia’s forests has prompted the European 
Commission to reorient its development co-operati n with Indonesia to focus on the 
sustainable management of forest resources. Based on the Agreed Minutes of a meeting 
between the Government of Indonesia and the Commission, which were signed in May 
1993, the Commission supports a range of projects in the field of conservation and 
sustainable forest management. The funds forthis upport have been donated in the form 
of grants. 
 
The importance of the fire issue cannot be over-emphasised. Estimates have set the 
economic loss caused by the haze that blanketed the region in 1997 at around Euro 1.4 
billion. The loss of wildlife habitat, which will take decades to regenerate or the soil 
erosion, which is the inevitable result of heavy burning, is too great to be expressed in 
financial terms. 
 
Because fire prevention and control is such an important issue, the Commission has been 
willing to support the Forest Fire Prevention and Control Project, which started in April 
1995, with a grant of Euro 4.05 million. The long-term objective of the project is to, 
“Furnish support, guidance and technical capability at provincial level for the rational 
and sustainable management of Indonesia’s forest resources.” Its imm diate purposes 
are to evaluate the occurrences of fire and its means of control, to ensure that a NOAA-
based fire early warning system will be operational in South Sumatra, and that a forest fire 
protection, prevention and control system will be operational in five Districts within the 
province. 
 
In co-operation with local government, representatives of the Ministry of Forestry and 
Estate Crops and the private sector, FFPCP set out to implement a series of activities that 
would support the achievement of these purposes. The results of these activities are now 
made available in a series of technical reports of which this is one. We believe that these 
professional publications will be of considerable value to those concerned in the forestry, 
agriculture and land-use planning sectors.   
 
 
Klauspeter Schmallenbach 
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Head of the Provincial Forestry and Estate Crops Office, South Sumatra 
 
Vegetation fires have undoubtedly become a more urgent focus of concern to the regional 
office of the Ministry of Forestry and Estate Crops in South Sumatra after the widespread 
smoke haze pollution of 1997. As part of our commitment to sustainable forest 
management, considerable efforts have been made to prevent fires happening again on such 
a scale. We hope that in the new spirit of reform the people of South Sumatra will play a 
greater role in protecting and managing the forests and their resources. 
 
I warmly welcome the FFPCP series of reports on their work from 1995 to 1999. These 
reports examine in detail the underlying causes of vegetation fires in the province, and this 
understanding allows us to suggest how numbers may be reduced. The reports also set out 
methods of prevention, NOAA satellite d tection, and control of fires. These are based on 
methods that have been shown to work under field conditions and when fully introduced 
will bring practical benefits to us all. 
 
I also hope that the work will serve as a reminder that we need to keep improving our 
capability to deal with future fires. While good progress has been made, much work still 
remains to be done before damaging vegetation fires are a thing of the past. 
 
 
Ir. Engkos Kosasih 
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RINGKASAN  
 
 
Tujuan 
 
 
 
Kebijaksanaan dan peraturan mengenai 
manajemen lahan di tingkat Nasional dan 
Propinsi, serta bagaimana aturan tersebut di-
implementasikan di lapangan, sangat 
mempengaruhi kelakuan dan tindak tanduk 
individu dan kelompok terkait dalam 
pemanfaatan lahan dan sumber daya alam. 
 
Faktor institusi secara langsung dan tidak 
langsung menpengaruhi besarnya kerusakan 
yang diakibatkan oleh kebakaran vegetasi di 
Sumatera Selatan, pada tahun 1997 maupun 
sekarang dan di masa mendatang. Faktor 
tersebut dipelajari dalam proyek FFPCP ini 
untuk memberikan jalan keluar guna 
melaksanakan sebuah sistem integrasi 
pencegahan kebakaran vegetasi.  
Studi lapangan telah dilakukan di tiga daerah konsentrasi kebakaran vegetasi terbesar di 
Sumatera Selatan pada tahun 1997 untuk meniliti bagaimana faktor-faktor institusi dapat 
mempengaruhi resiko, penyebab, jumlah, dan kerugian akibat kebakaran vegetasi tersebut. 
 
 
Latar Belakang 
 
Sumatera Selatan adalah Propinsi terluas ke-5 di Indonesia (104 000 km2). Kerusakan 
penurunan kualitas hutan mulai terjadi di lahan kering pada awal pertukaran abad dan 
kemudian menyebar ke lahan basah di pesisir (30 000 km2) pada pertengahan tahun 70-an. 
Pengembangan hutan tanaman industri dan perkebunan kelapa sawit yang cepat sejak 
tahun 80-an telah menyebabkan transformasi besar-besaran dalam penggunaan lahan 
sehingga menimbulkan perjuangan petani untuk mempertahankan lahan mereka dan 
kesenjangan sosial. 
 
Kebakaran vegetasi di sekitar Palembang selama musim kemarau yang panjang memang 
telah dicatat selama lebih dari seratus tahun yang lalu, tetapi faktor kekeringan dan 
penggunaan lahan yang tidak bertanggung jawab telah banyak menyebabkan persoalan 
kebakaran vegetasi dalam 20 tahun terakhir ini. 
 
Diperkirakan 786 000 ha telah terbakar pada tahun 1997 dan membuat Propinsi Sumatera 
Selatan menjadi Propinsi terparah di Pulau Sumatera. Kebakaran memusnahkan 40 000 ha 
perkebunan karet rakyat dan secara resmi 11 000 ha mungkin lebih hutan tanaman industri, 
tetapi kebakaran terbesar terjadi di hutan rawa dan hutan gambut yang telah habis 
dieksploitasi. 
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Kabut asap yang telah terjadi di Palembang adalah 10 kali melebihi ambang batas normal 
dan polusi tersebut melampaui Singapura dan Malaysia. Pembukaan lahan baru oleh petani 
atau pengusaha perkebunan besar adalah penyebab utama kebakaran vegetasi di lahan 
kering dan polusi yang dihasilkan tidak terlalu serius atau dapat dikatakan dalam tingkat 
lokal saja. Tetapi asap yang dihasilkan oleh kebakaran vegetasi di lahan basah pada waktu 
yang lama akan menyebabkan masalah polusi internasional. K bakaran besar di lahan basah 
biasanya muncul setelah terjadi kemarau selama tiga bulan atau lebih, dimana lahan basah 
termasuk lahan gambut menjadi kering dan rentan akan bahaya kebakaran. 
 
Kebakaran yang besar akan terjadi lagi di masa datang. Mengidentifikasikan siapa yang 
membakar adalah bukan masalah utama: tetapi yang penting adalah bagaimana supaya 
kebakaran tersebut tidak lepas kendali. Terjadinya atau tidaknya kebakaran vegetasi besar 
tergantung dari bagaimana lahan telah dipergunakan, bukan karena api yang dipergunakan 
sebagai alat atau senjata. 
 
Pendekatan masalah ‘manajemen kebakaran’ yang terbatas pada pendekatan birokratis 
secara ‘top-down’ (dari atas ke bawah, dari Jakarta atau Palembang sampai ke lapangan), 
dan yang difokuskan pada penghapuskan kebakaran vegetasi, akan gagal pula mencegah 
dan mengatasi kebakaran- ebakaran pada tahun el-nino mendatang seperti pada tahun 
1997. 
 
Tampa adanya perubahan dalam tata guna lahan, daerah yang rawan akan kebakaran 
vegetasi akan terus bertambah luas, dan jumlah kerugian akibat kebakaran serta biaya 
manajemen kebakaran akan bertambah di tahun-tahun mendatang. 
 
 
Penyebab Institusional Kebakaran Vegetasi di Sumatera Selatan 
 
Tidak cukupnya hak penduduk lokal dalam penggunaan lahan dan 
sumber alam 
 
· Penduduk lokal tidak diikutkan dalam proses pengambilan keputusan yang 
mempengaruhi tata guna lahan dan juga dalam pembagian hasil yang diperoleh dari 
eksploitasi hutan. 
 
Hukum kehutanan yang mengatur akses ke lahan kawasan hutan dan penggunaan sumber 
daya hutan mengenyampingkan hak penduduk lokal yang telah diberikan oleh hukum adat 
dengan sistem marga yang merupakan azas sosial dan organisasi administratif di daerah 
pedesaan secara resmi sampai tahun 1983. Hal ini mengakitbatkan situasi yang kurang 
kondusif untuk penduduk lokal mencegah kebakaran yang terjadi di luar ladang mereka. 
Pada pertikaian tanah yang berlarut-la ut, kemungkinan hanya api yang dapat dijadikan 
sebagai senjata. 
  
Penduduk lokal secara sistematik tetap berada di posisi yang lemah dalam hubungannya 
dengan aparat pemerintahan dan pemilik modal. Sejak penghapusan hukum marg yang 
lebih demokratis, intitusi pemerintahan di tingkat desa tidak lagi mewakili aspirasi 
masyarakat. 
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Tidak cukupnya kebijaksanaan tata guna lahan 
 
· Formulasi kebijaksanaan tata guna lahan dan hutan telah dan terus berlanjut didominasi 
oleh pemerintah pusat dan presiden, dengan sedikit memperhatikan pemerintahan di 
tingkat Propinsi, Kabupaten, dan lebih lagi penduduk lokal. 
 
· Tumpang tindih dari berbagai struktur administratif di Jakarta dan di dalam Propinsi, 
menciptakan banyak kekuasaan administratif, mengarahkan permasalahan menjadi lebih 
kompleks dan menciptakan berbagai prosedur yang tak jelas. Dalam masalah kebakaran 
vegetasi ini, tidak jelas institusi mana yang mempunyai tanggung jawab.
 
· Kelemahan perencanaan tata guna lahan pada tingkat Propinsi dan Kabupaten adalah 
kekurangan terbesar dalam setiap rencana pencegahan kebakaran vegetasi. Resiko 
kebakaran tidak pernah diperhitungkan dalam perencanaan lahan. 
 
· Kurangnya koordinasi di antara dan di dalam aparat perencanaan tata guna lahan dalam 
penentuan keputusan alokasi lahan yang berlawanan dengan klasifikasi lahan 
sesungguhnya dan perencanaan tata guna lahan di Propinsi. Hasil dari hal yang 
membingungkan ini adalah pertentangan dan dalam beberapa kasus berakhir dengan 
pembakaran. 
 
· Prosedur mengalokasikan lahan untuk perkebunan dan melepaskan kawasan hutan 
untuk dikonversi, kurang dihargai karena proses ini tidak transparan dan kurang 
terkontrol, dan ada kekurangan dalam penetapan hukum. 
 
Kebijaksanaan kehutanan, yang dipengaruhi oleh pengusaha yang berkepentingan, 
sering mengenyampingkan kepentingan lingkungan dan sosial. Kurangnya transparansi 
dalam proses pengambilan keputusan, lebih lanjut akan mengakibatkan kolusi antara 
pejabat dan kepentingan pengusaha. 
 
· Dengan alasan untuk proses pengembangan yang cepat sebagai prioritas utama, 
pemerintahan di tingkat Propinsi mendukung pengusaha yang sebenarnya mendahulukan 
kepentingan jangka pendek tanpa memperhatikan akibat jangka panjang yang akan 
terjadi. 
 
· Kebakaran vegetasi sering-sering adalah sebagai akibat kebijaksanaan yang bertujuan 
untuk membuka hutan dan konversi lahan hutan. 
 
- Penebangan hutan yang berlebihan dimungkinkan oleh kebijaksanaan kehutanan 
yang khusus dan penegakan peraturan yang lemah. Kurang kontrol atau tidak 
adanya kontrol, terutama di daerah lahan basah, adalah sangat lumrah sehingga 
pengusaha yang tidak bertanggung jawab mempersiapkan kondisi kebakaran 
vegetasi yang luas. 
 
- Insentif disediakan bagi pengusaha konsesi hutan untuk mengembangkan hutan 
tanaman industri (HPHTI) dalam skala besar, sementara resiko bahaya 
kebakaran vegetasi pada tahun pertama tidak diperhitungkan secara masak. 
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- Program transmigrasi di lahan kering melibatkan pembukaan lahan dalam skala 
besar yang akan menciptakan lahan alang- lang (Imperata cylindrica). Drainasi 
yang dibuat di areal transmigrasi pasang surut menjadikan hutan rawa yang 
berdekadatan menjadi lebih kering dan rawan kebakaran di tahun-tahun el nino. 
Perencanaan yang tidak matang mengakibatkan lahan tersebut menjadi tempat 
yang tidak berguna dan yang kemudian akan ditelantarkan, dan pada akhirnya 
terbakar contoh: Sugihan di OKI). 
 
- Secara lokal resiko kebakaran bertambah akibat kegagalan pelayanan instansi 
kehutanan dalam mewujudkan tujuan program penghijauan dan penghutanan 
kembali yang ditujukan kepada petani lokal. Tidak jarang petani membakar 
lahanya atau membiarkan api masuk lah nya. 
 
- Sistem fiskal adalah merupakan insentif bagi pemerintahan lokal untuk 
memberikan izin pengkonversian lahan hutan menjadi perkebunan. 
 
Kecendrungan yang terjadi 
 
Perubahan yang disebabkan oleh krisis ekonomi dan perombakan kebijaksanaan untuk 
mempromosikan sistem desentralisasi, akan menimbulkan pengaruh bagi tata guna lahan 
secara umumnya. Dalam jangka pendek resiko kebakaran akan bertambah karena 
penebangan hutan yang tak terkontrol dan tekanan untuk mengubah hutan menjadi lahan 
perkebunan. 
 
Dalam jangka panjang perombakan kebijaksanaan, apabila sukses, sepertinya akan 
membantu pencegahan kebakaran vegetasi. Tetapi, resiko sesungguhnya adalah 
kebijaksanaan baru yang dianjurkan ini akan tetap sebagai “kebijaksanaan di atas kertas” 
jika tidak didukng dalam perubahan pelaksanaan dan tingkah laku di lapangan. 
 
Penetapan keputusan dengan sistem disentralisasi dengan sendirinya tidak akan menjamin 
tata guna lahan yang lebih efektif. Biar pun demikian perubahan tanggung jawab yang lebih 
besar bagi pemerintahan di tingkat Propinsi dan Kabupaten, dapat membawa perubahan 
positif jika diikuti dengan proses transparansi dan rasa bertanggunjawab yang lebih jelas. 
 
Hal-hal tambahan 
 
· Resiko kebakaran vegetasi yang pada saat sekarang ini sedang bertambah, dapat 
dikurangi apabila kebijaksanaan tata guna lahan dan proses pengambilan keputusan di 
titik-beratkan bagi kepentingan masyarakat. Hal ini harus menjadi prioritas bagi 
program pengembangan yang terkait dengan pencegahan kebakaran vegetasi. Resiko 
jangka panjang kebakaran vegetasi harus diikut-sertakan dalam pengambilan keputusan 
mengenai tata guna lahan dari saat perencanaan sampai tahap implementasi di lapangan, 
merupakan masalah yang kritis. 
 
· Pengelolaan bekas areal HPH yang sekarang sangat rawan kebakaran, merupakan 
masalah utama di Sumatera Selatan. Tidak mustahil bekas areal HPH ini, termasuk 
yang telah terbakar di tahun-  sebelumnya, akan terbakar lain di musim kemarau 
yang akan datang, dan mengakibatkan polusi asap yang melampau negara tetangga. 
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· Hutan rawa di Kabupaten Musi Banyuasin dan Ogan Komering Ilir memiliki resiko 
kebakaran terbesar dan paling perlu diperhatikan dari sudut pandang lingkungan dan 
pencegahan kemungkinan polusi kab t asap. 
 
· Program rehabilitasi bagi daerah lahan basah (atau kering) yang telah terbakar, tidak 
merupakan jawaban jangka pendek mau pun jangka panjang, bagi penduduk lokal yang 
dirugikan oleh kebakaran vegetasi. Hal ini sangat penting dalam hubungannya denga  
perombakan dan tuntutan atas lahan dan sumber daya alam. 
 
· Perencanaan kehutanan perlu diintegrasikan dengan kerangka perencanaan tingkat 
propinsi yang dibawahi oleh BAPPEDA. 
 
Rekomendasi 
 
Desain proyek pencegahan kebakaran vegetasi harus mengingat persepsi dan kepentingan 
semua pihak yang terkait, terutama penduduk lokal. Terdapat resiko tidak konsistennya 
antara yang direncanakan dalam proyek dan kenyataan yang terjadi bila ternyata proyek 
tersebut terlalu dipengaruhi oleh pandangan internasioal atau nasional. Pandangan di 
tingkat desa mengenai tata guna sumber daya alam dapat bervariasi dari satu tempat 
dengan tempat lainnya, tetapi pada dasarnya menuntut ‘pemanfaatan yang bijaksana’: 
sehingga mereka dapat membentuk basis yang mendahulukan kepentingan penduduk lokal 
sama baiknya dalam pencapaian tujuan pencegahan kebakaran vegetasi di tingkat Nasional 
dan internasional. 
 
Pada tingkat Nasional, kerangka hukum dan peraturan memerlukan revisi untuk 
keberhasilan mencapai tujuan yang diharapkan dalam perbaikan tata guna lahan yang 
diintegrasikan dengan pencegahan bahaya kebakaran. 
 
Pada tingkat Propinsi dan lokal di Sumatera Selatan, integrasi dari pencegahan kebakaran 
dan tata guna lahan membutuhkan: 
 
- Bantuan dan dukungan kepada organisasi masyarakat di tingkat desa supaya mereka 
bisa mampu dan diakui sebagai ‘partner’ dalam pengambilan keputusan mengenai tata 
guna lahan dan pencegahan resiko kebakaran (seperti partisipasi dalam perencanaan dan 
pemetaan tata guna lahan, dalam pengidentifikasian prioritas pencegahan bahaya 
kebakaran di tingkat desa, dan menyangkut juga kesempatan untuk mendapatkan 
kredit). 
 
- Sokongan untuk memajukan proses- r  penengah dalam pencapaian persetujuan 
antara penduduk setempat dengan pihak kepentingan lain, seperti konsesi mengenai 
batas wilayah, dll.
 
- Memperkuat kapasitas instansi-instansi yang merupakan kunci dalam perencanaan tata 
guna lahan di tingkat Propinsi dan Kabupaten. 
 
BAPPEDA tingkat I dan BAPPEDA tingkat II membutuhkan asistensi untuk dibantu 
dalam mengikut-sertakan resiko kebakaran lahan dalam perencanaan: khususnya di 
Kabupaten OKI dan MUBA yang memiliki resiko paling tinggi. 
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Organisasi penyuluhan lapangan kehutanan perlu didukung (antara lain melalui peltihan) 
untuk bekerja dalam kerjasama yang lebih erat dengan aktifitas pengembangan pedesaan 
yang dilakukan oleh Departemen Perkebunan dan Pertanian. 
  
Pada lahan rawa adalah perlu dikuranginya resiko terjadinya kebakaran gambut yang 
berhubungan dengan penanaman padi sistem sonor di tahun el nino. 
 
Rencana pencegahan kebakaran perlu dibuat sebagai prioritas segera untuk lahan rawa di 
pesisir. Hal ini seharusnya memberikan berbagai jalan keluar untuk melindungi hutan rawa 
(gambut dan bukan gambut) yang masih ada tersisah dalam kondisi baik di bagian selatan 
Sumatera. 
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SUMMARY  
 
 
Objectives 
 
A top-down bureaucratic approach to fire management 
that focuses on fire suppression will fail in the field 
during the next el Niño year as it did in 1997. Fire-
prone areas continue to expand, and the costs of fire 
damage and fire management are bound to increase 
over the years. 
 
National and provincial land management policies and 
laws, and the way these policies and rules are 
implemented at field level, shape the attitudes and the 
behaviour of individuals, communities, private 
companies and government agencies as to how they 
regard and manage land and natural resources.  
 
The institutional factors that directly or indirectly 
contributed to the severity of the 1997 fires in South 
Sumatra – and that continue to influence both fire 
numbers and severity today – were examined to 
suggest ways to promote an effective system of 
integrated fire prevention within the province. 
 
 
 
Fieldwork was carried out in the three regions that had the greatest concentration of fires 
occurred in 1997 to assess how institutional factors impact on fire risk, fire causes, fire 
numbers and fire severity.  
 
Background 
 
South Sumatra  (104 000 km2) is the fifth largest province in Indonesia. Forest recession 
and degradation started in dryland areas at the turn of the century and spread to the coastal 
wetlands (30 000 km2) in the seventies. The rapid development of forest plantations and oil 
palm estates since the eighties has caused a major transformation in land-use that has 
resulted in local ‘struggles for land’ and social upheaval. 
 
Vegetation fires during ENSO-related prolonged dry seasons have been recorded around 
Palembang for almost a hundred years but more frequent droughts and the irresponsible 
use of land and natural resources have greatly exacerbated the fire problems over the last 
twenty years. 
 
An estimated 786 000 ha burnt in 1997 making South Sumatra the most severely affected 
province in the island. The fires destroyed 40 000 ha of smallholder rubber p antations and 
officially 11 000 ha – probably more - of pulpwood and timber plantations. However the 
largest fires occurred in degraded logged-over swamp forest, including those on peat. 
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Smoke haze in Palembang was ten times the norm and the pollution drifted to Singapore 
and Malaysia. The clearing of agriculture land by both smallholders and plantation 
companies is the main cause of fires on dryland. The pollution they cause is minimal or 
only of local concern. It is the haze produced by long durati  fires on wetlands that 
causes international anxiety. These fires are set for a number of reasons: prime amongst 
which are clearance for wood plantations and oil palm estates. In drought years sizeable 
areas are also burnt to prepare areas for the cultiva ion of sonor rice. Many of these escape 
control and become wildfires after droughts of three or more months when wetlands, 
including peat swamps, are parched and fire prone.  
 
Major fires will happen again in the near future. Identifying who sets the fires i  not the 
main issue: preventing them running out of control is. Whether or not they become 
wildfires depends on how the land has been managed, not on whether the fires were started 
as a tool or as a weapon. 
 
Institutional causes of fires in South S matra 
 
Inadequate rights of local population to land and natural resources  
 
§ Local communities are excluded from both the decision-making processes that affect 
land management as well as from the advantages gained from forest exploitation. 
 
§ Forestry laws that grant access to Forest Lands and to the use of forest resources, 
ignore pre- xisting local rights given by customary (adat) laws under the marga 
system. As the marga system has been the basis of social and administrative 
organisation in rural areas. The marginalised local communities, understandably, feel 
little commitment to prevent fires outside their own farms. In long-standi g land 
conflicts, fire may be the only weapon of the weak.
 
§ Local communities have until now been systematically kept in a weak position in their 
relationship with officials and large landholders. Since the abolishment of the marga 
system, which was comparatively democratic, the governmental institutions at the 
village level rarely represent the aspirations of the people. 
 
 
Inadequate land management policy 
 
§ The formulation of land and forest management policy has been, and continues to be, 
dominated by the central government and the President, with little consultation with 
provincial and district authorities, and even less with local people. 
 
§ The overlapping of various administrative structures in Jakarta and within the Province 
creates a legion of administrative territories, and leads to complex and unclear 
procedures and lack of accountability. In the case of fire, no one feels responsible. 
 
§ Deficient land-use planning at the provincial and district levels is a major limitation to 
any sound fire management plan. Fire risk is not taken into account when zoning or 
allocating land. 
 
 
xiv
 
 
 
§ Lack of coordination between and within land man gement agencies results in land 
allocation decisions that run contrary to official land classification and/or provincial 
land-use planning. The resultant confusion leads to conflicts that, in some cases, end in 
arson. 
 
§ Procedures to allocate land for plantations and to release Forest Lands to non-forest 
uses are not respected as there is a lack of transparency, control and law enforcement. 
 
§ Forestry policy, whose formulation was influenced by powerful business associations, 
over-rode environmental and social concerns. The lack of transparency in decision-
making processes further allowed collusion between officials and business interests. 
 
§ With rapid development as the overall priority, provincial government officials often 
side with private business: short-term business interests prevail over long term-
concerns for sustainable development. 
 
§ The fires are, to a large extent, the unforeseen result of deliberate policies that favour 
deforestation and forest conversion.  
 
- Specific forestry policies and lenient enforcement of regulations allow severe over-
cutting. The absence of control in the swamp areas is notorious and irresponsible logging 
conditions prepare the forest for major fires. 
 
- Incentives were provided to forest concessionaires to encourage large-scale 
industrial timber and pulp plantations (HPHTI) of fast-growing species, while the 
high fire risks during the first years of plantation establishment were insufficiently 
taken into account.  
 
- Transmigration programmes in dryland areas involved large-scale mechanical land 
clearance that favoured the establishment of alang-alang (Imperata cylindrica) 
grasslands. Drainage to reclaim swamps in tidal transmigration sites contributed to 
making adjacent swamp-forests more prone to dry-out and burn in ENSO years. 
Poor planning led to the development of unsuitable sites that were later abandoned, 
and eventually burned (e.g. Sugihan in OKI). 
 
- Locally, fire risks were also increased due to the failure of Forestry Services to take 
into account the land use obj ctives of local communities in regreening or 
reforestation programmes which were imposed on farmers, who later burnt or let 
burn the plantations. 
 
- The fiscal system is an incentive for local government to allow the conversion of 
Forest Lands to agriculture. 
 
Trends 
 
Changes that have resulted from the 1998 economic crisis and the 1999 reform of policy to 
promote decentralised control will have a profound influence on land management in 
general.  
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In the short-term fire risks will increase owing to unrestrai ed unauthorised logging, and 
new pressures to convert and clear forest lands for agriculture. 
  
However the reform of policy, if successful, is likely to enhance fire prevention in the long 
term. But, there is a real risk that the new policies now being suggested will remain as 
‘paper policies’ unsupported by concrete political and attitudinal change. 
 
Decentralised decision-making is not in itself a guarantee of more effective land 
management. However devolution of greater responsibilities to provincal and distri t 
authorities could bring positive change if accompanied by greater transparency and 
accountability. 
 
Additional points  
 
§ Fire risks that are at the present on the increase, could be reduced if land management 
policies and decision-making processes are amended to take account of the needs of 
local people in an equitable way. The priority is to formulate a programme of 
sustainable development that incorporates fire prevention. The way the long-t rm risks 
of fire are taken into account when decisions on land management - from the planning 
to field implementation steps – are made will determine success or failure. 
 
§ The future of logged-over forest concessions with their high fire risks, is of major 
concern in South Sumatra. It is likely that these forests, including those already burned, 
will be swept by fire in the next prolonged drought. Thereafter recurrent fires will 
continue to contribute in some measure to transboundary haze. 
 
§ Forests in the swamp of Musi Banyuasin and Ogan Komering Ilir Districts are at the 
greatest fire risk. They are of the highest concern from an ecological viewpoint and 
from preventing further dense smoke haze. 
 
§ Rehabilitation programmes for burned areas in the swamps (or dryland) that do not  
answer the short and long-term needs of local communities are doomed to be 
destroyed by fire. This is particularly so in the new context of reform which has 
prompted a revival of claims on land and natural resources. 
 
§ The provincial offices of the Ministry of Forestry and Estate Crops r , and will 
remain, key stakeholders, but a multi-sectoral approach to reducing fire damage is 
clearly needed. The issue can not be addressed and resolved only within the forestry 
and plantations sectors. 
 
§ Forestry planning needs to be integrated into a strengthened provincial planning 
framework under BAPPEDA.  
 
Recommendations 
 
The design of fire prevention projects must take into account the perceptions and the needs 
of all the stakeholders, and pay particular regard to the wishes of local communities. 
 
There is a strong risk of inconsistency between the stated objectives of a project and the 
realities of what is either desirable or feasible if the objectives are over-influenc d by 
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international or national views. Village-level views on the management of natural resources 
vary from place to place but are generally in line with ‘wise use’. The views at district and 
sub-district level could well form a base to serve local as well as international fire 
prevention goals. 
 
Laws and the regulatory framework at national level need revision to attain the overall 
objective of improved land management integrated with fire prevention.  
 
At provincial and local levels in South Sumatra, integration of fire prevention into land 
management implies: 
 
§ provision of support to local communities to allow them to become partners in land 
management decisions and fire prevention, e.g. through participatory land-use mapping 
and planning, identification of fire prevention priorities at village level, and through 
related needs such as access to credit funds; 
 
§ support to develop mediation processes aimed at achieving agreements between 
communities and other land-use stakeholders, e.g. for consensus boundary setting, and;
 
§ strengthening the capacity of the key land management agenci s at provi ial and 
district levels. 
 
BAPPEDA I and II require assistance to help them take fire risks into account when 
carrying out spatial planning; particularly for OKI and MUBA Districts that are most at 
risk. 
 
Forestry extension services within the Ministry need to be supported (e.g. through training 
of forestry extension agents in participatory approaches) to work in closer cooperation 
with rural development activities carried out by the Agriculture and Estate Crops extension 
services. 
 
In the coastal swamp regions there is a need to reduce the risk of recurrent peat fires 
associated with sonor rice cultivation in ENSO years.  
 
A fire management plan needs to be produced as a matter of urgency for the coastal 
swamp region. This should suggest ways to protect the last remnants of peat and non-peat 
swamp forests in good condition that remain in southern Sumatra. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Background 
 
South Sumatra with an area of 104 000 km2 is the 
fifth largest province in Indonesia (Map 1); of this, 
the coastal wetlands cover some 30 000 km2 
(Map 2). The dryland forests of the province have 
been continually felled and degraded since the 
beginning of the century and deforestation of the 
wetlands started in the seventies when concessions 
were granted to private companies. And from the 
late eighties the establishment of forest plantations 
and the rapid development of palm oil estates have 
resulted in major changes in land use as well as 
social changes whose impact is not yet fully 
appreciated. South Sumatra is also the leading 
province for the production of smallholder coffee 
and rubber. Very little land is unclaimed. 
 
 
 
Vegetation fires during ENSO-related prolonged dry seasons are not new to South 
Sumatra and were recorded over the last hundred years in the region around Palembang. 
Prolonged droughts are thus a regular feature of the southern part of the east-coast plains 
of Sumatra1 and vegetation types show evidence of recurrent fire events (Laumonier, 
1997)2.  
 
Droughts and the irresponsible use of lands and natural resources have increasingly 
exacerbated the fires since the eighties. The province experienced extremely severe 
droughts in 1982, 1991, 1994 and in 1997 when fires swept across large tract  of 
previously untouched coastal swamp and peat swamp forests. 
  
The fires directly affect the economy and the people. EUFREG (1998) estimated – almost 
certainly conservatively - that 786 000 ha burnt in 1997 making South Sumatra the most 
severely affected province on the island. The fires destroyed an estimated 40 000 ha of 
smallholder rubber plantations (Gouyon, 1999) and the pulpwood and timber plantations 
officially lost 11 000 ha. Local air transport was affected by smoke haze and the pollution 
index in Palembang was 10 times higher than the norm. The smoke haze drifted as far as 
Singapore and Malaysia. 
 
Smoke haze is produced during agricultural land clearing by both smallholders and 
plantation companies but is in relatively small quantities and only of local concern. But the  
                                                       
1 Data from the Palembang - Kenten meteorological station from 1951 to 1998, indicate that notable dry 
seasons (i.e. at least three consecutive dry months < 100 mm) were recorded in 1958, 1961, 1963, 1967, 
1972, 1976, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1991, 1993, 1994, and 1997. 
 
2 In wetlands, the extensive swamp grassland dominated by gelam (Melaleuca cajuputi) that covers nearly 
5000 km2 in the region of Palembang, is characteristic of a regular fire regime over a long period. In dryland 
parts of the province, the increasing areas of scrub vegetation dominated by Schima wallichii, a 
characteristic species of fire-degraded secondary vegetation, are indicative of an expanding process of 
degradation that results from deforestation coupled with recurrent fires.
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smoke haze produced by fires on wetlands is of international importance. These fires occur 
only during droughts of three or more months when wetlands, including peat swamps, are 
parched and fire prone. Major fires will happen again in the near future. 
 
Objectives and Methods 
 
The aim of the work reported here was to understand the institutional and social causes 
that underlie vegetation fires in South Sumatra Province. Land and natural resource 
policies and their implementation influence the behaviour of individuals and groups nd 
help shape the decision-making processes as to how the land is actually managed. We 
hypothesised that fire risks may be increased by conflicts over land-use rights and the 
rights to natural resources, as well as by poor land-use m agement. We examined this 
hypothesis in the field (Chapter 2) and then tried to understand the mechanism of the 
decision-making process that emanated in Jakarta and ended in the village (Chapter 3). 
Analysis of the latter has enabled us to put forward recommendations to pr ven  fires and 
to suggest actions for future donor support (Chapter 4). 
  
Field work was carried out in the three regions (Maps An.V.2 and An.V.6) where the 
greatest concentration of fires occurred in South Sumatra in 1997 (EUFREG, 1998; 
Anderson et al., 1999; Legg and Laumonier, 1999). These were: 
 
§ around an extensive HTI pulpwood plantation in the Pendopo area, Muara Enim 
District, lying in the central peneplain that is largely occupied by smallholder rubber 
plantations,  
 
§ in degraded logged-over dryland forest within former HPH logging concessions in 
Musi Banyuasin District (MUBA) to the north-east of the province close to the Jambi 
border, and  
 
§ in degraded swamp forest in the coastal Tulung Selapan Sub-District of Ogan 
Komering Ilir District (OKI), where extremely severe fires took place within HPH 
logging concessions from the end of August to November 1997. 
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2. LESSONS FROM FIRES IN THE FIELD  
 
A Large Acacia Plantation Established in a Region of 
Traditional Rubber Cultivation in Muara Enim District 
 
A forestry plantation concession (HPHTI or HTI) of 296 400 ha was granted in the late 
eighties to PT. Musi Hutan Persada (PT. MHP), a joint venture between Barito Pacific 
Timber group and the state-own d PT. Inhutani II. Acacia mangium was established on 
land formerly covered by, (1) secondary forest mixed with traditional jungle rubber3, (2) 
zones of alang-alang, or (3) degraded logged-over forest. From 1991 to 1998, 194 364 
ha were planted. This is one of the largest HTI plantations in Indonesia and production will 
support the PT. Tanjung Enim Lestari (PT. TEL) pulpmill built near Muara Enim and 
scheduled to be operational early in 20004.  
 
Most of the concession lies on land classified as ‘Production Forest’ and the land thus 
belongs to the state. The decision on where to locate the company was based on the 
assumption that most land in the area was still ‘empty’ or ‘available’. However, 
particularly in the Pendopo block, large areas were occupied or claimed by traditional 
rubber smallholders, a land-use not represented on any large-scale official map.  
 
 
Local land rights ignored in land acquisition 
 
The company delegated responsibility for land 
acquisition and land clearing to contractors, often to 
those from outside the region. As a rule, land clearing 
preceded negotiations with local people and operations 
were carried out quickly using bulldozers, sometimes 
at night, to avoid resistance5. I  several locations, land 
clearing proceeded under the protection of the 
territorial security apparatus. Indemnification6 was 
made on a case by case basis. Amounts paid for 
planted trees, and occasionally for bushy fallows, 
varied. In most cases weak farmers received 
insufficient money or none.   
                                                       
3 Jungle rubber is an agroforestry system practiced by smallholders. The plot is slashed and burnt and tree 
seedlings are planted at the same time as rice. After one or two years cultivation with food crops, usually 
dryland paddy, the rubber takes over and grows amid natural regrowth to give a mixed forest often 
indistinguishable at a distance from normal secondary forest. The trees are tapped for their latex for up to 40 
years (see Gouyon et al., 1993).  
 
4 The pulp mill has a yearly production capacity of 500 000 tons, requiring over 2 million m3 of wood. PT. 
TEL is a joint venture with assets from Japan, Barito Group owned by Prayogyo Pangestu, and PT. Citra 
Lamtorogung owned by ex-Pr sident Suharto’s daughter. 
 
5 Several farmers report that on the morning after their plantations had been destroyed, they searched in vain 
for the limits of their properties as the familiar trees that marked the boundaries had been pushed into the 
gullies together with their rubber trees. Villagers handled the bulldozer driver roughly. 
 
6 The company stresses that local people have no legal right over land when they are on Forest Lands. Hence 
they are given only indemnity (kompensasi): this is less than compensation (ganti rugi) paid by estates that 
acquire areas outside the Forest Land . 
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Many conflicts erupted over land-rights and indemnity amounts. When necessary, local 
authorities intimidated farmers who refused to release their land and depicted them as a 
threat to national security. On occasion, land clearing was also the opportunity for well-
connected middle-class people to obtain cheap land that is now planted with well-tended 
clonal rubber trees.  
 
Most of these disputes, which now date back six or eight years, remain unsettled. 
Company staff members acknowledge that it was a hard task to reach the target of 
200 000 ha planted, since they had to face many conflicts. “Until 1996, they took all the 
land they wanted, pushing us away,” said a resident in Sungai Bahung, an enclave village in 
the plantation. 
 
Arguing that a part of the granted concession (along its western boundary in MUBA 
District) had been previously released to transmigration, the company asked in September 
1996 for an extension of its area. Some 10 000 ha located in the eastern part of Muara 
Enim District, so far still classified as ‘Other Lands’, i.e. lying outside ‘Forest Lands’, were 
granted to the company by decision of the Minister of Forestry and the Governor. 
 
 
Fires in and around an Acacia plantation 
 
Official reports suggest that 8 257 ha and 3157 ha of A. mangium plantation established 
by PT. MHP were burnt in 1994 and 1997 respectively (see Annex V table 3). According 
to Saharjo (1996) approximately 20 000 ha were damaged by fire in 1994. 
 
The company considers that a high fire-risk inherent in immature stands and disputes over 
land are the two major problems they face in managing the pl ntation. Fire risk is especially 
high in the Pendopo block which is much fragmented and encompasses numerous enclaves 
with small settlements (talang), smallholder rubber plantations and fallow plots on land 
that the company could not secure.
 
An extension worker of the company estimates that in one plantation block 70 percent of 
the fires can be attributed to arsonists and the rest are wildfires that spread into the 
plantation despite firebreaks. Such estimates are speculative. However, arson did play an
important role locally in the 1994 and 1997 fires. Although they rarely acknowledge the 
incidence of ‘arson fire’, especially to foreigners working with a government agency, 
villagers sometimes refer to such fires as fire lit by ‘wild hands’ (‘tangan liar’).  
 
Fire also destroyed many smallholder rubber plantations in 1997. The destruction of young 
clonal rubber, unfortunately often poorly weeded and invaded by alang-alang that 
increased fire risk, was a devastating loss of assets (see Gouyon, 1999). Smallholders say 
that there were so many fires, sometimes spread over extensive areas, that it was hard to 
identify their origin. They acknowledge that some fires originated from burning by 
smallholders themselves to clear land, as well as from land clearing in neighbouring acacia 
and oil palm plantations. They stress that the vegetation was so dry in 1997 that preventing 
wildfires was impossible. 
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Fire Prevention Under The Customary Law 
 
The 1979 law on Village Administration, enacted in South Sumatra in 1983 by the decision 
of the local government, abolished the marga system that formed the basis of the social 
organisation in rural areas which, in turn, managed and controlled common land and forest 
resources. It also enforced fire prevention rules. 
 
In the old days, firebreaks were made along the boundaries of the plot and the appropriate 
date for burning was fixed by the village elders. Burning was conducted with the free 
assistance of other villagers (gotong royong). Fines had to be paid if the fire went out of 
control and destroyed neighbouring crops. 
 
Nowadays, these regulations are no longer regularly enforced. Even when they are, and 
concern all the members of a community, they can hardly be applied to outsiders. The 
weakening of traditional fire prevention systems is, in the main, the result of the weakening 
of village level institutions and the struggle for land. 
 
In a region like Pendopo where local communities feel themselves as dispossessed tenants, 
they are not likely to feel any deep commitment to prevent wildfires on the limits of their 
lands adjacent to large-scale plantations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fire In The Acacia Plantation 
 
by E.D., 16 years  
Class III.1 SMPN 1 Talang Ubi
 
One essay in particular among the many written by children who participated in a schools’ 
Fire Awareness Campaign run by FFPCP in 1997, gives a straightforward view of the 
situation : 
 
“Before becoming the property of the company, this land was owned by the local people. 
It was then sold to the company. The reason for buying the land was that it hadto be 
planted with acacia trees, which would be very useful for making paper. The price for the 
land was fixed to Rp. 10 000/meter [sic]. The people agreed with the price, because the 
land would be used for the benefit of their own country. But some land was not yet paid 
by the company although it was already planted and harvest time was approaching.” 
 
“When the people were asking about compensation money for the land, the foreman 
always get angry and the people were afraid to reiterate their demand. There were ot 
only one or two villagers who did not receive compensation for their land, but ten, may 
be. Finally, one of them set fires in the plantation of the company, and more than one 
hectare was destroyed. The loss suffered by the company was not small. After the fire, the 
foreman paid the compensation for the land which was not yet paid and re-planted the
land.” 
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Conversion of Dryland Forest After Logging in Northern Musi 
Banyuasin District 
 
 
Musi Banyuasin (MUBA) is the largest district (2.6 Mha) in South Sumatra and has 
1.5 Mha of Forest Land and an average population density of 45 per km2 - varying from 7 
to 60 according the sub-district. Transmigration settlements have been developed over 500 
000 ha in the tidal and dryland regions and caused a sharp increase in population and the 
district has undergone major changes in land-use since the eighties. 
 
The last tracts of lowland - under 500 m a.s.l. - forests, albeit over-exploited, in South 
Sumatra are found in MUBA. They are predominantly swamp forest along the coast from 
the mouth of the Banyuasin river to the boundary with Jambi (abutting Berbak National 
Park), and, to a lesser extent, dryland forest along the northern border with Jambi 
province. Apart from a few protected areas7 that include a wide belt of coastal mangrove 
(the proposed Sembilang National Park), practically all the remaining forested areas were 
granted to logging concessions (790 000 ha) in the seventies.   
 
Data from EUFREG (1998) and Anderson et al. (1999) show that a number of large, long-
duration fires occurred in September - October 1997 close to the Jambi border. Long 
duration fires are typical of extensive burning in coastal peat swamps and in logged dryland 
forest within forest concessions8. These, together with fires in surrounding areas, are 
considered below, whilst the fires that burnt in the coastal regions are reviewed in the next 
section.  
 
Field-work was carried out in Bayung Lincir sub-d strict9, one of the most fire affected in 
the province. A wide variety of vegetation burned in 1997. This included scrub and 
grassland on abandoned agricultural plots in transmigration areas and in secondary forest.  
Other fires burnt gardens and smallholder jungle rubber plantations, PT. Pakerin acacia 
plantations, PT. Inhutani V timber plantations, fragmented degraded forest, logged forest 
in concessions areas, and Nature Reserves. No reliable data are available on the total area 
burned but elders in the rare villages that are found within the sub-district said that they 
were amazed to see the forest burning, a thing they had never witnessed before, even in 
previous abnormal droughts. 
 
 
                                                       
7 There are 199 000 ha of Nature Reserves (Hutan Suaka Alam) and 153 000 ha of Protection Forest (Hutan 
Lindung) in MUBA. Most of these Nature Reserves on dryland consist of fragmented, degraded forests with 
a low conservation status. Several forest conc sions, as well as transmigration settlements, overlap the 
Wildlife Nature Reserves of Bentayan (19 300 ha) and Dangku (29 000 ha), which are largely degraded and 
recently encroached by oil palm plantations. Durand and Pain (1993) noted that 14 percent (342 025 ha) of 
the total area granted as concessions (2 272 300 ha) were located outside official boundaries. 
 
8 EUFREG (1998) showed that in September 1997 long duration fires in Jambi, South Sumatra and 
Lampung provinces were twice as common in loggingconcessions as elsewhere. 
 
9 Kecamatan Bayung Lincir: 0-25 m a.s.l., 6 700 km2, 103 540 inhabitants (1995), 16 inhabitants km-2; 
(Musi Banyuasin dalam angka, 1996) 
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Increased fire risks in logged forest concessions under a continued 
degradation process 
 
The few important logging co cessions10 till active in South Sumatra are mainly located in 
MUBA in the swamp region close to the proposed Sembilang National Park. 
Supplemented by illegal logging,  they are the main source of timber for the province11. A 
limited amount of timber is still extracted from the previously logged dryland forests. 
 
The parastatal company Inhutani V12 has managed areas formerly granted to forest 
concessionaires PT. Wisma Lukita, PT. Niti Remaja and PT. Padeco since 1991. The area 
of dryland forest under Inhutani management was later increased and now stands at some 
235 000 ha with blocks in the sub-districts of Bayung Lincir and Babat Toman in MUBA 
and Lalan in Muara Enim District13. Logging is sub-contracted and timber is extracted 
either under HPH or IPK licenses14. A Police Mobile Brigade (Brimob) was charged with 
preventing illegal logging in the concession up to October 1998. (See box on the next 
page). 
 
Under this pressure of timber removal, the Inhutani V concession became further degraded 
and thus increasingly fire-prone during droughts. And it is clear that in 1997 the profound 
dissatisfaction of the local people towards Inhutani V was not conducive to fire 
prevention. 
 
In February 1998  - i.e. after the 1997 fires - the logging concession (HPH) became a 
plantation concession (HPHTI) managed under TTJI (Tebang dan Tanam Jalur 
Indonesia) silviculture using strip clearing (20 - 100 m in width). As noted by NRI-DFID 
(1998), the system is popular among concessionaires as it allows them to remove a greater 
volume of timber in the short term. The opening of rectangular widths of up to 100 m cut 
in the matrix of the residual forest, is highly detrimental to the forest environment which it 
makes even more fragmented and fire-prone. 
 
                                                       
10 Notably PT. Sukses Sumatera Timber, currently co-managed by Inhutani V and PT. Riwayat Musi Corp. 
In 1999, logging concessions in MUBA amount to about 790 000 ha.
 
11 The production of logs legally extracted from HPH has dropped from 537 933 m3 in 1992-93 to 
204 438 m3 in 1997-98, while logs extracted under IPK license remained around 100 000 m3 (Kanwil 
Kehutanan Sumsel, 1998). 
 
12 The various Inhutani have the responsibility to cut the remaining harvestable timber as well as to 
rehabilitate degraded areas. As a government agent of development, Inhutani are also required to improve the 
prosperity of people living near the concession and - within the framework of a so-called ‘Community 
Development of Forest Village’ Program (PMDH) - to provide limited assistance to surrounding villages. 
(See Annex 1, Ministry of Forestry and Estate Crops, for further details). 
PT. Inhutani V was established in 1991 under the legal status of BUMN (Badan saha Milik Negara, i.e. a 
state owned company). It manages forest concessions in the province of South Sumatra, Lampung, Bengkulu 
and Jambi. Concessions whose license rights have been suspended or cancelled are handed over to the 
company. In South Sumatra, Inhutani V manages some 900 000 ha including logging concession areas 
temporarily placed under its responsibility, and 250 000 ha of timber plantation (Annex V.3-4).  
 
13 According to the PT. Inhutani management plan (RKPH April 1991 - Maret 2011) quoted by Sudarmanto 
(1996), nearly 66 percent of the total area of 205 000 ha (Musi Banyuasin and Lalan Hulu blocks) were 
already more or less heavily degraded in 1991; of the additional area, 30 percent was logged forest and 5 
percent ‘primary forest’.  
 
14 e.g. about 600 0 m3 were officially extracted in 1996-97 and 100 000 m3 in 1997-98 from the Batanghari 
Leko Forest Unit 
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13 The population of the three villages was 3 657 in 1994, one-third of Javanese origin. 
 
16 116 illegal sawmill units are reported to be active in the province. (Suara Pembaruan, 19 August 1999. 
Tak Mudah Mengamankan Hutan Di Sumsel. [The arduous task of protecting the forest of South Sumatra.] 
(http://www.suarapembaruan.com/news/1999/08/190899/lainlain/ll01/ll01.html)  
 
17 Sumatera Ekspres, 21 October 1998. Base camp Inhutani dibakar masa. [People burn the Inhutani b se 
camp.]. 
 
18 Following a sharp increase of the fees they had to pay, and the seizure of a motorcycle belonging to one of 
the illegal loggers by Brimob security guards.  
 
19 The army's Special Force. 
 
 
An Example Of Widespread Illegal Logging And Conflicts Between Local 
People And Inhutani V 
 
Timber harvesting in the forests on marga lands was a traditional activity in the villages of Marga 
Bayat long before concession rights were granted to logging companies. The harvesting has remained 
despite conflicts with forest concessionaires. According to Sudarmanto (1996), who carried out socio-
economic studies in the area, money from timber extraction (memb lok) provides 86 percent of the 
income of 730 households in the villages of Pangkalan Bayat, Muara Bahar and Bayat Ilir13 and is the 
main activity of 55 percent of the people in the latter two villages. Timber is cut according to orders 
(species and volume) from traders from Lampung and Jakarta, who support the villagers with cash 
advances - usually 20 percent of the agreed total. 
 
Since 1994 families from Pangkalan Bulian (24 km away) have settled along the logging road at 
Simpang Empat, 2 km from the Inhutani Kedembo camp. They say that they were forced to become 
illegal loggers ‘to eat’ as they have no alternative. They view themselves as the ‘coolies’ of the illegal 
logging business, and while they are looking for a livelihood, they are also looking for l nd. They are 
well aware that the timber resource will soon, “Within three years”, be exhausted and anticipate acute, 
"Social problems” after that. They would like to be allowed to plant tree-crops i  plots they have 
opened in the forest, but are evicted by the forest administration as they are not legally allowed to 
settle on state forest land. They face further difficulties in that they lack the capital needed to produce 
cash crops, such as maize and chilli, on the land. 
 
From time to time, organised groups of illegal loggers arrive from elsewhere in the province (e.g. 
Betung in the Palembang area) and apparently work for illegal sawmills14. 
 
Illegal logging is a major discussion point in Bayung Lincir sub-distr ct. Sudarmanto (1996) and 
reports in local newspapers, suggest that illegal logging could not have reached its present level 
without the involvement of local officials and those in-charg  of the concession. The illegal loggers 
that we met were tolerated by Inhutani V and worked, “Under the monitoring of the company security 
staff”. A ‘fee’ of Rp 5000 m3 has to paid at each gate along the road when they transport the wood and 
the illegal loggers say that they stop work when they are told that high-ranking forestry officers from 
Palembang or Jakarta will visit the concession. 
 
Prompted by increased demand from the Lampung and Jakarta-b sed timber traders and the economic 
crisis, it seems that illegal logging has speeded-up sinc  1997 in the Bayung Lincir forest block sited 
only 50 km off the main Jambi to Palembang road. In October 1998, several hundreds villagers 
attacked the Inhutani camp at Kedembo and burned an office15. According to the illegal loggers 
themselves, they went in fury (amok) when pressure from Brimob members responsible for the 
security of the concession reached an intolerable level16. After the incident, Inhutani passed 
concession security to Kopassus17 members, whom, according to the company, were asked, “To adopt 
a softer approach”. 
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Fire in the context of recent and rapid forest conversion 
 
Pressure to exploit forested lands at the periphery of the province has increased over the 
last two decades as land has become scarce in the more populated parts. And, as the forest 
degrades, so it becomes the target for for st- and estate-plantations. 
 
Transmigration 
 
Transmigration settlements were established in the mid-eighti s in the sparsely populated 
dryland zone of MUBA on the edge of production forest and reserves – particularly in 
Bayung Lincir sub-district and in adjacent areas. These settlements commonly infringe on 
lands classified as Permanent Forest. 
 
Large-scale mechanical clearance, and later abandonment of agricultural plots on land 
unsuitable for food crops, promoted the growth of fire-prone alang-alang. These 
grasslands are now regularly burned by hunters to attract deer from the forest to graze the 
regrowth. 
 
Labour available from the transmigration settlements allowed the development of oil palm 
and cassava agro-industrial estates. And workers from other small settlements located 
closed to indigenous villages (trans swakarsa), have also provided the manpower needed 
to establish forest plantations. 
 
Agro-industrial plantations 
 
From 1986 to 1998, 114 938 ha of forest area20 were released to plantation companies - in 
the main for oil palm – and most in MUBA (45 percent) and MURA (41 percent). The 
largest single areas were released in 1991 in MUBA to PT. Hindoli (15 500 ha) and PT. 
Sumber Harapan (12 128 ha), (Dinas Kehutanan Sumatera Selatan, 1998).  
 
Eleven percent (77 000 ha21) of Bayung Lincir sub-district was allocated to oil palm 
plantations from 1994 to 1998. Besides ‘nucleus estate’ plantations, oil palm plantations 
are also established on transmigrant land under a PIR system22, e.g. the PIR programme 
developed by PT. Hindoli in Bandar Jaya.  
 
According to transmigrants in Bandar Jaya21, some fires originated from land clearing 
operations, and as there was no protection measures such as fireline clearance, fires went 
out of control and raged into dry, logged forest adjacent to the area. 
 
                                                       
20 83 percent in Convertible Production Forest, 12 percent in Production Forest, and 4 percent in Limited 
Production Forest. 
 
21 22 000 ha in 1994, 33 000 ha in 1995 and 20 000 ha in 1998 (Dinas Perkebunan, 1999). 
 
22 PIR (Perkebunan Inti Rakyat):  ‘package programme’ specifically intended to develop the potential of 
smallholders. 
 
21 Bandar Jaya, D 3: a transmigration unit of 450 predominantly Javanese families settled in 1987, following 
a PIR ‘plasma’ scheme plantation under the management of PT. Hindoli since 1994. 
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Forest plantations  
 
Both the timber plantations established by Inhutani V, and the pulpwood plantations of PT. 
Pakerin were severely burned in 1997 (See also WALHI, 1998b). Official reports show 
that the fires destroyed 25 percent of the 6 000 ha Inhutani V sungkai (Peronema 
canescens) and mahogany (Swietenia macrophylla) timber plantations. The thick 
accumulated leaf litter of deciduous Per nema canescens makes plantations particularly 
fire-prone. Nicolas (1998a) reports a fire in the Bayat Ilir area fought over ten days in early 
October 1997 with the assistance of 350 firefighters from Malaysia. The fire destroyed 
1 000 ha of plantation and 300 ha of surrounding logged forest. PT. Inhutani management 
staff say that the fir s originated outside the concession from agricultural burning by local 
people and transmigrants. 
 
Thirty-five percent of the 17 250 ha PT. Pakerin Acacia mangium plantation was officially 
reported burned in 1997 (see table Annex V.4). PT. Pakerin, which was listed by MoFEC 
among culprit companies with fire in their concessions, declared that it did not use fire in 
land clearance operations, although fires may have originated from adjacent land newly 
cleared by farmers22. It is clear that fires in the plantation can be linked to a land dispute 
that had remained unresolved since 1993. (See box on the next page). The fires may have 
been direct arson or ‘accidentally’ left to spread from agricultural plots near the acacia 
plantations. 
 
Additional Notes 
 
The situation at the forest-frontier in the dryland areas of northern MUBA underlines how 
the ingredients that promote fires are intertwined and synergistic. They include: 
 
- irresponsible forest exploitation practices that prepare the physical conditions for l rge-
scale forest fires, 
 
- a profound dissatisfaction of local people towards forest concessionaires who represent a 
forest administration that ignores or denies their rights over land and forest resources,  
 
- inadequate land-use planning and land allocation process, and 
 
- a lack of consideration of fire-risk, or the belief that fire is not a problem, in the planning 
and implementation stages of large-scale transmigration, agro-industrial and forest 
plantations projects. 
 
With the exception of small ares surrounding the few ancient villages, the Lalan River 
region was still heavily forested some twenty years ago and the process of forest 
conversion is recent. Fires are largely associated with the conversion of forest to forest 
plantations or estates crops. But, experience shows that tree plantations are as susceptible 
to fire as logged forest. Fires may become recurrent events.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                       
22 Sumatera Ekspres, 3 September 1998, PT Pakerin bantah bakar hutan. [PT Pakerin argues it did not burn 
the forest.] 
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23 Surat Keputusan Menteri Kehutanan Republik Indonesia No. 642/Kpts-II/23 Juni 1992.  
 
 
26 From 1993 to 1996, only 16 600 ha could be planted out of the 31 130 ha planned in the 1993 - 1996 
annual plan works (PT. Pakerin, 1997).
 
 
27 Pagar Desa, also called Puring, is located on the Lalan River. The village has 120 families, mostly local 
people belonging to the Marga Bayat.  
 
28 Early in 1994 seven villagers who had openly pulled up Acacia trees, were jailed. Among them was Mr. 
H.A.K. (83 years) who was sentenced to 9 months 4 days imprisonment. (Sriwijaya Pos, 1 May 1999. 
Pakerin bayar ganti rugi tanah rakyat. [Pakerin pays compensation amounts for lands owned by local 
people.] 
 
29 From five villages (Pagar Desa, Bayat Ilir, Pangkalan Bayat, Simpang Bayat and Telang) 
 
30 Sumatera Ekspres, 16 April 1999.Kasus lahan di Muba mulai menemukan titik terang. [Th  be inning of 
a solution for land conflicts in MUBA.]. 
 
31 Sumatera Ekspres, 1 May 1999. PT. Pakerin bayar ganti rugi kepada warga. [PT. Pakerin pays 
compensation to local people. 
 
A Land Dispute Caused By Inconsistencies In The Land Allocation Process 
 
 
A 200 000 ha plantation concession (HPHTI) granted in 1992 to PT. Pakerin23 is located in the 
forest divisions (CDK/KPH) of Musi Ilir and Sungei Lalan to the south-west of Kedembo Inhutani 
V. The company acknowledges that it faced difficulties in developing the Acacia mangium
plantation as its allocated area overlapped that of other companies and part of the land was claimed 
by local people24. 
 
The head of the village of Pagar Desa25 reports that in 1993 the company cleared the land without 
taking account of local claims, and considering solely the limits of the concession granted by the 
Ministry of Forestry. Some jungle rubber plantations were cleared and durian and ‘bee trees’ owned 
by the villagers in the surrounding forest were cut. No significant fires were reported. 
 
After violence against company workers in 1995, the company stopped clearing village land in 
Pagar Desa  At the time of the interview in March 1999, 39 Pagar Desa villagers were claiming 
back 232 ha and similar situations were reported in other villages surrounding the plantation26. The 
bulk of PT. Pakerin’s acacia plantation was destroyed by fire in 1997. 
 
In 1998 in the spirit of ‘reformasi’, an inventory team appointed by the governor approved the 
villagers’ claims. And in April 1999 it was officially recognised that 833 ha belonging to 189 
villagers27 had been planted to acacia by the company. As shown on the map issued by the Ministry 
of Forestry and attached to the Ministerial decision that allocated land to PT. Pakerin for HTI 
plantations, part of the concession included lands lying outside Forest Lands. The status of these 
lands had remained unchanged, since they had never been modified by the governor. Stressing the 
fact that the plantation had encroached outside Forest Estate, the regent of MUBA questioned 
whether responsibility lay with the company or with the officials who had decided to allocate the 
concession28 
 
Compensation was finally settled in April 1999 when villagers received Rp 400 000 ha-1 for lost 
trees planted on Forest Lands and Rp1 million ha-1 for land lying outside Forest Lands with the 
land to be returned to the villagers after the first plantation cycle29 
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Over-Exploitation of the Swamps: When Fire Follows the 
Chainsaw  in Ogan Komering Ilir District 
 
 
The coastal swamp region of OKI30 is one of the least densely populated areas and is the 
‘wild frontier’ of the province31. Indigenous settlements are sparse, mainly along rivers nd 
coastal areas, although there are also small villages on dryland on the southern edge of the 
swamp. The area is difficult to access and to control. It has been well-known locally as a 
centre of widespread illegal logging activities for 25 years.  
 
This coastal region formerly covered by swamp forest and peat swamp forest, was the 
setting of the most severe fires in South Sumatra in 1997. They burned from early 
September until late October 1997 and affected several hundred thousand hectares32. And, 
as pointed out by Stolle et al. (1998), 59 percent of the hot spots detected in Sumatra 
between mid-September 1997 and the end of June 1998 were recorded in wetland areas. 
 
A thick smoke haze, rich in particulates, is produced when peat swamps catch fire. In 1997 
the South Sumatra peat fires, together with those in Riau and Jambi, were responsi le fo  
the largest part of the cross-boundary haze that hit Singapore and Malaysia. Conservative 
estimates suggest that 60 percent of both particulate matter and carbon dioxide originated 
from peat fires33.  
 
Three main activities in the studied area are directly related to the incidence of fires in the 
eastern corner of OKI; logging (either legal or illegal), sonor rice cultivation during 
prolonged droughts, and fishing. 
 
Logging  
 
Since the late seventies the greatest part of the coastal swamps classified as Permanent 
Production Forest (some 500 000 ha), has been granted to seven logging companies. PT. 
SBA Wood holds the largest concession of 134 200 ha, that is largely peat swamp forest 
and was previously exploited by PT. Inwihco from 1980 to 1991. 
 
The fire history in the PT. SBA area shows that fire follows logging. The 1994 fires 
affected blocks logged from 1992 to 1994 and areas previously burnt in 1991. The 1997 
fires were especially severe in a large area logged from 1994 to 199734.  
 
Satellite imagery (Map 3) confirms that numerous and persistent fires were recorded in the 
concession from October until the first rains of mid-Nove ber 1997 (Anderson et al, 
1999)35. Many of the fires continued to smoulder underground in the peat until 
                                                       
30 The study was conducted in the sub-district of Tulung Selapan, Ogan Komering Ilir District. 
 
31 Mean population density in the seven central and east sub-districts of OKI is 19 km-2 
 
32 The total area burnt in South Sumatra in 1997 is estimated to be 786 000 ha (EUFREG, 1998). 
 
33 ADB (1999) 
 
34 Field visit and interviews with company staff. 
 
35 A night time NOAA image is chosen to illustrate the point as such images allow long-lasting and thus 
potentially more serious to be distinguished form the multitude of transient fires that are detected on daytime 
- particularly late afternoon - images. These one-day-only fires are frequently associated with the controlled
burning of relatively small areas.  
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extinguished by the rising watertable in February 1998. Most of the fires were seemingly 
accidental although some might have been indirectly or directly linked to logging activities 
and land clearing operations in a location drained for the establishment of an HPHTI 
plantation36. 
 
Further fires appeared in the PT. SBA area in June 1999 and remained continuously 
present and to worsen up to mid-September when the on-set of the rains finally controlled 
the burn. Around 14 000 ha were burned37. 
 
Illegal logging is socially cceptable in the coastal swamp and has followed local rules 
since the seventies. Tulung Selapan is a small town that controls access to a large part of 
the area. Illegal logging and gambling are ‘official’ and lucrative sources of income within 
the town. Until 1982, the head of the marga (pasirah) controlled the trade. Loggers paid a 
fee and were given the right to dig a small canal (parit) from the Riding River to float-out 
timber from a 600 m band on both sides of the canal. The concession area was extended by 
lengthening the canal. Even today informal rights of wood exploitation are still associated 
to a right on a canal.  Illegal loggers may possess official letters of canal ownership; these 
papers are viewed at local level as a right to harvest forest resources. 
 
According to PT. SBA at least 115 illegal sawmills operated along the three rivers in the 
region of Riding at the time their license was allocated in 1991. These illegal loggers burnt 
a company security post in 1992, attesting that the arrival of the company was 
‘unwelcome’. According to local people an agreement was reached between the company 
and the illegal loggers: the latter had to give to the former two logs of every twelve logs 
floated on the company controlled canal. 
 
The duty to protect concession is devolved to the concessionaire and in 1993-94, HPH 
concessionaires were required to enforce protection against illegal loggers38. PT. SBA 
called for the assistance of the army administrative unit to crackdown on illegal sawmills 
operating along the east coast of OKI39.  
 
As the local resource is almost exhausted, many illegal loggers have moved into swamp 
forest in the north of MUBA, or have exported their ‘know-how’ to Jambi and other 
provinces. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
36 Nicolas (1998a) 
37 I.P. Anderson (pers com) 
 
38  In compliance with the decree SK Menhut 523/Kpts II/1993 of the Ministry of Forestry 
 
39 150 sawmill units were seized in 83 illegal mills, each unit with a capacity of 15 to 20 m3 per day. 
Apparently this was not enough to stop illegal loggers. In 1996, 63 000 m3 of wood were seized in 42 
sawmills around Lebong Hitam, Kuala Duabelas and Lumpur rivers (Sriwijaya Pos, 18 June 1996. (Danrem 
tinjau kayu sitaan, juga ditemukan 42 sawmill liar.) 
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Sonor rice cultivation: a major source of fires in drought years 
 
The technique 
 
Sonor is a local form of swamp-rice cultivation practised only after a three month dry 
period when the herbaceous vegetation along swamp rivers is exceptionally exposed and 
dry enough to be burnt (end September - Octobr). Sonor involves the direct sowing of 
traditional long straw varieties that are adapted to growth in a rising watertable. Coarse 
minimal land clearing is carried out after burning (1 manday ha-1) and the seeds are sown 
after the first rains (November). Th y germinate and grow untended until the harvest. The 
harvest, often using boats, takes place immediately the crop ripens and requires the help of 
labour from adjacent regions. 
 
Sonor has traditionally been practiced by local people settled within the swamp and along 
the coast and has now been adopted by transmigrants settled in the lower Musi delta (e.g. 
Sugihan) who were first employed by local people to harvest the crop. 
 
The  sonor rice cultivation regions in South Sumatra 
 
Sonor is practiced in four regencies: OKI, MUBA and to a limited extent in OKU and 
Muara Enim. It is particularly important in central and eastern OKI where it is found 
notably along the Sugihan river and its tributaries in the north, and along the Lumpur and 
Mesuji rivers and their tributaries in the east40. These are the least populated areas with a 
mean population density in the seven central and eastern districts of 19 km-2 (Table A 
IV.2). 
 
The importance of sonor to the local economy 
 
The growing of sonor rice is a speculative activity but one that is attractive to locals and 
settled migrants as well as to outsiders that include city dwellers. It requires little labour 
and is compared to a gambling game by local people. In successful ‘sonor years’ yields are 
estimated at 2 t.ha-1 or 100 to 200 times the weight of planted seeds. Nevertheless, yields 
are unpredictable. Rats eat the seeds if there is a dry period after the first rains and the 
harvest is lost if an excessively high water level submerges the fruiting spikes. The roles of 
the various stakeholders are shown in Table 2. 
 
Prolonged dry seasons are a time of scarcity in the household economy and many farmers 
can not afford to buy the 15 to 30 kg of seed required41. Some villagers sell their 
possessions - a radio or motorcycle - to buy seeds but most make arrangements with 
wealthy people, ‘the backers’. The backers who live in Tulung Selapan or Palembang, 
provide seeds or money in exchange for half of the harvest.
  
In successful years (1991-92, 1994-95 and 1997-98) sonor rice contributes at least 20 
percent of total production in OKI District, and from 7 to 10 percent of that of South 
Sumatra province as a whole (see Table A.IV.3). This welcome supplement is all the more 
important as dryland-rice yields poorly in drought years. The figures for harvested areas 
                                                       
40 Sonor rice is also cultivated in  neighbouring Lampung province which has similar swamp areas. The 
major fires in 1997 in the Mesuji and Tulang Bawang sub-district were caused by sonor. [Suyanto, S. 
(1999). Field report Mesuji-Tulang Bawang-Lampung, 27 September - 2 October 1999. ICRAF] 
 
41 In 1997 in Simpang Tiga, kec. Tulung Selapan, a 1.6 kg tin of local rice seed varieties, such as padi s wah 
kemang, kanyut, and sibur, sold for Rp 12 000 and new IR varieties for Rp 9 000 to10 000. 
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given in Tables A.IV.3 are based on surveys by agriculture extension workers and must be 
considered as no more than ‘best estimates’.  
 
Table 2: Stakeholders in sonor activities in OKI 
 
Stakeholders Area of origin Mode of 
access to land 
Activities / Role 
Sonor farmers 
Local settlers 
 
 
Outsiders : 
- villagers 
- city 
dwellers 
local villages and 
transmigration settlements 
in sonor districts (see 
below) 
 
- adjacent districts and 
regencies 
- mainly Palembang 
 
traditional land 
 
 
 
permit needed 
from local 
formal/informal 
leaders who 
control sonor 
area 
- land preparation 
(often with intentional 
burning) 
- planting 
- harvesting 
 
as above,  
or only harvesting 
Sponsors of 
sonor activity 
mainly resident of Tulung 
Selapan and Palembang 
 - lending money for 
buying seeds 
- organising groups of 
people willing to 
chance sonor 
Informal and 
formal leaders 
local villagers in sonor 
districts 
 land allocation 
Government 
agencies  
  organisation of 
transport of rice 
harvest (e.g. BIMAS) 
 
 
Sonor and wildfires 
 
If some 75 000 ha were harvested in 1998, then it can be extrapolated that at least l50 000 
ha of swamp were burnt in 1997. For each hectare sown with rice, an estimated double 
(some sources claim three to five times) the area is burnt to clear la d that then proved 
unsuitable and/ or fires that escaped control (Ramon and Wall, 1998). 
 
Unchecked fires sweep large areas in the fire-prone swamp herbaceous communities, in the 
Melaleuca savanna and in adjacent degraded peat swamp forest until stopped by a river, 
wetter area or heavy rainfall. NOAA images for September - October 1997 show the 
progression of fire from riversides (including the River Sugihan) eastwards in the direction 
of degraded peat swamp forest (Anderson et al., 1999). Damage is always severe and the 
total area of coastal wetlands burnt in 1997 is estimated to be some 500 000 ha (Nicolas 
and Bowen, 1999). 
 
Steps to limit the risk of major fires linked to sonor activities in peat areas 
 
Calls for a total ban on long-established sonor cultivation are completely unrealistic, but 
ways to start to reduce the impact and gain some control over the activities are feasible: 
 
§ Create awareness of the concept of ‘source-fires’ and gain the involvement and 
support of provincial and local government, agriculture agencies and informal and 
formal leaders and local communities who play a role in organising and/or sponsoring 
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sonor activities. 
§ Identify key agencies (Dinas Pertanian, BIMAS42, BAPPEDA at district level43 and 
other groups such as the network of agriculture extension agents) to monitor and 
coordinate sonor activities. 
§ Map the location of fires that may be linked to sonor activities (1997 NOAA data, and 
data from the next ENSO years in conjunction with field checking). 
§ Identify areas where sonor can be practiced with a limited risk of fires escaping, and 
those adjacent to deep peat where it should be prohibited. 
§ Establish a network of informal leaders who are involved in sonor activities, and 
§ Support initiatives to develop alternative rice cultivation methods. 
 
Inland fishing  
 
Inland fishing, both subsistence and commercial, is part of the traditional life style of 
people settled in the swamp region and in OKI involves ten times more families than sea 
fishing (BPS, 1997). It is a seasonal occupation that peaks in the dry season when water 
levels are lower in the flooded plains and fish accumulate in the deepest pools. The 
fishermen establish camps close to these deep pools often in remote parts of the forest. 
There camps are a potential source of fires. The fishermen also take advantage of the dry 
season to clear-burn the vegetation to facilitate access to fishing grounds. 
Tidal transmigration programmes as an added fire factor 
Several large transmigration sites are located along the wester edg  of th  swamps as part 
of the tidal areas programme that began around 1970. The optimistically named Cinta 
Manis [Sweet Love] scheme of 4 000 ha and the Upang Delta (15 000 ha) settlement were 
later expanded to the east of the delta as far as the Saleh and Sugihan rivers. Two much 
larger schemes, Air Sugihan Kiri (935 000 ha) and Air Sugihan Kanan (45 000 ha)44 were 
created abutting forest concessions (Charras and Pain, 1993). 
 
An area of 50 000 ha to the south of the two Air Sugihan sites was already logged and 
transected by drainage canals in 1983 when it was transferred into Padang Sugihan Wildlife 
Reserve. Elephant herds are now driven here from the more densely populated regions of 
South Sumatra but the reserve has suffered heavily from fires during the last decade. There 
are currently 40 animals on the Reserve. 
 
The reclamation of these tidal swamps necessitated the removal of the natural forest and 
the digging of an impressive network of large and small drainage and irrigation canals. 
These have caused a general reduction in the dry season watertable over a large region. 
 
The major difficulties inherent in tidal transmigration programmes and in the reclamation of 
peat swamps (Soepraptohardjo and Driessen, 1976; Danielsen and Verheugt, 1990; 
Levang, 1995) have resulted in the partial abandonment of the settlements. Many of the 
transmigrants have to rely on seasonal off-farm employment, in the timber industry or on 
the oil palm plantations. Some, as noted earlier, practice sono in el Niño years. 
                                                       
42 Discussion with the Secretary of BIMAS (Agriculture Credit and Marketing Service), which is directly 
responsible to the governor and is involved in organising the transport of harvested s nor rice, may be able 
to play a role in coordinating efforts to control s nor activities. 
 
43 BAPPEDA Tk. II OKI has recently produced a first tentative map of sonor reas based on information 
provided by agriculture extension workers. 
 
44 See Numbers  9 and 10 on the map (Annex V.2) 
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Dry season fires for agricultural clearing readily escape control and enter poorly tended 
plantations and surrounding grasslands. On occasion, sub-surface peat fires start to the 
amazement of transmigrants: several stressed that, ‘Here, it’s he soil that burns’. 
 
 
The general question of fires in the swamp areas 
  
Logging, whether legal or illegal, of swamp forests is obviously unsustainable and has, 
quite literally, prepared the ground for future major fires. However history shows that the 
zone also burnt when it was still forested, and it is therefore imperative that fire-risk is 
integrated into the management plans for those very few areas that remain unlogged 
(mainly in the lower part of the Lalan River in MUBA), as well as into plans for the logged 
forests and for the management of areas previously affected by fires. The areas that have 
been burnt are sizeable and most of the trees are dead and scattered in a weedy vegetation 
of aquatic ferns and sedges. The whole zone is very liable to be swept by fire during he 
next prolonged drought. Periodic fires will also continue during the dry season in non-
drought years as they did in 1999. Regular smoke haze - some of it transboundary – will
thus also continue. 
 
The zone is mainly classified as Production Forest and it  management is thus the 
responsibility of MoFEC and Inhutani V. The area is large and access is difficult; its use 
therefore can not be controlled by the few forest guards with limited means that are 
presently assigned to the task. 
 
Several options are envisaged for the future of the region. The rehabilitation of burned 
swamp forest with local species sounds an attractive option and is widely advocated by 
logging concessionaires and the forestry offices despite the known technical difficulties45. 
The extremely high risk of recurrent fires destroying the newly planted area are 
consistently underestimated despite past experience. This sounds as if the re-planting per 
se is more important than the future safe productivity of the plantation.  
 
A second option is to convert parts of the zone into forestry plantations. This is currently 
being tried in PT. SBA Wood under a 40 000 ha HPHTI licence granted in February 1998. 
The company initially planned to establish swamp pulai (Alstonia pneumatophora) and 
jelutung (Dyera polyphylla) to be harvested after 15 years46. However following an 
agreement with a major pulp company, this was changed to Ac cia mangium and/or 
Acacia crassicarpa. Although A. mangium can grow on a variety of soils, including acidic 
or saline with impeded drainage, it does not tolerates waterlogging. A network of 
orthogonal canals is therefore being dug to drain the 5 000 ha to be planted in 1999 - 
2000.  
 
The venture looks hazardous. The performance of Aca ia on a partly burned peat is 
uncertain47 and canals will not offer effective protection to the young plantation against the 
                                                       
45 Planting  seedlings in a partly inundated zone is difficult and  weeding requirements are high (three times 
in the first year, twice in each of the two subsequent years). Also, severe fires burn the slightly raised 
hummocks that are a feature of peatland areas, down to a flat comm n w tertable. They thus eliminate the 
very areas that promote regeneration. (Rieley, pers comm.) 
 
46 According to the company, the nursery that contained two million seedlings of swamp pulai was destroyed 
by fire in 1997. 
47 A plantation is reported to have been successfully established in a drained peat swamp area in Jambi by 
PT. Wira Karya Sakti (Sinar Mas Group). 
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wildfires that are likely to occur in adjacent areas. Indeed they may further lower the 
watertable in non-drought years and add to difficulties. 
 
A third option is to plant the area to oil palm. It is 
ironic that this choice that has been so widely 
criticised elsewhere for its use of fire to clear land, 
may prove the best option for a ‘haze free’ future. PT. 
Lonsum contemplated plantations in parts of the zone 
before the economic crisis and trials are doing well. 
Careful water management is essential for successful 
growth of the palms and, as part of this regime, water 
levels need to be kept high during periods of drought; 
a necessity that may also limit the spread of wildfires. 
The mature plantations themselves are a low fire risk. 
While infrastructure costs are high, oil palm will 
remain an attractive option at a time when available 
land is becoming scarce elsewhere in the province.48 
 
 
Whatever options are chosen, the preservation of the swamps looks far from assured as it 
is impossible to turn the clock back and to re-isolate these formerly sparsely used zones.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
48 A fuller discussion of conversion of land to oil palm is given by Bowen , Anderson and Bompard. (in 
press). 
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3. THE INSTITUTIONAL CAUSES OF FIRES IN 
SOUTH SUMATRA 
 
 
Identifying who sets the fires is not the main issue. 
Used as tool or weapon, fires will happen during the 
coming ENSO years. How many will become wildfires 
depends on how the land has been, and is, managed. 
 
Land management involves a long-term decision-
making process and is the result of a complex system 
of relationships between stakeholders and their use of 
land and natural resources. An outline description of 
the roles of the national and provincial forestry and 
land management institutions are given in Annex I. 
Legislation as it relates to land management is 
described in Annex II, while the numerous land 
management procedures are covered in Annex III. In 
this chapter, we outline how land management in 
South Sumatra over the past 30 years has encouraged 
the recurrent wildfires experienced today. 
 
 
 
Inadequate Land Rights and Resources for Local People 
 
People living within areas managed under the Basic Forestry Law 
 
“The branches of production which are important for the State and which affect the 
lives of most people, shall be controlled by th  State. Land and water and the natural 
riches therein shall be controlled by the State and be made use of for the greatest 
welfare of the people.” (Constitution 1945, Article 33). 
 
As a result of the interpretation of what constitutes the ‘greatest welfare of the people’, 
the people who actually live on or near forest land have generally been deprived of their 
previous rights to land and forest resources. The Forest Administration has ignored 
previous systems of land-rights, such as those enacted by customary (adat) laws, and put 
in their place new laws over land access and the use of forest resources. 
  
Forest Land boundaries are largely inherited from the colonial period when demographic 
pressure was much less than today. This has led to 45 percent of South Sumatra Province 
being declared as State Forest Lands, and hence to be managed under the Basic Forestry 
Law (see Annex II).  The on-g ing revision of the boundaries is being conducted without 
real participation of local people at the village level32. 
 
Thus, almost one half of the province land is under the control of an administration which 
is out of touch with the lands it is supposed to administer and is thus unable to control and 
manage it effectively33. 
 
                                                       
32 See Annex II, Chapter 2. 
 
33 There are only 167 forest guards (jagawana) in the province. 
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The lack of rights of local people to Forest Land i  a major underlying cause of continuous 
trespass in the forest, deforestation and, to some extent, fires. This is clearly shown in our 
case study in Musi Banyuasin District, where illegal logging is carried out not only by 
outsiders, but also by localpeople living within or near to forest lands. Paradoxically, it is 
because local people were officially excluded from the benefits of forest exploitation that 
they are driven to become illegal loggers themselves. But in most instances illegal logging 
is backed by well-connected middlemen and some officials34. 
 
People living within areas managed under the Basic Agrarian Law 
 
Villagers living on land subject to the Basic Agrarian Law have more rights than those on 
lands under the Basic Forest Law. The Agrarian Law requires all land-rights to be 
registered, and the registration process includes measurement, survey and mapping of the 
area. Land-rights are registered and issued by the National Land Office (BPN). 
 
The hak milik is an individual land ownership right recognised under the Agrarian Law. 
Hak milik must be registered and the holder is given a certificate that ensures security for 
owners and users, and the right of transfer (sale, gift, exchange, etc.). However, because of 
the uncertainty and the complexity of the procedures and the costs involved, official land 
registration is out of reach of most smallholders. Few in the South Sumatra countryside 
hold a hak milik property right (see Table  AII.1). 
 
The Basic Agrarian Law – at least in theory - recognises traditional local (dat) rights 
acquired before the Agrarian Law came into force. After that date the Basic Agrarian Law 
takes precedence. This is a major difference from the Basic Forest Law that does not 
recognise adat (see Annex II, Section 3). 
 
National vs. customary law: conflicts in the land acquisition process  
 
Traditional land rights are often the sole rights known and enforced at the village level. 
However problems arise when traditionally owned land is claimed by outsiders. Such land 
may be owned individually or held in common by a village or a group of villages that 
belonged to the same marga; in either case it is officially unregistered land. 
 
The villagers thus can not claim compensation for ‘their’ land within Forest Lands apart 
from an indemnification for planted trees - g nerally rubber and fruit. On land under the 
Basic Agrarian Law, smallholders are entitled to compensation for their land, but it is 
common knowledge that amounts are deemed unfair or unpaid. (See box on the next 
page).  
 
Inadequate Land Management Policy 
Centralism and overlapping of administrative structures 
 
The formulation of land and forest management policy is still dominated by the central 
government and the President, without extensive consultation with provincial and district 
                                                       
34 Suara Pembaruan, 19 August 1999. Tak mudah mengamankan hutan di Sumsel [The arduous task to 
protect the forest of South Sumatra]. 
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authorities. In regional planning, little attention has been paid to local situations and land-
management objectives at the village level35.  
 
The National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS) leads and coordinates the 
planning process for land management, while land-use planning within forest lands is in 
essence regulated by decisions made by the Ministry of Forestry and Estate Crops and 
closely linked to the President’s agenda. 
 
At the provincial level the Regional Development Planning Agency (BAPPEDA) is placed 
under the governor’s authority. And there are two regional forest offices: Dinas 
Kehutanan, which corresponds to the decentralised structure, under the Head of Region 
authority (Ministry of Home Affairs), and Kanwil Kehutanan dan Perkebunan, under 
MoFEC within the decentralised structure. There appears to be no change envisaged under 
the New Forestry Law. (See Annex I, Deconcentration and decentralization) 
 
 
Land Acquisition ‘Negotiations’ Vary With Land Status – As Applied In 
Pendopo South Sumatra Province  
Land status Land 
‘acquisi 
tion’ 
Government 
and companies 
views 
(according to 
National 
Laws) 
Local perception 
(according to 
Customary Laws) 
Official 
arguments 
Process of land 
acquisition 
Compensation 
Marga Forest / 
Tanah adat 
communal land 
under local control 
State Forest / 
State Land 
 
 
No negotiation 
(conflicts) 
None 
Privately owned 
fallow (belukar 
without planted 
trees) 
Unoccupied land 
Secondary forest 
No negotiation 
(conflicts) 
None / some 
indemnification 
 
 
By HTI 
Forest Land  
Under Basic 
Forestry Law 
(BFL) 
Privately owned 
rubber plantation 
Recognition of 
rights over 
planted trees 
Negotiation done 
by contractors 
(generally after 
land clearing) 
Indemnification 
for planted trees 
Privately owned 
forest fallow 
(belukar without 
planted trees) 
Unoccupied land 
Secondary forest 
No negotiation 
(conflicts) 
None / some 
indemnification 
Private land with 
rubber trees ( not 
titled) 
No title but some 
compensation 
Direct negotiation 
with plantation 
company 
Compensation 
for trees and/or 
land 
By estate 
company  
Land under 
Basic 
Agrarian Law 
(BAL) 
Titled land 
(privately owned) 
Usual transaction   Full 
compensation for 
land and trees 
 
 
 
At the District level, the forest offices, Cabang Dinas Kehutanan (CDK) and Perhutanan 
dan Konservasi Tanah (PKT) are placed, for administrative reasons, under the authority 
of the Head of District (bupati), i.e. under the Ministry of Home Affairs. PKT technically 
falls under the Directorate of Reforestation and Land Rehabilitation (BRLKT) of the 
provincial office of MoFEC (Kanwil). The unclear separation of functions between the 
Dinas and Kanwil forest offices is partly responsible of the poor integration of For st Land 
management into regional planning (ECO, 1997). 
                                                       
35 See Annex I 
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The overlapping of various administrative structures in Jakarta and within the provinces 
creates a legion of administrative territories36. Such bureaucratisation leads to complex and 
unclear procedures, lack of accountability and, ultimately, to inefficiency. In the case of 
fire, no one feels re ponsible. 
 
Ineffective land-use planning and inter-s ctoral coordination mechanisms 
 
Land-use planning at the provincial and district levels in South Sumatra is still in its 
infancy. This is a major limitation to any sound fire management plan. And it must be 
stressed that up to now, fire-risk is not taken into account in land-zoni g37.  
 
The risk of wildfire during land clearing operations and the potential for smoke haze 
pollution should be evaluated prior to land allocation. Where found to be unacceptably
high, as is certainly the case for peat swamps, permission to clear should be refused. In 
1997, fire and pollution issues were taken into account only during the peak fire period 
when diverse administrations issued regulations to ban land clearance by burning. These 
belated regulations could not be enforced and their aims were in essence, unrealistic. 
 
The reasons for the inefficiency of regional planning are multifold. 
 
§ The provincial Development Planning Agency (BAPPEDA) has insufficient capacity to 
effectively coordinate land-use planning, despite support by LREP I in the late 
eighties38.  
 
§ The lack of an accurate basic land-use map and coordination between government 
agencies, which tend to use their own maps, are both major problems39. Poor mapping 
is a source of confusion and land mismanagement that leads to conflict, and in several 
cases has proven to be a direct cause of fires. 
 
§ The use of small-scale maps makes the boundaries unclear40. Unr solved cases of 
overlap and related discrepancies between planned and allocated land-uses, have 
                                                       
36 For instance, planning: the Ministry for National Development Planning and the National Development 
Planning Agency (BAPPENAS); land affairs: the Ministry for Agrarian Affairs and the National Land 
Agency (BPN). And at provincial level there are diffused and decentralized structures (see Annexes I). 
 
37 Provisions were made in the 1994 RTRWP for the specific protection of deep-peat swamp areas that 
should not be allocated for development projects. The provisions can not be observed as peat swamp areas 
are not shown on the maps used in the land allocation process. 
 
38 Limited support was provided to BAPPEDA by the Land Resource Evaluation Project (LREP 1987 - 
1990) that covered the Sumatra provinces. The project aimed to strengthen provincial government land-use
capabilities by establishing provincial data-centers and also to support land-use policy planning and the 
preparation of regional land-use plans (Scott and Lusli, 1998). 
 
39 Many difficulties were encountered in assembling the information required to prepare Map 3 hat shows 
major land-use classifications. This was assembled from a number of source-maps d awn on different base-
maps.   
Concern about the accuracy of official maps is a liet motiv in almost every report that deals with land 
management and planning issues. ‘Errors of omission and commission’ are commonly reported. In a recent 
review of the forestry sector (NRI-DFID, 1998) it is stressed that, “One of the critical issues to forest 
management has been the inadequacy of the mapping base and the general confusion over the extent of the 
forest estate.” As noted by Schweithelm (1998), “Indonesia is also in desperate need of a new national land-
cover map to show what land uses and what forest types are where, and who is responsible for which.”  
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accumulated. Thus there are now significant variations between the figures and the 
maps produced by different land-use institutions. Indicated and actual land- se may 
differ widely. 
  
 
§ Coordination  mechanisms between land-man gement institutions at the provincial 
level are not effective (see Annex I) and the directives defined in the provincial spatial 
plan (RTRWP) are not enforced. The 1999 final report on the RTRWP evaluation by 
BAPPEDA I and the Spatial Planning Section of the University Sriwijaya Research 
Centre sadly concludes that41, “Land-use planning is not working as it should; not all 
the institutions and development actors take decisions about land-u e in coordination 
with BAPPEDA I, and in-li e with the RTRWP plan.”  Members of the Provincial 
Land-Use Coordination Team acknowledge that they were often pressed to ratify 
(‘rubber stamp’) top-d wn decisions (i.e. decisions from Jakarta) that blatantly 
contravened provincial land-use planning directives decided at th  provincial level and 
coordinated by central authorities.  
 
Flawed procedures in the granting of land to estate plantations 
 
Fire risks were not taken into account when land was allocated to estate plantations. It is 
also not uncommon for areas set aside for estates to overlap with land classified as 
Permanent Forest (e.g. HPH logging concessions, HTI plantations or Nature Reserves), 
and companies sometimes do not adhere to their stipulated boundaries. Control by third 
parties has been impossible as the land allocation maps prepared by BPN are considered to 
be confidential. 
 
Conflicts with smallholders were further exacerbated by corrupt land acquisition 
procedures. Companies often ignored official channels and dealt only with government 
representatives - often the village heads - or through intermediaries (calo tanah), instead 
of negotiating directly with the landowners42. In many instances, landowners received only 
the ‘basic price’ (harga dasar) fixed by a committee of government officials, and this 
                                                                                                                                                                     
40 Maps used in land allocation planning are at a much too small a scale. Th  spatial plan-map (RSTRP: 
Rencana Struktur Tata Ruang Propinsi) is based on a consensus by concerned government agencies and is 
drawn at 1: 500 000 scale. Provincial spatial plans RSTWP (Rencana Tata Ruang Wilayah Propinsi) are at 
1:250 000 scale. Maps at larger scale are simply derived from the RSTRP or RSTWP plan-maps and thus 
purport to a spurious accuracy. 
 
41 “Pada umumnya, tidak semua instansi atau pelaku pembangunan mengkoordinasi pemanfaatan ruang 
dengan BAPPEDA Tingkat I. Dengan demikian, tumpang tindih pemakaian atau pemanfaatan ruang yang 
telah direncanakan dalam RTRWP Sumatera Selatan tidak berjalan sebagaimabna semestinya.” 
(BAPPEDA I and Pusat Penelitian Tata Ruang UNSRI, 1999). 
 
42 The regent of MUBA blamed an oil palm plantation company for not respecting official procedures when 
acquiring land from farmers. He also blamed the company for clearing land outside the allocated area and for 
burning when clearing land during the 1997 dry season. (Sumatera Ekspres, 14 April 1999. Bupati menilai 
PT GPI, perusahan nakal [Regent judges PT. GPI as a ‘recalcitrant’ company]. 
 
In the reform era, villagers frequently now come to Palembang to protest in front of the governor’s office to 
complain against village heads who have sold villagers’ land to plantation companies. Several heads found 
guilty of irregular land transactions have been dismissed. (Sumatera Ekspres, 14 December 1998. Karena 
kasus tanah, 21 kades dipecat [Twenty-one village heads dismissed]. 
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amount was almost always far below the market price (harga pasar), or the price actually 
paid by the company43. 
 
Official land allocation procedures and the correct acquisition process were rarely 
followed, as there was no transparency, poor control and lack of l w enforcement. A 
situation not helped by the fact that landowners are not represented in the team designated 
to control land acquisition procedures, nor consulted in the land allocation process. Until 
very recently, they were rarely in a position to resist pressure from government officials. 
An example of how the allocation and acquisition rules can be by-passed by powerful 
interests using the ‘izin prinsip. Izin lokasi’ system is given by Gouyon (1999). [See text 
box on page 29] 
 
The necessity to develop ‘sleeping land’ (lahan tidur) or allegedly unoccupied land 
(tanah kosong, meaning ‘empty’ land), was often invoked by government to justify land 
allocation decisions. It is common for government officers, especially those not of local 
extraction, to ignore local agricultural practices such as smallholders’ ‘jungle rubber’ 
plantations and fallows; all were conveniently regarded as assimilated in to the categories 
of secondary forest or unproductive land. Government staff similarly often refuse to take 
into consideration marga customary laws which are seen - ov r-hastily - as belonging to 
the past. 
 
In the forestry sector, local officers acknowledge that in practice the release of Forest Land 
is not planned but is based simply on the demand from large land users. As  result, forest 
conversion is chaotic and often manipulated for corrupt purposes44. 
 
Land management policies favour deforestation and forest conversion 
 
To a large extent, the fires are the unforeseen result of deliberate policies that favoured 
deforestation and forest conversion. Such a ‘logic of fire’ is obvious in the case of the 
large-scale forest fires that ravaged the coastal swamp (including peat swamp) forests and 
the remaining dryland forest in northern MUBA. As succinctly expressed by Schindler 
(1998), “When logging companies enter into a new area, they automatically bring with 
them the fire problem”.  
 
Specific forestry policies that contributed to deforestation have been reviewed by several 
authors (in particular by Dauvergne, 1994; Durand, 1994; Sunderlin and Resosudarmo, 
1996). At heart, no, or minimal, incentive was provided for sustainable forest 
management45 and lenient enforcement of regulations allowed major over-cutting46. 
 
                                                       
43 See also, Sumatera Ekspres, 4 November 1998. Kenapa kasus tanah di Sumsel menonjol? [Why so many 
noticeable land conflicts in South Sumatra ?]. Sriwijaya Pos, 10 April 1999 (A. Rifai). Masalah pertanahan 
di Sumsel. [Agrarian issues in South Sumatra]. 
 
44 Also mentioned by Schweitelm (1998) 
 
 
45 The duration of the lease given to forest concessionaires was only 20 years, i.e. less than the 35 years 
regeneration cycle intended under the ‘selective cutting silvicultural system’ supposedly supported by 
government, and much less than the true time actually needed for sustainable management, estimated by 
FAO (1990) to be about 60 years.
 
46 “Of the order of twice the likely annual allowable cut” (NRI/DFID, 1998). 
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Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that ‘fire follows th  chainsaw’ in forest 
concessions where two decades of abusive and uncontrolled logging have greatly disturbed 
the forest47. In prolonged dry periods the accumulation of fuelwood and the opening of the 
canopy create an easily flammable understorey. This situation is even worse in the fragile 
peat swamp forest ecosystem. 
 
Many incentives were provided to forest concessionaires to encourage the planting of 
large-scale industrial timber and pulp plantations (HTI) of fast-growing species. These 
included interest-free loans, low land-taxes, and right to clear- ut and sell remaining trees 
(Potter and Lee, 1998). The high fire risks in HTI during clearing and in the first years of 
plantation establishment were not sufficiently taken into account. 
 
Fire-risks were increased where transmigration sites were sited within or close to logged-
over forest. Large-scale mechanical clearing up to two years before the arrival of 
transmigrants, allowed alang-alang grassland to take hold over extensive areas. Drainage 
to reclaim swamps in tidal transmigration sites made adjacent swamp forests more prone to 
drought and fire. 
 
Local fire-risks were also increased owing to the failure of forestry services to take into 
account the land-use objectives of local communities. Re-greening and reforestation 
programmes were imposed on farmers who later let burn or burnt the plantations. 
 
The fiscal system also acts as an incentive for local government to convert forest lands to 
agriculture. Agricultural land is subject to direct taxation by provincial and district 
government, whereas the majority of forest revenues are collected by the Ministry of 
Forestry and Estate Crops and only a small part is redistributed to provincial and lower 
levels of government48. 
 
‘Development at all costs’ orientated policies 
 
Objectives given in the Five-Year Development Plans (REPELITA) are focused on 
improving macro-economic indicators. It is thus essential for the provincial governments to 
attract sufficient investment to reach the targeted growth rate in their provinces. 
‘Development’ is generally read as “Rapid economic development at all costs” (Potter and 
Lee, 1998). In consequence, provincial government officials sided with the investors in 
their effort to attract investors and to favour the creation of large-scale development 
schemes. Their private and corporate interests prevailed over social and environmental 
development in the both short- and long-term. 
 
The abuses and limits of such policies are clearly on-vi w in the expansion of estates and 
pulp plantations in South Sumatra since the late eighties. As a rule, government officials 
and security forces defended the rights newly granted to large landholders (HTI and oil 
palm plantations) rather than those of local people. And, if necessary, used intimidation 
and force49 to uphold these ‘rights’. Smallholders who objected to the release of their lands 
were viewed as opposed to the national development and as threats to national stability 
and security. 
                                                       
47 STREK data from Berau, East Kalimantan, suggest that conventional logging dam ges 48 percent of the 
trees (Bertault and Sixt, 1995). 
 
48 Allocation of forest royalties in 1989: Central Government 10.7 percent; Province 13.4 percent; District 
11.3 percent, Ministry of Forestry 64.6 percent (Mubariq Ahmad, 1992). 
 
49 Land ownership and compensation disputes between rural people and plantation companies lead both 
parties to burn crops and trees. In the new reform era, further acts of sabotage have started to appear. 
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Links between Business and the Political Elite Inf u nce Land 
Management 
 
There are numerous examples of connections between the national elite and forestry 
businesses. Many forest concessions (HPH and HPHTI) were granted to well-connected 
business groups. Business associations, such as the powerful Indonesian Plywood 
Association (APKINDO), tycoons of the timber industry and other dominant private 
interests have strongly influenced the formulation of forestry policy (Jemadu, 1997).The 
short-term economic interests of a business and political elite over-rode nvironmental 
concerns, while forestry policy favoured rapid exploitation of the forests and their 
conversion to other uses. Collusion of officials with business contributed to deforestation 
and increased fire-r sk. The environmental and social costs were borne by local 
communities and ultimately by society as a whole.  
 
 
Lack of Counter-Powers from Civil Society 
 
Lack of representative institutions at the community level  
 
Local communities were systematically kept in a weak position in their relationship with 
officials and large landholders.  
 
Since the abolishment of the comparatively democratic marga system in 1983, the 
governmental institutions at the village level, mainly vested in the head of the village, are 
often not representative of villagers’ spirations. Formal adatinstitutions, enacted by the 
governor’s decision in 1988, are insubstantial owing to a lack of prerogatives. Although 
the marga spirit survives informally, it is not embodied in any institution. 
 
Farmers groups (kelompok tani) - sometimes formed around local leaders - unit d in their 
struggle against large landholders and corrupt heads of village, are gaining a new influence 
in the reform era. A local network of such groups50 now claims 10 000 members in South 
Sumatra. 
 
Non-Governmental Organisations 
 
Two NGOs that assist farmers with land-rights issues are playing a significant role in South 
Sumatra in raising awareness about fire related problems.  
  
The Palembang Legal Aid Bureau (LBH) provides legal assistance to farmers groups who 
claim for their rights over land seized by large landholders. A census of land conflicts in the 
province, prepared by LBH and listing 136 cases in October 1998, was instrumental in the 
recognition of land conflicts by local officials, including by the governor himself who 
decided (6 October 1998) to institute the formation of a Fact-Finding Team on Land 
Conflicts. 
                                                       
50 KSKP (Kelompok Solidaritas Kesajahheraan Petani - Solidarity Group for Farmers Welfare) 
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Izin Prinsip, Izin Lokasi: Fast Land Acquisition 
Anne Gouyon 
 
The granting of an HGU on areas above 200 ha is in the hands of the National Land Agency, 
below 200 ha with the Provincial Office. The process in theory takes into account environment 
conservation, regional planning and existing rights. The application is reviewed by a committee 
that includes the local land officials and the local authorities at sub-dis rict (camat) and village 
(kepala desa) level. The application can only succeed after the committee has reviewed the land 
history, existing rights, and the conformity of the proposed development to land-use plans and 
policies (World Bank, 1991). 
 
If the procedure were followed, time and costs become important considerations. Land survey 
and the checking of the history and status of each sector requires considerable practical abilities 
as well as the capacity to successfully discuss and negotiate with local communities –
impossible unless mutual trust is established over time. The full HGU process can easily take 
several years. 
 
To bypass the process, corporations and government made ample use of procedures that regulate 
what happens before the HGU is issued. A corporation must first apply for an izin rinsip (a 
provisional rights permit). This grants the right to survey the land and make development plans.
 
The izin prinsip is granted by the district government, and its holder can apply for a land 
reserve right (pencadangan tanah). The next step is to obtain the zin lokasi that enables a 
corporation to start planting without having necessarily met the requirements of an HGU.  
 
As noted by Boehmer (1998), this system gives a developer the monopolistic right to purchase 
land. Although government regulations also stipulate rights for landowners who refuse to sell 
their land to such permit holders, in practice developers and local officials pressure owners to 
release their land at below-market prices, especially if they do not hold an official title. 
 
The power to grant izin lokasi was shifted from the regional to the national government in 1993 
as part of a deregulation package [Pakto 1993] meant to ease foreign investment. The change 
allowed corporations backed by central government to obtain land permits in Jakarta with little 
involvement of the local authorities. The system has led to many abuses: development of land 
despite contrary environmental regulations (e.g, planting oil palm on steep slopes without 
terracing), and the unfair expropriation of land from local people are now commonplace.  
 
In many cases the land granted to a company under izi  prinsip is much larger than the land 
actually developed. Many corporations have then used their permits as collateral for bank loans 
spent on other projects, while retaining their monopoly right over the original land. According 
to a recent evaluation by the National Development Planning Bureau (BAPPENAS), of the 2.9 
M ha under izin lokasi nationwide, only 470 000 ha (16 percent) has been developed. The total 
land reserved for large private plantation companies in 1997 in South Sumatra was 876 000 ha 
- only 180 000 ha with  full HGU - of which  240 000 ha were planted (Map 3).  
 
The izin prinsip / izin lokasi system was suspended in 1998 when the government froze the 
granting of new permits and started to review existing grants. The permits of a few companies 
that did not meet development regula ions were revoked. The granting of iz  lokasi reverted to 
regional governments in May 1999 in anticipation of local autonomy. Whether this will lead to 
a wiser use of land resources depends on the accountability of the administrators to the local 
citizens. 
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The South Sumatra wing of the national Indonesian Forum for Environment (WALHI), 
was established in the early nineties. The organisation is active in raising awareness on 
environmental questions, particularly on forestry and fire issues. It supports farmer’s 
interests in conflicts over land- and forest-rights. In 1998, both organisations took legal 
action against eleven forest concessionair . (see box on the next page).   
 
 
 
A Time of Change 
 
As recognised by Sunderlin (1998), changes that are underway as a result of the economic 
crisis and the policy reform will have a, “Profound influence on the forest sector and on 
land use in general”. 
  
§ Increased pressure for conversion of forest lands to agriculture will lead to additional 
land clearance and will increase the risks of fire in at least the short-term.  
§ But in the long-term policy reform is likely to aid fire prevention if the intended 
objectives that include greater recognition of the rights of local people and 
transparency in the decision-making process are achieved. 
 
The forestry sector is, “In a period of dramatic change and fluidity”. The policies of the 
Ministry of Forestry and Estate Crops are now focused on encouraging the growth of 
small and medium-scale enterprises, control of monopolies / oligopolies, trying to reduce 
corruption through greater public sector transparency and accountability, and on 
government decentralisation (NRI/ DFID, 1998)51. 
 
Many people expect that the present double administrative structure will be simplified 
under a reformed system and that the Kanwil offices will disappear while Dinas offices take 
on a greater role. This would clarify responsibilities and enhance coordination between 
agencies. 
 
                                                       
 
51 “Until there is a sea-ch nge in the operation of the Kanwil and Dinas, and a willingness to accept real 
responsibility the changes at the center could still end as rhetoric.” (DFID/NRI, 1998) 
 
 
A case of legal action against logging concessionaires 
suspected of being responsible for fires in South Sumatra 
 
“Early in 1998, the South Sumatra branch of The Indonesian Forum for Environment 
(WALHI) took legal action against 11 forest concessionaires suspected of burning 
forest between September and November 1997. This was one of the first cases brought 
under the new Environmental Management Act (No 22 1997)”1 1. 
 
“In its ruling of 17 October 1998, the Palembang District Court found two companies 
(PT. MHP pulp-wood plantation and logging company PT. Inti Remaja Concern) 
guilty of negligence that led to forest fires, and ordered them to prevent forest fires 
from happening again. WALHI’s demand for US $256 millions in compensation for 
the losses was not met.” (Jakarta Post, 20 October 1998. Two firms blamed for forest 
fires.) 
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But the reforms face resistance from the forest state bureaucracy. There is a real risk that 
the new policies will remain simply ‘paper policies’ if they are not supported by concrete 
political and attitudinal change52. 
 
The provision of greater responsibilities to provincial and district authorities may bring 
positive change if accompanied with greater transparency and accountability53. More 
decentralised decision-making is not in itself a guarantee of more effective land 
management, but it should allow local conditions and the needs of local people to be better 
taken into account. 
 
The recent change in political climate has allowed greater freedom of expression. Foremost 
among topics of concern voiced by village communities in South Sumatra are conflicts that 
centre on land issues and, to a lesser extent, on rights to forest resources. 
 
With the political uncertainties and in the degraded social situation, local government 
officials and security forces are less able to control access to land and forest resources. 
‘Free access’ to forest lands is starting to be a reality in some regions. The resultant 
increase in land clearance and illegal logging is leading to an enlargement of fire-prone 
areas. 
 
In line with the reform policy, and to prevent new conflicts, the governor of South 
Sumatra (appointed in August 1998) has adopted a new stance and emphasizes the need to 
halt the growth of estate plantations presently pushed through to the detriment of 
smallholders. He urges companies to do their best to solve the most pressing land disputes. 
But he insists that South Sumatra still needs investors to develop 2 Mha of land available 
for agriculture and plantations54.  
 
Conflicts are likely to increase unless durable solutions are found to the land tenure 
problems: the implications for fire prevention efforts are obvious. 
 
The future of logged-over concessions must be a major concern of the forestry and land-
use planning sectors in South Sumatra. Fire-risks are particularly high in these Forest 
Lands that are: (i) often heavily degraded or even devoid of forest cover; (ii) already 
locally burned, or; (iii) de facto converted to agriculture. The danger of fire can be 
exacerbated or mitigated depending of the decisions to be taken about their future 
management.  
 
                                                       
52 “Implementation of these policies may lead to modest improvement in the management and forest 
conservation practices of some concessionaires. However, it is difficult to imagine how these reforms will 
modify in any meaningful way the incentives that currently promote over-harvesting and that m intain past 
patterns of destructive logging practices.” (Sunderlin, 1998)  
 
53 First steps for decentralized decision-making have been taken in the land allocation process for 
plantations. According to the recent regulation of the State Minister for Agrarian Af airs / Head of the 
National Land Agency (Kepmen Agraria/Kepala BPN No.2/1999), the Heads of Districts now have the 
authority to grant location permits for plantations (izin l kasi). The specified fees will go to the local 
government budget (p ndapat n asli daerah). 
 
54 Sriwijaya Pos, 14 January 1999. Sumsel masih membutuhkan investor [Sou h Sumatra still needs 
investors]. The governor was quoted as saying, “... Di bidang pertanian dan perkebunan saja masih 
tersedia 2 juta hektare lahan yang masih mebutuhkan investor untuk menggarapnya.” 
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Logging will continue beyond 1999 in only three or four of the nine private concessions55. 
The management of former logging concessions is taken over by the parastatal company 
Inhutani V that already has charge of more than half of the 1.7 M ha of logging 
concessions. These include concession areas transitionally placed under its responsibility as 
well as some 250 000 ha of timber plantation concession with less than 10 000 ha planted. 
(Table AV.3)  
 
How the long term risks of fire will be taken into account in the future decision-making 
processes for land management is of the highest importance. If, as in the past, they are 
ignored, fires will continue unabated in numbers and severity. 
                                                       
55 Underlining the fact that the forest logging concessions have made little contribution to the local economy 
and destroyed the forests of South Sumatra, the governor (14 August 1999) decided not to extend the period 
of four logging concessions scheduled to the end of 1999, and stopped the issuance of new licences. 
“Selama ini Pemda hampir tak pernah merasakan manfaat keberadaan HPH itu, yang ada hanya 
kerugikan berupa kehilangan kayu dan gundulnya kawasan hutan.” (Sriwijay  Pos, 16 August 1999. 
Pemda Stop Izin HPH [Local government stops granting forest logging concession rights]. 
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4. RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
 
A top-down bureaucratic approach to fire 
management that concentrates on fire suppression 
will be almost as useless in the field during the 
next el Niño as it was in 199756. 
 
Fire-prone areas are expanding, in the main 
because of continued forest degradation in the 
swamps, and the cost of fire damage and of fire 
management is bound to increase over the years if 
nothing is done to stop the process of land 
degradation. Yet, this situation is not a fate. The 
decline can be halted and trends can be reversed 
if land management decision-making processes 
and policies are amended to take into account the 
needs of local people in a more equitable way and 
to integrate fire prevention in to land-use 
planning. This should be the priority for long-
term fire prevention. See also, Byron and 
Shepherd (1998), Dennis (1998), Abdul Malik 
(1999), Chandrasekraran (1999), Fox (1999), 
Sayer (1999) and Schweithelm (1999, 1999a). 
 
 
It is essential that the design of fire prevention and control projects takes into account the 
perceptions of the stakeholders. There is a risk of inconsistency between the stated project 
objectives and the realities of what is either desirable or feasible in the field, if the 
objectives are over-influenced by Jakarta-based or international views.  
 
The perceptions of the fires in South Sumatra differ widely depending on whether the 
stakeholder lives in a western country, Singapore, or Jakarta. The respective concerns may 
be: carbon emission and global warming; smoke haze and; a cause of reproach from 
neighbouring countries, or a new opportunity to share grants from foreign assistance (See 
box on next page).  
 
Perceptions at field level are completely different. Farmers see wildfires as a threat to 
welfare as they may destroy their smallholding but there is also a fatalistic acceptance of 
their regular recurrence. In the coastal swamps sonor rice cultivation is viewed first and 
foremost as a potential source of income during a prolonged dry season, and not as a 
possible cause of wildfire and cross-boundary smoke haze. South Sumatra people are as a 
whole more directly concerned about drought and water or food shortage in el Niño years 
than in fire damage and related smoke haze problems.  
 
Land-use, and the use of renewable resources in general - with their direct and associated 
fire risks - are shaped by local perceptions. These local views on the use of natural 
resources vary from place to place, but in most cases local perceptions are in-lin  with a 
wise management. They could well be used to serve national and international as well as 
local fire prevention goals.  
                                                       
56 See MoE / UNDP (1998). Forest and Land Fires in Indonesia. Volume 1: Impacts, factors and evaluation. 
page 107. 
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Differing Views On Fires 
                                                                                                        
Level Major concerns about fires Priority areas for fire 
management in Indonesia 
World Loss of biodiversity,  
Carbon release (climate change) 
Primary forests,  
Swamp* areas 
Region  
(Singapore- Malaysia) 
Haze pollution 
(public health, transport) 
Swamp* areas in Sumatra 
eastern coast, Central and West 
Kalimantan 
Country 
Central government of 
Indonesia 
Threats to 
- International relations 
- Economic development 
(agriculture, forestry, transport, 
tourism) 
- Public health 
Sumatra 
Kalimantan 
Province 
Provincial authorities of South 
Sumatra (Jambi, Riau, 
Lampung) 
Wildfires as a threat to 
economic development 
Coastal swamps 
- degraded forests 
- grasslands 
Drylands 
- degraded forests 
- plantations 
District 
(kabupaten) 
as above as above 
Sub-district 
(kecamatan) 
as above as above 
Village Wildfires as a threat to 
plantations 
 
 
 * including peat swamp 
 
 
Shortcomings and outright failures in many sectors over the last twenty years have 
contributed to the number and severity of the vegetation fires throughout Indonesia. 
Wholly inadequate land management policies have been much to blame. If there is to b  
any improvement, then there must first be a genuine will, followed by rapid and decisive 
action to integrate fire prevention in to all decisions and activities that relate to land 
management. We see four principle steps as required to achieve this goal. 
 
1. Support to village level institutions for land-management planning and fire prevention; 
 
2. Develop mediation mechanisms to prevent and to solve conflicts related to land-use 
and land management; 
 
3. Strengthen the capacity of the key land management gencies at provincial and district 
levels, and; 
 
4. Prepare a fire management plan that limits fire risks in the coastal wetlands.  
 
These four general recommendations are based on field-work in South Sumatra province. 
They are however, much more widelyapplicable and could be implemented with benefit 
throughout Indonesia. The same holds true of the majority of more specific 
recommendations that fellow. Only those that relate to the cultivation of sonor rice have a 
more restricted geographical applicability.    
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Land Management and Fire Prevention at the Village Level 
 
Village communities must be fully recognised as the dominant level in land management 
and fire prevention decision making. In most cases, the village is the only level where 
control and accountability for the use of natural resources are workable and where fire 
prevention, detection and suppression, are physically possible. 
 
Cooperation between these village communities and the many other stakeholders 
(government administration, private or prastatal companies) is a prerequisite if land 
management and fire prevention is to be effective. This collaboration can not merely be 
called for only when fire problems arise. Neither can it be achieved by the creation of ‘co-
operatives’ instigated from ‘the top’. It requires the participation of village communities in 
all decisions and at all times about the use of the indigenous natural resources. In this 
context, village (or inter-village) land management means that village stakeholders 
participate in the definition of objectives and in the design of the village land management 
plan, including consensus boundary setting. 
 
Local NGOs assisted by Donor Project are probably best-placed to support the creation of 
village institutions, and strengthen existing one , such as farmers groups, active in village 
land management and thus, in fire prevention.  
 
There is aneed to increase the awareness of local people not only about their land rights 
and about the options offered to them, but also about their duties in fir  prevention.
 
The current development of farmers’ groups (KSKP), the revival of the adat gr ups, and 
the increasing activity of provincial NGOs, whose role is becoming more commonly 
accepted by local authorities, offer a positive environment in which to start ‘bottom-up 
land-use planning’. 
 
 
Mediation Processes for Land Co-management 
 
The co-management of land between local communities, the state and private companies 
will entail a revision of the boundaries of state forest lands at village level. Medi tion 
procedures for consensus boundary setting need to be developed and tested in cooperation 
with BIPHUT and BAPPEDA II.
 
There is also a need to improve mechanisms to consult communities when decisions on 
land allocation are being taken by local government. As suggested by Potter and Lee 
(1998) intermediaries, including NGOs, should ensure that holders of large parcels of land 
engage in transparent discussions with people living in the area and that the system finally 
put in place is supported by the communities. (See also Gouyon, 1999). 
 
 
Land Management at the Provincial and District Levels 
 
As underlined in Chapter 3, significant benefits for fire prevention can be achieved by 
ensuring: 
 
§ that fire risks are taken into consideration in land-use planning and in the land 
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allocation process at provincial and district levels, [These include risks such as those 
linked to a particular environment (e.g. peat swamps, degraded forests, young 
plantations), those involved in large-sc le change in land use, and those caused by 
particular agricultural practice (e.g. sonor rice cultivation)]  
 
§ a fair balance is observed between regional development objectives and the 
development priorities of communities, with this comes there is a greater transparency 
in the land-use decision-making process, and  
 
§ there is greater coordination between land management agencies, most notably the 
integration of forestry sector planning into regional planning.  
 
The realisation of these objectives largely depends on greater political will and much 
needed policy changes. But it is also conditional on strengthened capacities and expertise 
at local level, and on the availability and then wise-us  of accurate information. If the gap 
between policy as elaborated in Jakarta and the reality as exp rienced in the field is not 
bridged, there is a great risk that the reform process will abort or that the hastily 
implemented field programmes will perform poorly. Either outcome would lead to even 
greater distrust from provincial communities. 
 
Our research shows that in South Sumatra, specific attention should be given to three 
courses of action. 
 
n Strengthening BAPPEDA’s land-use planning capacity.  
 
Discussions need to be held with BAPPEDA, BPN, BIPHUT / MoFEC to identify the 
most appropriate means to strengthen land-use planning capacity and thereby to ensure 
proper integration of fire risks into land-use planning in the province. 
 
This will involve the provision of staff and training and the setting up of a provincial land-
management data-centre at BAPPEDA that can map fire-risks (in particular the production 
of maps that identify peat areas). It is of major importance that the information produced 
by BAPPEDA is disseminated in a format that is appropriate to the needs of the users: 
over-complex information remains unused. (See also Schindler, 1999). 
 
Priority should be given to integrating fire-risks into spatial plans for the Districts: 
especially those for OKI and MUBA that have large swamp regions. 
 
BAPPEDA land-use planning models have been promoted in 18 provinces but not yet in 
Sumatra. As recommended by Scott and Lusli (1998), discussions should be held with the 
Directorate General of Planning Development (BANGDA). The aim would be to ‘fast-
track’ the implementation of land-zoni g and semi-detailed land-use planning that takes 
account of fire risk. 
 
 
n The integration of forestry planning into the provincial planning framework. 
 
Every effort must be made to enhance the integration of the forestry sector into the 
provincial planning process under BAPPEDA. The need to make the IFRIS data-base 
more appropriate to the requirements for good regional planning has been voiced by Scott 
and Lusli (1998). The same authors also suggest that the Land-Use Planning Units to be 
established within MoFEC should be located at provincial level, i.e. with sub-BIPHUT 
rather than with BIPHUT, and that the approach to land-use planning should follow that of 
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BAPPEDA. 
 
n Supporting extension staff in their work on participatory management of land and 
forest resources. 
 
A most serious crisis of confidence exists among forestry extension workers who are ill-
prepared to fill the new roles they are expected to play. Under the decentralisation policy, 
there is ample scope to strengthen the Forestry Extension Services by training agents in 
genuine participatory approaches. There is also a need to support the integration of the 
Service with other rural development activities carried out by the Agriculture and Estate 
Crops Extension services, and to develop links with NGOs. 
 
The Coastal Swamp Regions of OKI and MUBA Districts 
 
The coastal swamps that lie within the two districts are already degraded and under 
imminent threat of complete destruction. Urgent action is needed to: 
 
n Limit the risk of recurrent peat fires linked to sonor rice cultivation in el Niño years. 
 
A total ban on sonor rice cultivation is unrealistic, but ways to initiate control and to 
reduce the magnitude of sonor fires are possible. 
 
§ Promote awareness of the ‘sonor  - fire’ link to enhance support and involvement. 
Target groups are: provincial and local governments to ensure political support; 
agriculture agencies to stimulate involvement; informal and formal leaders who 
organise and sponsor sonor activities, and; local communities. 
 
§ Identify key agencies to ensure that sonor cultivation and associated activities are 
monitored and coordinated within the agriculture services. (Dinas Pertanian, the 
network of agriculture extension workers, BIMAS57, etc.) and other local government 
agencies (e.g. BAPPEDA at District level58). 
 
§ Provide support to map the occurrence of fires in sonor areas - using 1997 and future 
NOAA data from ENSO years in conjunction with field checks. 
 
§ Identify those areas where sonor can be practised with a limited risk of fire escape and 
areas those where the practice should be prohibited, i.e on lands adjacent to deep peat. 
 
§ Establish a network of informal leaders who are involved in sonor activities. 
 
§ Support initiatives to develop alternativ  cultivation methods, e.g. permanent wet-rice 
cultivation. 
 
n Prepare a fire management plan for the coastal swamp region. 
 
                                                       
57 Discussions with the Secretary of BIMAS (Agricultural Credit and Marketing Service) indicated that 
BIMAS - directly responsible to the governor and involved in organizing the transport of arvested sonor
rice - may be able to play a role in coordinating efforts to control sonor activities. 
 
58 BAPPEDA Tk. II OKI has recently attempted to produce a tentative map of sonor reas based on 
information provided by agricultural extension workers. 
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The uncontrolled logging of, and ill-planned drainage in, the coastal peat swamp region 
promote large-scale fires. It is recommended that: 
 
§ A specific fire management plan is drawn-up s a matter of urgency for the last 
remnants of peat and non-peat swamp forests in good condition that remain in the 
southern part of Sumatra59. The plan should integrate both conservati  objectives and 
the needs of local communities. The area in need of conservation is located in the 
logging concessions adjacent to the proposed Sungai Sembilang National Park 
(currently 156 000 ha, mostly mangrove forest). 
 
§ Fire prevention measures in the planned HPHTI plantation on drained peat swamp are 
carefully re-assessed and strengthened. 
 
The dangers of embarking on rehabilitation programmes in burned forest concessions 
without taking into consideration the reasons that underlie the causes of the original 
wildfires are stressed. In both swamp and in dryland areas rehabilitation programmes that 
do not answer the short- and long-term needs (in particular land- ights) of the people are 
doomed to be destroyed by fire. This is particularly true in the new cl mat  of ‘reformasi’ 
and the upsurge in claims on land and natural resources. 
                                                       
59 Including 49 000 ha formerly included in Terusan Dalam Nature Reserve which were excised in 1988 and 
granted to forest concessions PT. Sukses Sumatera Timber currently co-managed by Inhutani V and PT. 
Riwayat Musi Corp. 
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6. ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
 
 
BAL   Basic Agrarian law 
BAPEDAL Badan Pengendalian Dampak Lingkungan (National Board for Environmental 
Impact Management)  
BAPEDALDA    Badan Pengendalian Dampak Lingkungan Daerah (Regional Board for 
Environmental Impact Management)  
BAPPEDA Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah  (Regional Development Planning 
Board) 
BAPPENAS Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (National Development Planning 
Board) 
BFL      Basic Forestry Law (Undang-U dang Pokok Kehutanan) 
BIMAS Bimbingan Masyarakat ( Agricultural Credit and Marketing Service)  
BIPHUT Balai Inventarisasi dan Pemetaan Hutan (Forest Inventory and Mapping Office ) 
BPN   Badan Pertanahan Nasional  (National Land Agency) 
BPS   Biro Pusat Statistik (Central Statistical Office) 
Bupati      Head of kabupaten (District) 
Camat     Head of kecamatan (sub-District) 
CDK Cabang Dinas Kehutanan (Regional Forestry Service on destrict level) 
CIFOR   Center for International Forestry Research 
Desa       Administrative village unit, sub-division of rural sub-districts 
Dinas      Service  Departements at Province level or below   
DPRD I        Provincial Assembly of People Representatives (Legislative Council) 
DPRD II       District Assembly of People Representatives 
ENSO   El Niño-Southern Oscillation 
EUFREG  European Union Fire Response Group
FAO       Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
FIMP Forest Inventory and Monitoring Project (European Union Project) 
GIS   Geographic Information System 
Hak Milik   Right to full ownership of land 
Hak Pakai  Right to use land  
HGU      Hak Guna Usaha (Right of exploitation) 
HPH   Hak Pengusahaan Hutan (Forest Concession Right) 
HPHTI Hak Pengusahaan Hutan dan Tanaman Industri (Utilisation Right for Industrial 
Forest Plantation) 
HTI  Hak Pengusahaan Hutan Tanaman Industri (Industrial Forest Plantation) 
IMF   International Monetary Fund 
INTAG Direktorat Jenderal Inventarisasi dan Tata Guna Hutan (Directorate General of 
Forest Inventory and Land Use) 
IFRIS Indonesia Forest Resource Information System 
IPK       Izin Pemanfaatan Kayu (Timber usage licenses)
Kabupaten     District 
Kades   Kepala Desa (Village head) 
Kantor Pertanahan     Land Office at city/district level
Kanwil   Kantor Wilayah (Regional Office) 
Kepmen  Keputusan Menteri (Ministerial Decree)  
Kpts      Keputusan (Decree) 
Marga Clan settled over a defined territory,  also the administrative village unit in use in 
South Sumatra prior the early 1980s 
MoE       Ministry of Environment 
MoF       Ministry of Forestry (before May 1998)  
MoFEC  Ministry of Forestry and Estate Crops (since May 1998) 
MPR             People's Consultative Assembly 
MUBA  Musi Banyuasin (name of a District in South Sumatra)
MURA  Musi Rawas District 
NES     Nucleus Estate and Smallholder scheme 
NGO   Non-Government Organization 
OKI     Ogan Komering Ilir (name of a District n South Sumatra) 
PHPA  Perlindungan Hutan dan Pelestarian Alam (Forest Protection and Nature 
Conservation, Department of the MoFEC)  
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PIR or PIR-Bun Perusahaan Inti Rakyat Perkebunan (a package program specifically intended to 
develop the potential of smallholders) 
PMDH Pembinaan Masyarakat Desa Hutan (Community Development of Forest Village)  
PP      Peraturan Pemerintah (Government regulation) 
PPL     Penyuluh Pertanian Lapangan (Field Extension agents of MoA) 
PSDA  Provisi Sumber Daya Alam (National F rest Resource Contribution) 
PSDH      Provisi Sumber Daya Hutan 
PT.      Perseroan Terbatas (Limited Liability Company) 
RRL      Land Rehabilitation and Soil Conservation 
RSTRP Rencana Struktur Tata Ruang Propinsi (Provincial Structure Map) 
RSTWP  Rencana Tata Ruang Wilayah Propinsi (Provincial Spatial Plan) 
RTRWK  Rencana Tata Ruang Wilayah Kabupaten (District spatial plan map) 
RTRWP Rencana Tata Ruang Wilayah Propinsi (Provincial spatial plan map) 
SK      Surat Keputusan (Decision Letter) 
TGHK       Tata Guna Hutan Kesepakatan (The Forest Land Use Plan) 
TJTI  Tebang Jalur Tanam Indonesia (logging and planting system with use of strip 
clearings) 
UNDP   United Nations Development Programme  
UU   Undang-Undang (Laws) 
UUPA      Undang-Undang Pokok Agraria (Basic Agrarian Law) 
WALHI  Indonesian Environmental Forum 
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Annex I:  NATIONAL AND REGIONAL LAND 
MANAGEMENT  INSTITUTIONS  
 
 
Planning in all sectors is directly and tightly controlled by the President.
 
The Ministry of State for National Development Planning 
 
The principal duties of the Ministry of State for 
National Development Planning are based on 
Presidential Decree No. 44/1993 that deals with the 
position, main duties, functions, organizational 
structure and the working organization of all 
Ministers of State. The Ministry formulates national 
development planning policies and coordinates the 
planning activities of all government institutions 
within a comprehensive framework of programme 
implementation.   
 
The Ministry is specifically charged with coordinating the activities of the National 
Statistics Bureau (BPS) and the National Coordinating Agency for Survey and Mapping 
(BAKOSURTANAL) as they relate to national development planning. The activities of the 
National Development Planning Board ( APPENAS) are also supervised and monitored 
by the Ministry. 
 
 
The National Development Planning Board, BAPPENAS 
 
The functions of BAPPENAS are laid out in Presidential Decree No. 35/1973, as variously 
amended in Presidential Decree No. 19/1983, Presidential Decr e No. 7/1988, and No. 
73/1993.  
 
In essence it is the duty of BAPPENAS is to formulate short-medium-and long-term 
national development plans. The Board in agreement with the Ministry of Finance also has
to harmonize sectoral and regional proposal lans and then reconcile these with the State 
Budget.  Policies that guide the receipt and use of foreign loans and assistance are also 
made by BAPPENAS. Further information can be found on 
http://www.bappenas.go.id/html 
 
 
The Regional Development Planning Board, BAPPEDA 
 
The regional wing of BAPPENAS is the Provincial Development Planning Board 
(BAPPEDA) that operates under the control of the governors of the various provinces. 
BAPPEDA issues directives on land allocation (e.g. for forestry, agriculture, mining, etc) 
in line with its provincial spatial planning function.  
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The National Land Agency, BPN 
 
The President is assisted in his control of land matters by the National Land Agency (BPN) 
which answers to the President and the State Ministry of Agrarian A fairs. The State 
Minister of Agrarian Affairs is appointed by the President and receives from him 
instructions in land policy matters (Presidential Decree No. 44/1993). The State Minister is 
also automatically the head of BPN, and is a member of BAPPENAS.
 
The Ministry coordinates agrarian policy formulated by BPN who is in charge of land 
registration, cadastral surveys, land measurement, land-use mapping, land certification and 
the granting of land. 
 
At the provincial level, Kanwil BPN is under the Governor (operating within the de-
centralized system) and is divided in four sections that deal with land ownership, land-use 
planning, land-rights, and land measurement and registration. Kanwil BPN is assisted at the 
district level by Land Offices (Kantor Per anahan). 
 
 
The Ministry of Forestry and Estate Crops, MoFEC 
 
The Ministry of Forestry and Estate Crops controls 70 percent of the country’s land and 
thus has great potential influence on the prevention and management of vegetation fires. 
The Ministry is divided in to five Directorates-General, (i) Forest Utilization, (ii) 
Reforestation and Land Rehabilitation, (iii) Inventory and Land-Use Plan ing,  (iv) Forest 
Protection and Nature Conservation, and (v) Estate Crops, together with a Secretariat-
General and an Inspectorate-General. 
 
The State-Owned Forest Enterprises Inhutani also lie within MoFEC. There are six, each 
of which operates in a different province or provinces: Inhutani I, East Kalimantan; II, 
West Kalimantan; III, Central Kalimantan; IV, Aceh, Riau, West Sumatra and North 
Sumatra; V, Jambi, South Sumatra, Bengkulu and Lampung, and; VI, Sulawesi. An 
equivalent enterprise, Perum Perhutani, operates in Java. 
 
MoFEC plays two distinct roles. As the Forest Authority it is responsible for licensing 
forest exploitation and for policing the activities of the licensees. In this MoFEC has to 
enforce the New Forestry Law 1999 and be relatively inflexible, operating straightforward 
procedures and enforcing regulations without favour or discrimination. 
 
As the overseer of the Inhutani, MoFEC finds itself responsible for companies that perform 
a large number of different activities, e.g. logging, reforestation, transmigration, 
agroforestry, etc. which require efficient and flexible, but at all stages, accountable 
management. 
 
The two roles are in many ways incompatible as MoFEC is called up on to control itself. 
That it has not always done so, has had a strong negative impact on the quality of forest-
land management in Indonesia. 
 
At Province level two Forestry Offices work side by side.
 
- Kanwil Kehutanan dan Perkebunan is the provincial office of the MoFEC that is responsible for policy 
making. 
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- Dinas Kehutanan Tingkat I (Provincial Forest Services) is also under MoFEC but is responsible for the 
field implementation of policies.  
 
Dinas Perkebunan Tingkat I, the Provincial Plantation Service, also operates within the 
province as part of the decentralized system.  
 
At District (Kabupaten) level, the Forestry and Plantations Services, Dinas Kehutanan 
Tingkat II and Dinas Perkebunan Tingkat II, re under the authority of the Head of 
District. Kanwil is not represented at District level. 
 
The Provincial Government has its own budget but as between 70 and 90 percent of this is 
contributed by central government and is designated for specific purposes, there is limited 
scope for decision-making at this level. 
 
 
The Ministry of State for the Environment, BAPEDAL 
 
The Ministry of Environment has a limited remit. It formulates environment policies, e.g. 
pollution control, and is in-charge of fire prevention and disaster management.  
 
The Environmental Impact Management Agency (BAPEDAL) is directly subordinated to 
the President, and deals mainly with pollution issues, although it also has the major interest 
in fire damage and environmental rehabilitation schemes. 
 
BAPEDAL is represented at provincial level by a regional office (BAPEDALDA) that 
supports local government. In Palembang, South Sumatra, it is a new office with limited 
means. 
 
 
The Ministry of Transmigration and Forest Squatters Resettlement 
 
The Ministry of Transmigration and Forest Squatters Resettlement is powerful and 
manages large transmigration programme projects supported by the state and donors, e.g. 
the World Bank. 
 
The government gave high priority to transmigration programmes within Repelita I (1970 - 
1974), Repelita II (1975 - 1979) and Repelita IV (1985 - 1990) when hundreds of 
thousands of families a year were resettled. Current numbers are only 50 000.
 
 
The Ministry of Agriculture 
 
The main job ofthe Ministry of Agriculture is to manage the tasks of government and to 
formulate policy. It is also charged with developing production, extension and processing 
methods in the fields of general agriculture, agri-b siness, fisheries and livestock. Although 
the Directorate-G neral of Food crops and Horticulture is involved in land rehabilitation 
and land development, land management is not a major responsibility of the Ministry. 
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Institutions at Province Level 
 
 
 
 
Under the control of Ministry of Interior, he Governor and Bupati are elected respectively 
by the Regional Assembly of People Representatives (DPRD I) and the District Assembly 
of People Representatives (DPRD II). The head of District (Bupati) appoint the heads of 
sub-districts (Camat). The villagers in turn elect the head of village (Kades) among 
candidates officially designed. 
 
Deconcentration and decentralization: two overlapping systems 
 
The administrative divisions: The Republic of Indonesia is divided into 27 Regions, that 
correspond exactly to the 27 Provinces.  
 
The First Levels of the Regions (Daerah Tingkat I) are subdivided into Second Levels 
(Daerah Tingkat II). The ‘Provinces’ (Propinsi) are subdivided into Districts (Kabupaten). 
The Second Levels of the Regions and Districts (Kabupaten) also coincide perfectly.  
 
  
Bupati  
  
 
 
 
 
Province 
Hamlet 
District 
Village 
Sub-district 
Governor 
Kadus 
Bupati 
Kades 
Camat 
Organization of Regional Administration 
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The Third Level covers the same geographical area as the Sub-Di trict (Kecamatan) and forms the link 
between the Village Level and the Second Level.  
 
Since 1979, the Village Government Law Number 5 (UU 5/1979) allows the government to control villages 
whenever needed by replacing their elected village heads with appointed state staff.  
 
Below the Village Level, there is the Hamlet Level (Dusun). 
 
The Indonesian administrative structure at Regional/Province levels is characterized by  
double system, that overlaps. The Region has an autonomous administration but the 
national administration has its own line agencies inside the different administrative levels of 
the Province. Decision making processes are therefore complicated. Developm nt planning 
and investment are still highly centralized, the Government is gradually embarkly on a 
process of decentralization.  
 
Until the 1960s, the positions of Governor and Head of Region were held by two different 
people. Act 5 of 1974 defined the, ‘principles of Administration in the Regions’ and to 
integrated the two systems, (the autonomous Region and the Province), and one person 
acts simultane now ously as Head of the Region and as the Governor. The Governor is the 
administrator of the Province on behalf of the Central Government.60  
 
Deconcentration within the Province (dekonsentrasi).  Deconcentration s the delegation 
of authority from the Central Government to the Governor’s Office, and from the 
Governor’s office to the Head of District (Bupati). Governor and Bupati at their levels are 
in charge of the implementation of the laws and regulations issued by the Central 
Government. Within the deconcentration system, the Governor and the Bupati are the 
representatives of the Central Government (Ministry of Interior) at Province level and 
District (Kabupaten) level. 
 
Decentralization within the Region (desentralisasi). Decentralization is the devolution of authority from 
the Central Government to the Regional Government and also from the Regi nal Gov rnment to the District 
Government. The Regional government, as well as the District Government at its level, produces regional 
regulations and policies in coherence with the national regulations.  
 
The Regional Government has its own budget which r lies on central Government for 70 
to 90 percent of its monies. As this contribution is designated for specific purposes, 
decision-making at Provincial level is limited. 
 
Overlapping systems 
 
At Province/Region level two Forestry Offices work side by side : 
 
- Kanwil Hutanan under the Ministry of Forestry and Estates Crops (deconcentration system), is the 
Provincial MoFEC Office, responsible for policy making.
- Dinas Kehutanan Tingkat I is the Regional Forest Service and is responsible for field implementation. 
Dinas belong to the decentralized system. 
 
There is also a Dinas Perkebunan Tingkat I (Plantation Service).  
 
At District (Kabupaten) Level, both the Forestry and the Plantations Services (Di as Kehutanan Tingkat II 
and Dinas Perkebunan Tingkat II) re under the authority of the Head of District. Kanwil is not represented 
at District level. 
                                                       
60  
“Jan Michiel Otto, 1997. Implementation of environmental law: harmonisation , environment management 
and enforcement by the courts, with references to Indonesia and the Netherlands, Indonesian Journal of 
environmental law. Page 41.”  
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The similarities and diferences between the deconcentralization and the decentralization system are shown 
diagramantically on the following two pages. 
 
 
 
Sub-Distric, Kecamatan 
Bupati 
National / Jakarta 
level 
Deconcentration System 
Regional Government 
Law n°5/1974 on Regional Government 
 
Ministry of Interior 
Kantor BPN 
GOVERNOR 
(Head of Region) 
 
Kanwil Kehutanan, 
Forestry Office 
Province 
Ministry of Land Affair 
BPN 
Ministry of Forest &  
Estate Crops 
District, Kabupaten 
PRESIDENT 
Coordination Hierarchy links 
Kanwil BPN, 
Provincial Land 
Agency 
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First level - (Tingkat I, 
Province) 
BKPMD : Regional 
Coordination Investment 
Board 
Local government at second level
Local Government at First Level 
National / Jakarta level 
Decentralization System 
According the law N°5 1974 on Regional Government 
 
Regional 
Regulation 
and 
Policies 
Plantation Service  
(Dinas Perkebunan tgt I) 
Head of 
District 
(Bupati) 
 
Forestry service II 
Dinas kehutanan ;  
DPRD  II = 
Assembly second 
level  
Plantation Service II 
Dinas Perkebunan  
Ministry of  Forestry &  
Estate  Crops 
District 
Regulations 
and Policies 
PRESIDENT 
BAPPENAS 
Forestry Service 
(Dinas 
Kehutanan) 
BAPPEDA 
Second Levl 
DPRD I = 
Regional (or first 
level) assembly 
BAPPEDA 
First Level 
Head of Region 
(GOVERNOR) 
 
Ministry of Interior 
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Annex II. LEGISLATION  
 
 
AII. 1. Forms of Laws and Regulations in the Forestry Sector 
 
 
The forms of laws and regulations used to administer 
the legislation on land management and forestry issues 
are outlined with particular reference to the Basic 
Agrarian Law of 1960, and more especially to the 
Basic Forestry Law of 1967 and its replacement, the 
New Forestry Law of 1999. It should be noted that 
commercial oil palm and rubber estates are managed 
under a Plantation Business License (Izin Usaha 
Perkebunan, IUP) which is granted by either the 
minister or a province governor depending on the size 
of the area. These regulations, of which Ministerial 
Decree No. 107/Kpts-II/99 (3 March 1999) is the 
latest, are not dealt with here. 
 
 
Laws and Regulations Issued at National Level 
 
Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 are the statutes of the 1945 Constitution 
on which the laws are based.  
 
 
UUD can be implemented through decrees issued by the People's 
Consultative Assembly (Ketetapan MPR).  
 
They can also be implemented by statutory l ws (Undang-Undang) such 
as the Agrarian Law and the Basic Forestry Law which are promulgated 
jointly by the President, the People's Consultative Assembly and the 
House of Representatives. 
Government regulations (Peraturan Pemerintah) aim to implement 
statutory laws (UU). They are prepared by the executive bodies in 
Ministries, signed by the President and promulgated by the State 
Secretariat. Perpu is a government regulation to replace a regulation. 
UUD can be implemented also by a Presidential decision Keppres 
(Keputusan Presiden). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An SK (Surat Keputusan) is a decree. It can be issued by Ministers, 
who, in turn, may delegate to Directors Generals, specific regulatory 
capacity to issue decrees. These decrees are detailed documents on 
procedures.  
 
UUD 
Ketetapan MPR  
Decree MPR 
SK 
INPRES 
 
Etc.. 
UU 
PP or Perpu 
KEPPRES 
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Indonesian laws are based on the 1945 Constitution. According to the constitution, 
branches of production which are important for the State and which affect the lives of most 
people are controlled by the State and must be used for the greatest welfare of the people. 
Land, water and the natural riches therein shall be controlled by the State. Article 33 
provides the basis for state control and exploitation of resources on Forest Lands. 
Accordingly, the government manages the nation’s forests by the provisions and 
implementing regulations of the Basic Forestry Law of 1967 (Undang-Undang Pokok 
Kehutanan No. 5/1967). 
 
The procedures for rule-making within the Ministry of Forestry are defined in the Minister 
of Forestry SK No. 12/1984, ‘Guide for the preparation of laws, regulations and decisions 
in the Department of Forestry’. The Basic Forestry Law delegates authority over forest to 
the then Ministry of Forestry, now the Ministry of Forestry and Estate Crops (MoFEC).  
 
MoFEC issues SKs (Ministerial Decisions). The draft SKs are usually prepared by 
appropriate technical staff with the assistance of the Directorate’s legal staff and the 
Bureau for Legal and Organization matters (Biro Hukum dan Organisasi) which is under 
the Secretariat General. An inter-directorate or inter-departmental team is set up when an 
SK involves different Directorates or another Government Department.  
 
However, because of lack of coordination in the rule-making process, SKs may overlap or 
contradict each other. Presidential Instruction Programs (INPRES) can also overlap with 
SKs. A listing of supplementary regulations and decrees that relate to vegetation fires is 
given in the last section of this annex. 
 
Regulations Issued at Provincial Level 
 
Some SKs issued by Directorates General deleg te authority to regional forestry 
department offices (Kantor Wilayah), while others (UU and PP) may also delegate 
authority to the Province Heads who control the provincial Forestry Services (Dinas 
Kehutanan). 
 
 
AII. 2.  The Forestry Laws 
 
The 1967 Basic Forestry Law 
 
The BFL of 1967 consisted of eight chapters that covered the definition of ‘forest’, 
planning, administration, management, production, conservation and security. 
 
Article 5 defined the role of the government in forest management as, “The government 
determines the use of forests according to the interest and benefit of the state and 
population, the government determines the legal relationship between people and legal 
entities with forests”. 
 
Forest Lands (Kawasan Hutan)  
 
Article 7 was the basis for land to be registered officially as Forest Lands, i.e. as state-
controlled land. The Forest Lands are, “Special areas maintained as permanent forest by 
Ministerial Decree”. Deforested lands can be included in forest areas provided that 
reforestation is planned.  
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Permanent Forest Areas (Kawasan Hutan Tetap) 
 
The Permanent Forest originally fitted into one of has four categories: Protection Forest 
(Hutan Lindung), Production Forest (Hutan Produksi), Nature Conservation (Hutan 
Suaka Alam) or Recreation Forest (Hutan Rekreasi). Subsequent SK regulation 
established a category of Production Forest Convertible to Non-Forest Uses (Hutan 
Produksi yang dapat di Konversi).  
 
Procedures for forest land planning and classification   
 
All the procedures are top-down and the administrative approach does not allow much 
involvement of local people and populations. Regulations provide guidelines for forest 
policy and planning processes. These guidelines are divided into five steps: (i) inventory 
and survey (ii) prepaation of a general plan (iii) preparation of a forest-area boundaries-
setting plan, (iv) preparation of a forest land-u e plan, and (v) preparation of forest 
management-plans.  
 
SK 837/1980 of the Minister of Agriculture details procedures to classify Protection Forest 
areas61. The classification is based on a scoring system. Three basic factors are evaluated 
for each area: (i) slope, soil (type and erosion potential), (ii) and rainfall. A score 1 to 5 is 
given to each factor. The three figures are then weigh ed and added to give a single score 
for the area. Decisions about forest classification are made by comparing the score 
obtained again on index: if the score is over index ‘A’ the land is classified as Protection 
Forest; between ‘B’ and ‘A’ as Limited Production Forest, and; under ‘B’ as Unlimited 
Production Forest. Nature Reserves and Recreation Forests are established by following a 
separate set of technical and other criteria.  
 
In 1980 the Directorate General of Forestry initiated the process of the ‘C nsensus Forest 
Land Use Plan’ (Tata Guna Hutan Kesepakatan – TGHK). The process is a set of rules 
and guidelines to assign Forest Lands into Production, Protection, and Reserve Forest 
categories and to determine which areas are to be classified as Permanent Forest and those 
that can be converted to agricultural and other uses62. H e, the term ‘consensus’ means 
agreement among the different state agencies at the provincial and national levels, and does 
not imply the participation of the local population.  
 
A draft TGHK at province level was prepared jointly by the Provincial 
Forest Service (Dinas Kehutanan) and the Regional Forest Mapping and 
Inventory Center (BIPHUT). The draft was then discussed among all 
provincial level agencies concerned with land-use. O ce a consensus was 
reached, it was approved by the Governor and sent to Jakarta for 
approval by the Ministry of Forestry. The TGHK then became the 
official plan and a map was issued showing the delineation of all forest 
areas in the province together with those of the various sub-
classifications; it was accompanied by a supporting explanatory 
document. No village people participated.  
 
                                                       
61 The Minister of Forestry was created in 1983. Previously, forestry was a Directorate General within the 
Ministry of Agriculture. 
 
62 Charles Victor Barber ‘The Legal and Regulatory Framework for Forest’, in Ch. Zerner, ‘Legal Options 
for the Indonesian Forestry Sector’, Indonesia Forestry Sector  Development Planning Project, MoF-FAO,
1990. 
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Some limited reform was seen when the new Ministry of Forestry and Estate Crops under pressure from 
NGOs and academics issued a decree on Community Forestry (SK. 677 Hutan Kemasyarakatan) in October 
1998 to provide guidelines to allow communities to exploit their forests.  
 
The New Basic Forestry Law 1999 
 
A New Basic Forestry Law (NEW BFL) of fourteen chapters was approved by The House 
of Representatives on 15 September 1999, was signed by the President on 30 September. 
It replaces the 1967 law. 
 
Written in the context of the post-S eharto reform area, Article 2 stipulates that 
forestry implementation shall be based on equity, transparency, integration and 
sustainability. 
 
However, the new law does not modify the statute that enforces total state control over 
Forest Land: “The designated and/or established forest area based on the prevailing 
legislation rule prior to the issuance of this Act shall be considered approved and 
established as forest area based on this act. ” (Transitional Provision Article 51)  
 
 
Different articles re-affirm the state control over Forest Lands: 
 
§ “All forests, including its natural wealth, that are located in the jurisdiction of the 
Republic of Indonesia, is controlled by the state for the maximum prosperity of the 
state”. (Chapter 1, Part 3) 
 
§ “State’s control over forest resources as referred to in paragraph (1) [above] grants the 
authority to the government to: (a) regulate and take care of all issues related to 
forests, forest areas and forest products, (b) decide a status of certain areas as forest 
area or non-forest area, (c) regulate and stipulate the legal relations between man and 
forest and regulate all legal conducts pertaining to forestry”. (Chapter 1, Part 3) 
 
§ “This effort also aims to protect and to maintain the government’s rights on forest and 
its products”. (Chapter VII, Forest Protection, Article 33) 
 
§ “No one/any other parties shall be allowed to: a) cultivate and/or use and/or occupy 
illegally a forest area”. (Chapter VII Forest Protection, Article 35) 
 
§ “State forest shall mean a forest situated on a state’s land, including forests with prior 
ownership by traditional community law, namely Regional Forest, District Forest and 
many other terms. The inclusion of forest with prior ownership by traditional 
community law into State Forest is due to the consequence of ownership rights by the 
state as the top power organization of the entire community, and due to the Union 
State of the Republic of Indonesia principle”. (Clarification on the Bill of Republic of 
Indonesia Year 1999, draft) 
 
This is the same paradigm expressed in the BFL. ‘Traditional bias’ and old concepts about 
the attitude of local communities recur. “Forestry extension shall be intended to increase 
the knowledge and skill and to change the mental attitude of the communities so that they 
shall be capable to support the forestry development and be aware of the importance of 
forest resources to human life”. (Chapter IX, Education, Training and Forestry Extension, 
Article 43) 
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There also appears to be no immediate intent to resolve the problems caused by diffusion 
of function by the existence of Kanwil Kehutanan dan Perkebunan within a province, BFL 
1999 makes no stipulation and UU 22/99 regarding local Government appears to remain 
valid.  
  
The new BFL does however introduce opportunities to increase the participation of the 
local population:  
 
§ “State forest as referred to in paragraph (1) can be in the form of ‘adat forest’. (Article 
5 (2)) 
 
§ “Government stipulates forest status referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2): and adat 
forests is quaranteed as long as such traditional law is prevailing and its existence is 
officially recognised. ” (Article 5 (3))
 
§ “…when adat law is no more existing, management right shall be returned to 
government. ” (Article (4)) 
 
 
§ “Forestry plan arrangements shall be implemented based on inventory results by 
considering the community’s aspiration and the respective parties involved in forestry 
development and environmental factors.” (Chapter IV, Forestry Planning System, 
Article 21, Forestry Plan Arrangement) 
 
§ “However, the inclusion of forest with prior ownership by traditional community law 
into state forest as defined under Basic Provisions on Forestry, shall not erase the 
rights of traditional community law based on its existence to harvest forest 
yields/products. It still also has the opportunity to obtain the Rights of Forest 
Utilization or Rights of F rest Yields Harvesting” (Clarification on the Bill of Republic 
of Indonesia Year 1999, draft) 
 
§ “(1), A Traditional Law Community as it shall exist and be recognized shall have the 
rights to harvest forest products within the forest area determined by the government. 
(2), The recognition of traditional law community existence shall be conducted by the 
head of the local village.” (Chapter XI Traditional Law Community, Article 46) 
 
Nevertheless, these opportunities are restricted and will be tightly controlled by the 
Minister, whose approval will be required for formal recognition of Traditional Law 
Communities. The concept of ownership rights is also, restricted in that most of the local 
population do not posses land ownership certificates. 
 
Only one article (Chapter 5, Article 48 (6)) deals specifically with forest fires. “The holder 
of right or license shall be responsible for forest fires occurring in its working area”. It 
remains to be seen how the words, “responsible for” and “forest fires” are interpret d in 
the expected Government Regulations (Peraturan Pemerintah) nd by the Courts. 
 
 
Conclusions  
 
The government regulatory framework was established to favour timber production to 
supply the Indonesian wood industry. Seventy percent of the land in Indonesia is now 
classified as Forest Lands and the people living in the forest zone have been deprived of 
 
59
 
 
 
their rights. They can be evicted legally at any time by the forest administration. This is a 
source of conflict between the people and the forest administration. 
The new BFL has been prepared in a political context of reform with input from groups of 
foresters, lawyers and scientists. Although it does not modify the statute of the Forest 
Lands open possibilities for local people to be involved in forest management and forest 
production. In this context it is worth noting that the new BFL states that, “Government 
means central government”. This phrase does not exist in BFL 1967 and is thought to 
anticipate the decentralisation of forestry affairs, and to differe tiate central government 
from local governments.  
 
Revision continues and new guidelines and regulations are to be issued for implementing 
the new law. Their content will depend on the post-November 1999 political context in 
Indonesia. If reform is to prevail, significant improvements can be expected. But there is a 
risk that the new BFL will be interpreted in a way that will allow the timber industry to run 
‘business as usual’ until the forest disappears. If this happens, social conflict at local level 
will increase and become even more difficult to handle. 
 
 
AII. 3. The 1960 Basic Agrarian Law 
 
Around half the land in South Sumatra Province is classified as Forest Land and is thus 
administered under the Basic Forestry Law; the other half falls under the Basic Agrarian 
Laws No.5/1960. 
 
The state controls land under the Basic Agrarian Law (BAL) based on the concept that 
land has a social function as it provides both food and clothing.  
 
Sixty-seven articles cover all aspects of land-use (i.e. rights to land, water and space, land 
registration, penal provisions, transitional provisions). In theory, traditional local (at) 
rights acquired prior to its promulgation are recognised; otherwise BAL takes precedence 
over adat. (The Basic Forestry Law of 1967 did not recognise adat).  
 
 
Land rights 
 
There are three major types of land rights recognised under BAL: hak milik, hak guna 
usaha and hak pakai. 
 
Hak milik is an individual land property right granted in perpetuity under BAL and the 
owner can lease the land to others. The total land owned by a household can not exceed 22 
ha. Only Indonesian nationals and statutory bodies (badan hukum) appointed by the 
government (e.g state banks, agro-cooperatives, religious and social non-profit making 
organisations) may acquire hak milik. This right should be registered and the holder given 
a certificate: in practice few smallholders in South Sumatra have registered rights (see 
Table AII.1).  
 
The right of exploitation hak guna usaha (HGU) is the right to use state land for 
agriculture, fisheries, etc. Large company plantations are operated under an HGU that is 
granted for 25 to 35 years and can be extended for a further 25; a de facto 50 or 60 years. 
An HGU can be acquired by Indonesian nationals and by statutory bodies es ablishe  
under Indonesian law and domiciled in Indonesia. No maximum land area is specified but 
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the right must be recorded at the Land Registry Office. Land registered under HGU can be 
used as security for a mortgage and may be transferred to other parties – by sale, exchange 
or gift - with the permission of BPN. 
  
Hak pakai gives the holder the right to use a particular area of land that is held in either in 
state or private ownership. In practice, the right is scarcely used for private land since 
other titles, such as the right of lease or the right of land-pledging, play a greater role. Hak 
pakai is time limited and, in principle, can be transferred when no other regulations apply. 
Resident foreigners and foreign corporations with representatives in Indonesia can be 
awarded hak pakai. The right for private land to be registered is not realized as the 
implementing regulations do not exist. 
 
Of the remaining two land titles, Hak guna bangunan is a title on land which gives its 
holder a right for a fixed period of time, on a construction built on land owned by another 
party, while Hak Penggunaan lain  are rights of lease, share-cropping, lodging, land-
pledging, etc. 
 
Table AII.1. Land titles issued by the National Land Agency in South Sumatra from 1961 
to 31 March 1999  
 
 
 
Land titles 
 
Number of certificates 
issued  
 
Area 
(ha) 
 
% of province 
area 
Hak milik 
Right of ownership 
669 290      340 014 3.3 
Hak guna usaha 
Right of exploitation 
       86      363 123 3.5 
Hak pakai 
Right of use 
  57 891        40 836 0.4 
Hak pengunaan lain 
Other kinds of rights 
       128        39 107 0.4 
Hak guna bangunan  
Right of building 
  45 546          6 227 0.06 
 
Total 
 
 
772 941 
     
    789 308 
 
7.66 
 
 Source : BPN Propinsi Sumatera Selatan, April 1999. “Rekapitulasi penerbitan sertipikat, dari tahun 
1961 s/d 31 maret 1999” 
 
 
AII. 4.  Supplementary Regulations and Decrees Related to 
Vegetation Fires 
 
At the time of writing in September 1999 these supplementary regulations and decrees are 
believed to remain in-force despite the passing of the New Basic Forestry Law. It is 
however, known that a number of government committees are engaged on drafting 
guidelines and procedures designed to clarify the workings and applications of the New 
Law. It is likely that when they are published that some of the old decrees will be annulled 
or modified. 
 
State Regulation on Forest Planning PP Number 33/1970. Mandates the spatial planning 
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and demarcation of the functional categories of forest together with an inventory and 
survey of resources for use and conservation. Precedence is given to conservation over 
utilization in all cases where demarcation is not yet determined. 
 
State Regulation on Forest Protection PP Number 28/1985. Primary responsibility is 
given to the provinces to prepare gulations to prevent and suppress forest fires, and to 
provincial forestry officers to protect areas in and around the estate. It is the responsibility 
of the local population to take part in prevention and suppression of forest fires, but the 
false assumption that no people live inside but only around the forest is perpetuated. 
 
Decree of the Minister of Forestry Number 195/Kpts-II/1986. Directives on the 
prevention and control of forest fires. Prevention and management of forest fires (PPKH) 
should be founded in local regulations as stipulated in Paragraph 10 of the above 
regulation. Provides guidelines to local governments to formulate local regulations on the 
prevention and management of forest fires. 
 
Presidential Decree Number 43/1990. On the establishment of Bakornas PB (National 
Coordinating Board on Disaster Management) as an extra-structural organization at the 
national level. Major forest fires can be declared a national disaster. 
 
Guidelines for the Protection of Utilization Forestry Number 523/Kpts-II/1993. Each 
concession holder is made responsible for the organisation and equipping of a patrol and 
protection unit (Satpam PH), appropriately funded and competently staffed according to 
the size of the concession. 
 
Decree of the Minister of Forestry Number 677/Kpts-II/1993. On the establishment of an 
Echelon III Sub-Directorate of Forest Fire under the Directorate General of Forest 
Protection and Nature Conservation. Describes the tasks and authority of the Sub-
Directorate. 
 
Decree of the Director General of Forest Protection and Nature Conservation Number 
243/Kpts/DJ-VI/1994. On fire prevention and control in forest concessions. After a fire, 
the area burnt, economic and ecological losses and rehabilitation costs must be estimated.
 
HPH/HTI companies and state-owned enterprises must establish a fire control centre and 
reduce controlled burning in land clearance. The size of fire control teams is specified. If 
license holders do not carry out fire control, the services provided by all forestry 
institutions will be halted. The size of financial penalties for failure to rehabilitate burned 
areas is specified. 
 
Decree of the Director General of Forest Protection and Nature Conservation Number 
244/Kpts/DJ-VI/1994. On technical guidelines for forest fire control. Requires companies 
to provide transport, fire fighting kits, communications and food, as well as firefighting 
teams and command posts near the fire areas. Firefighting tools are described, as are 
supporting machinery and national level equipment. The number of firefighters is stipulated 
for various sizes of fire as on the control methods to be used.  
 
Decree of the Director General of Forest Protection and Nature Conservation Number 
245/Kpts/DJ-VI/1994. On the functions, application, maintenance and storing of fire 
control equipment, transport and communication tools.  
 
Decree of the Director General of Forest Protection and Nature Conservation Number 
 
62
 
 
 
246/Kpts/DJ-VI/1994. On the production of fire warning signs.  HPH and HTI holders are 
obliged to make signs and are instructed where and how to deploy them. 
 
Decree of the Director General of Forestry Protection and Nature Conservation Number 
247/Kpts/DJ-VI/1994. Describes standardized firefighting infrastructure, such as radios, 
fire control teams, patrol equipment, observation facilities and tools. 
 
Decree of the Director General of Forest Protection and Nature Conservation Number 
248/Kpts/DJ-VI/1994. Describes fire prevention procedures; patrols; sign fixing; fire 
control training; observation tower, and; fire control. 
 
Decree of The Minister of Forestry Number 260/Kpts-II/1995. On improvements to SK 
Menhut Number 195/Kpts-II/1986 on fire prevention.  
 
Decree of the Minister of Forestry Number 188/Kpts-II/1995.  Establishes the National 
Forest Fire Control Center (Pusdalkarhutnas) and gives its organizational structure and job 
description.  
 
Decree of the State Minister of Environment Number Kep-18/MenLH/3/1995. On the 
establishment of National Coordinating Team on Land Fires (TKNKL). Issued by the 
Minister of Environment on the same say as the previous decree by the Minister of 
Forestry. Creates the National Coordination Agency for Fires (BKNL). Like the forestry 
decree, mandates the creation of coordinating units at the provincial level, to be established 
by Governor’s decree and known as the Coordinating Team for Management of Fires (Ti  
Koordinasi Pengendalian Kebakaran Lahan: TKNPKL) 
 
Decree of the Director General of Plantations Number 38/KB10/SK/DJ.BUN/05.95. On 
Zero Burning Land Clearance (PLTB). Sets out in detail how land is to be cleared by hand.  
 
Decree of the Coordinating Minister of People Welfare / Head of Bakornas PB Number 
17/Kep/Menko/Kesra/X/1995. On the work of Bakornas BP to prevent and mitigate 
disasters, as well as in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the areas. 
 
Decree of the Director General of Forest Protection and Nature Conservation Number 
81/Kpts/DJ-VI/1995. On guidelines for Local Forest Fire Control Centres. (Follow-up of 
MoF Decree No.188/Kpts-II/1995 and MoE Decree No.18/MenLH/3/1995.). Stipulates 
the establishment and membership of provincial Pusdalkarhutda. The Land and Forest Fire 
Control Task Force (Satlak) is to be housed at the provincial / district forestry office.  
 
Decree of the Director General of Forest Prot ction and Nature Conservation Number 
47/Kpts/DJ-VI/1997. On technical guidelines on controlled burning. Determines 
requirements for land clearance by controlled burning, such as the permit requirement; 
dryness level of the fuel; maximum wind speed; lowest air temperatures, and; relative 
humidity. 
 
Decree of the Director General of Forest Protection and Nature Conservation Number 
152/KPTS/DJ-VI/1997. Revokes Decree No. 47/Kpts/DJ VI/1997 of 3 April on the 
technical guidelines for controlled burning. 
 
Act Number 23/ 1997. On environment management. Does not specifically refer to fire 
management but the act is the foundation to assess and to adapt other existing regulations, 
including forestry regulations.  
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Decree of the State Minister of Environment Number Kep-40 Men LH/09/1997. On the 
revision of TKNKL to become the National Coordinating Team on Land and Forest Fire 
Control (TKNPKHL). Changes in TKNPKHL membership and gives it greater authority 
to, formulate national policies on fire prevention and management; to coordinate central 
and local operations, and; to formulate a human resource management system, a 
monitoring mechanism, an information system and an incentive system. 
 
Government Regulation Number 28/1999. On forest protection. Article 10 states that no 
one is allowed to burn forests without a legal authority and stipulates that communities 
living around the forest must participate in the prevention and control of forest fires. 
Prevention and control of forest fire is regulated by provincial regulations, based on 
directives from the Minister. Article 18 regulates criminal sanctions on parties that cause 
forest fires due to their negligence. The violator will be jailed for a maximum of one year 
or fined a maximum Rp. 1 million. 
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Annex III: LAND MANAGEME NT  
PROCEDURES 
 
 
 
AIII. 1. The National Planning Process 
 
Planning processes based on time span 
 
The main outputs - through BAPPENAS - of the 
State Ministry for National Development Planning, 
are as the name of the ministry implies, national 
development plans for the long-, medium- (Repelita) 
and short-terms. The Minister advises the President 
on the content of the plans and on how best he may 
evaluate their implementation.  
  
 
 
Long-term plans (Pembangunan Jangka Panjang, PJP) look 25 years ahead. State Policy
Guidelines (GBHN), the medium-ter  plans, are set every five years by the People’s 
Consultative Assembly (MPR), for a period that corresponds to the Repelita. Repelita VI, 
1998 – 2003, coincided with the beginning of PJP II. Short-term plans, such as the state 
budget, are prepared annually. 
 
The Repelita planning process in the forestry sector 
 
National policy guidelines and overall strategies issued through BAPPENAS and the 
Ministry of Finance are communicated to the other ministries and then to theprovinces. In 
the case of forestry matters, the Dinas Kehutanan office (decentralized system) prepares a 
Forest Provincial Plan that is submitted to the planning boards in Jakarta. Under the forest 
de-concentration system, Kanwil Kehutanan dan Perkebunan is not directly involved at 
this stage and can only communicate comments to MoFEC.  
 
In Jakarta the Planning Bureau of MoFEC assembles all the provincial plans and in 
collaboration with forest industry associations produces a proposed Forest Sector Plan. 
This is sent to BAPPENAS and is harmonised with plans for other sectors before it is 
integrated into the Repelita. If the whole is acceptable to the Cabinet of the President, the 
National Repelita is published as an indicative plan. 
 
Guidelines based on the Repelita are sent to the line agencies to translate into sector 
strategies and projects. From the line agencies they are sent to the provinces and turned 
into prescriptive production targets. The political and economic elite of the timber business 
can exert influence at any time in the cycle from the Dinas Kehutanan office through 
Jakarta and then back to the province. The content may become profoundly altered in the 
process.  
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AIII. 2.  Provincial Spatial Planning And Mapping In South 
Sumatra Province 
 
The provincial structure plan-map (Rencana Struktur Tata Ruang Propinsi, RSTRP)63 is 
prepared by BAPPEDA. It shows the land-classification accepted by the provincial 
agencies involved in the management of land and proposed for development before the end 
of 2005. It is the product of a consensus reached after consultation between government 
agencies at national level, and between provinces (aduserasi process). The RSTRP 
includes changes made to the forest classes as defined by the Forest Law Classification 
Map (TGHK). As noted by Scott and Lusli (1998), of the fifteen mapped categories in the 
RSTRP, eight are under the responsibility of the MoFEC. 
 
District spatial plan-maps (Rencana Tata Ruang Wilayah Kabupaten, RTRWK) are 
prepared from the RTRWP (or RSTRP, see footnote). These maps are meant to be a tool 
to coordinate development and avoid inter-sectoral conflicts. In theory every development 
project must comply with the RSTRP / RTRWP map. The map should be used as a 
directive for land allocation, especially when granting HGU. 
 
The process of map revision is undertaken formally at five-year intervals. In South Sumatra 
province the first steps of evaluation and recommendations for revision, are contracted to 
the Spatial Planning Section of the local University Sriwijaya (UNSRI) Research Centre 
(Pusat Penelitian, Bidang Tata Ruang). 
 
The process of revision itself (in 1999 - 2000) is carried out under the governor by a 
coordination team (TKPR: Tim Koordinasi Penataan Ruang) of 15 representatives of 
government agenci s who are appointed by the governor (SK 590/SK/IV/1996, 30 
September 1996). The team is headed by the head of the infrastructure division at 
BAPPEDA (Kabid. Fisik dan Prasarana), nd includes staff of Kanwil BPN, Kanwil 
Kehutanan dan Perkebunan, BAPEDALDA and Dinas Kehutanan. The results are 
submitted for approval to the Provincial Legislative Council (DPRD I) which then adopt 
the plan as a regulation (Peraturan Daerah, or Perda). 
 
It is this smaller-scale RSTRP map that is used to prepare the Forest Land Categories 
Boundaries (Peta Tata Batas) at the larger scale of 1:25 000 and not the reverse as would 
be logical. These maps update the forest zonation mapping presented in the Forest Land 
Classification Map (Tata Guna Hutan Kesepakatan, TGHK) and give authority for the 
boundary of Forest Land categories. 
 
The map preparation process, carried out by a team led by the Head of the District, 
includes field delimitation by sub-BIPHUT staff. The team includes members of concerned 
government agencies at the provincial level (Sub-Balai BIPHUT, Kanwil Kehutanan dan 
Perkebunan) and at the regency level (camats, Heads of the Cabang, Dinas Kehutanan, 
Bappeda II, BPN II, Dinas Perkebunan, Dinas Tanaman Pangan II, Dinas Pekerjaan 
Umum II). The maps have then to be approved by INTAG and MoFEC. Until 1997, they 
also had to be approved by the governor before getting the approval of the ministers.  
                                                       
63 The provincial structure map (Rencana Struktur Tata Ruang Propinsi), at an approximately scale of  1 : 
500 000, was issued in 1994, but was already under preparation in 1992 when each province was required to 
prepare a RTRWP (Rencana Tata Ruang Wilayah Propinsi) provincial spatial plan at 1: 250 000 scale. This 
explains the confusion between RSTRP and RTRWP.  
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The boundaries of the various categories of Forest Land are available for around 85 
percent of South Sumatra and the positions of field boundary markers (p tok) are plotted 
on the maps. In the process of field delimitation needed to establish the positions of the 
markers, the surveyors are allowed to excise established agricultural areas. (Scott and 
Lusli, 1998). 
                                                       
5 Pemerintah Daerah Tingkat I Sumatera Selatan (1994). Peraturan daerah propinsi tingkat I Sumatera 
Selatan nomor 05 1994 tentang Rencana Tata Ruang Wilayah Propinsi Daerah Tingkat I Sumatera 
Selatan. [Regional Government of South Sumatra province. Regional Regulation number 5 of 1994 
concerning the Provincial Spatial Plan of South Sumatra]. 
 
 
RTRWP in South Sumatra5 
 
The 1994 Pemerintah Daerah Tingkat I Sumatera Selatan (RTRWP) includes the following 
instructions: 
 
· Forty percent of the total province area (10 925 400 ha) must remain as Permanent Forest (Article 
11).  
 
· The Permanent Forest Estate was estimated to be 4 237 600 ha (38.8 percent) compared to 37 
percent found in the TGHK. It was thus hoped that part of the Convertible Protection Forest, 
especially where adjacent to forest logging concession, would remain as Permanent Forest.  
However the target area is likely to be lowered, since the Perman nt For st Estate is by 1999 
estimated to be only some 30 percent of the land area (Ir. Idhamto, Kepala Seksi Tata Ruang dan 
Tata Guna Tanah, BAPPEDA, Palembang, pers. comm., May 1999).  
 
· Forest conversion can take place only in designated Convertible Production Forest areas which 
were estimated to total 774 100 ha or 7 percent of the province area (compared to 9.6 percent in 
the TGHK). Any extension of agricultural areas should first take place on degraded land (in areas 
of alang-alang or secondary vegetation) and not in productive forest area with more than 20m3 of 
timber trees of more than 30 cm  diameter per hectare.
 
· Alang-alang grasslands, scrubby vegetation (belukar) and swamp forest (hutan rawa) [sic] in 
Permanent and Limited Production Forest areas can b  converted into Plantation Forest (HPHTI). 
(Article 12). 
 
· Deep peat areas (> 2.5m) in OKI and MUBA regencies are in the category of ‘Protection 
Areas’ (kawasan lindung) and deserve special protection status. (Article 17). Infringement of 
protected area regulations can be punished by six months imprisonment and/or a fine of Rp 
50 000  (Article 44).  
 
It is also stipulated that:
 
· Every citizen is entitled to consult the RTRWP map. (Article 39).  
 
· Everyone is entitled to receive fair compensation is a affected by development carried out in 
accordance with the guidelines provided by the RTRWP. (Article.35.c). 
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AIII. 3. Land Registration  
 
 
The BAL stipulates that all land-rights have to be registered with the National Land 
Agency. Registration should provide security for both owners and users, as well as the 
right to transfer land. However land registration has proceeded very slowly and that which 
has taken place has mostly been in urban areas and in Java. The registration process 
includes the measurement, survey and mapping of land, the registration of rights, and the 
issue of the rights certificates. Smallholders can barely afford to register their lands 
because of the fees and the complexity of the administrative process. In South Sumatra, 
many do not even contemplate getting an official land-ownership certificate. 
 
The procedures to obtain a hak milik title are: 
 
§ The applicant marks the limits of his land with posts (tanda batas). 
§ The applicant passes a letter he has obtained from BPN to the neighbouring land-owners and sks their 
agreement on the proposed limits. 
§ The applicant must provide information on the historical ownership status of the land (riwayat tanah). 
If the applicant can not provide any title, he must certify his right under oath in the presence of an 
official representative. 
§ The District BPN Office
 arries out a field check to identify any counter-claims. 
§ The land is officially surveyed and a map (surat mengukur) p epared. 
§ The map and documents are posted in the offices of the village head and sub-district head for 60 days to 
allow time for objections. 
§ If no objections are received, the district BPN Office prepares a letter of recommendation. 
§ The letter of recommendation is sent to the provincial office of BPN for a letter of decision. (For non-
adat land, the letter is forwarded to Jakarta). 
§ The applicant is informed of the decision and required to pay a fee for the completion of the process. 
§ A land-ownership certificate is issued, and a copy is provided to the applicant. This right can be 
contested during the five following years. 
 
Indonesian culture places a high value on consensus. The decree (PMDN No. 2/1976) on 
the release of land to the private sector for the implementation of projects of public interest 
incorporates this value. According to this process the amount of compensation given to the 
holder of a land-right is decided by consensus and may be less than the market price. 
 
Land Acquisition By Expropriation 
 
 
The President alone is authorized to expropriate land by decree to facilitate the 
implementation of projects (Act No. 20/1961). Indonesian law states that expropriation 
must only be used as a last resort when negotiations have irreparably failed and the act is in 
the public interest. A presidential decree fixes the form and amount of compensation. 
 
Land Consolidation 
 
Officially recognised land-consolidation procedures are followed to release land for 
infrastructure development (e.g a road) and other public facilities and they are carried out 
with the agreed participation of local people. The process can also be used to re-arrange 
land-tenure and land-ownership in both urban and rural areas. The legal bases for action 
are found under the BAL and under the Spatial Use Management Law No. 24/1992. 
 
The BPN District Office (Kabupaten) executes land consolidation projects. A committee, 
under the chairmanship of the bupati, is in-charge of the site location and the Bupati 
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coordinates state agencies at district level. A second committee (with Kanwil BPN as a 
member) at provincial level, in turn, controls the first. The head of the provincial office of 
BAPPEDA chairs the second committee. 
 
Conclusions  
 
Unclear and often inadequate delineation between lands under BAL and forestry lands 
under BFL is a frequent source of conflict between local communities and the state. The 
competencies of the numerous departments and bodie involve  in land-planning overlap 
and are unclear. These discrepancies are a major cause of decades of land mismanagement 
in Indonesia. They are also detrimental to fire prevention.  
 
In the reform era, the process of administrative decentralization could allow the evolution 
of a much improved, participative land-use planning system at provincial level. BAPPEDA 
should be the focal point of new initiatives and international donors are encouraged to aid 
the process. 
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AIII. 4.  Trends in Forest Policy 
 
Impacts of the Economic Crisis, International Agencies and Political 
Turmoil on Forestry Policy 
 
The economic crisis, the intervention of international institutions and the political turmoil 
of 1998 – 1999 had a great impact on the policy making process.  
 
To overcome the economic turmoil, the government took limited steps towards reform. 
These included some structural adjustments pledged to the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). This commitment was expressed in the Indonesian Memorandum of Economic and 
Financial Policy Program (MEFP) signed by President Suharto on 15 January 1998. The 
conditions requested under the memorandum cover various economic and monetary 
changes. Eight articles are directly related to the forestry sector (Articles 10, 12, 36, 37, 
38, 40, 42, and 50). These articles requested forestry reforms including the liberalization of 
the forest industry and wood trade, and were aimed at increasing the efficiency and 
competitiveness in the international market. But the articles also underlined the nee  to 
implement sustainable forest management under the principle of economic equity.  
 
The eight articles required three key changes: (a) create consistency and transparency in 
decision-making processes that affect the utilization of forest as a public good, (b) open 
competitive market mechanisms, and (c) strengthen property rights in forest utilization. 
  
The guidelines for the ‘Reform Agenda of the Forestry and Estate Crops Sector’ made 
public in July 1998, were intended to show the will of the new governm nt t  speed up the 
reform agenda and to do so within a new decision making process. An independent reform 
team was established to identify needed changes in the forestry and estate crops sector.  
 
 
The Legal Framework for HPH and HPHTI: The Present Situation and 
Trends  
 
Hak Pengusahaan Hutan (HPH) 
 
The granting of a forest logging concession (HPH) is, “A right to exploit the forest in a designated forest 
area, through cutting of timber, regenerating and caring for the forest, and processing and marketing forest 
products, in accordance with a forest exploitation workplan, in line with existing regulations, and on the 
basis of conservation and sustainable production”. (SK. 21/1970) 
 
HPH could be granted only to state corporations and to private companies. Under the new regulation, the 
right may be granted to state-owned corporations (BUMN), to regional-ow ed corporations (BUMD), to 
privates companies and to cooperatives. (New Basic Forestry Law 1999, Article 24) 
 
Regulations and requirements to gain an HPH are legion. They include application and extension request 
procedures, a requirement to submit work-plans and reports, regulations to specify roads, infrastructure and 
facilities, and technical requirements for forest exploitation. (See text box on the next page) 
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The new regulations are designed to increase transparency in concession allocation by the introduction of an 
auction system.  
 
1. Ministerial decree No. 731/Kpts-II/1998, 10 November 1998, "The procedure for 
the auction of a concession". 
 
2. Ministerial decree No. 732/Kpts-II/1998, 10 November 1998, "The conditions and procedures for the 
renewal of a concession right". 
 
3. Ministerial decree No.734/Kpts-II/1998, 11 November 1998, "The establishment of a 
committee for the preparation of the auction of a concession."  
 
4. Ministerial decree No.735/Kpts-II/1998, 11 November 1998, "The establishment of the 
auction.”65 
 
Limits for a single HPH66 concessionaire company or cooperative are fixed (PP.6/1999)  at 
100 000 ha in any one province (200 000 ha in Irian Jaya) and to 500000 ha nationally. 
For a plantation company the limits are set at 20 000 h  and 100 000 ha. The New Forest 
Law does not adjust the areas given under PP.6/1999 but stipulates that there must be, ‘a 
limitation on an area [granted] in the interests of justice, fairness and sustainability’. 
                                                       
65 There appears to be no record of Ministerial Decree No. 733/Kpts-II/1998: it may have been issued for a 
topic other than forest management and not published. 
With the recent enactment of PP 6/99, Ministerial Decree No. 731 and 732 have been changed to No. 
312/1999 respectively with little revision. 
 
66 In the recently issued PP No. 6/99 HPH becomes ‘HPH alam’ a ‘concession in a natural forest’, while HTI 
becomes ‘HPH tanam’ a ‘concession for a plantation’. 
 
 
An Example of Bureaucracy: the HPH Progress Reports 
 
Companies are required to produce a variety of reports (monthly, quarterly, annual, 
five-year and termination reports) under SK No. 521/1985 and SK No. 75/1989. 
 
· Cruising report: on the stand composition of a particular cutting block.
· Production report: an annual report on the volume and species of logs from a particular block. 
· Log transport report: on the volume and species of logs transported to processing sites. 
· Log supply report: on the volume and species of logs on hand at processing site log-yard  and log-
ponds. 
· Processed wood supply report: the weight, volume and species of each type of processed wood in 
the processor’s warehouse. 
· Register of export wood. 
· Register of domestic wood and self-utilized wood. 
· Register of wood from small industries. 
 
It is unclear how the required information was intended to be used, checked and verified. This is an 
example of the plethora of regulations that are not implemented. Are these regulations workable? Can 
they be enforced? In fact they were used to effect by the forestry administration to justify concern over 
sustainable forest exploitation, and, too often, they provide opportunities for ‘negotiations’ between 
administration officers and forest concessionaires. 
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The policy focuses on strengthening the communities' economy by giving a role to small 
and medium sized businesses and cooperatives. It is very doubtful if the development of 
cooperatives is the best way to achieve forest sustainability: and there are many risks 
linked to a biased selection and/or manipulative creation of so-called c operatives by large 
forest concessionaires. Moreover, cooperatives have a bad image in rural areas, as existing 
cooperatives have performed poorly and are often linked to corrupt practices. 
 
The new government talks of empowering the communities as the key to forest 
sustainability (www.dephut.go.id). But the government role in the Indonesian forestry 
context is uneasy as the major stakeholders are powerful lobbies from the timber industry, 
often well-connected to political and military figures. 
 
Incentives for Timber Estate Concessions - HTI67 
 
As the government anticipates a wood material deficit from natural forest, the development 
of large-scale industrial timber plantations is a political goal. A number of incentives are 
given to companies (Potter and Lee, 1998). 
 
§ Loans from the reforestation funds cover 32.5 percent of establishment costs and must 
be paid back in seven years. 
§ The government helps the companies to obtain loans from banks. 
§ Low land taxes. 
§ HTI concession could be granted on logged-over areas with a timber utilization permit 
(IPK). 
§ Since 1992 within an HTI-trans scheme, the state and a state forestry company could 
provide 40 percent of the investment while the private company provides the 
remainder. 
 
The timber utilization permit is a also an incentive that allows a company to profit from the 
sale of timber stands. The residual biomass after exploitation is a potential fire hazard but 
the company may find it profitable to let it remain and take the risk of fire when it can 
claim compensation from the insurance company (UNDP-BAPEDAL, 1998: page 70). 
 
The legal framework is an incentive to establish plantations but discourages their 
sustainable management. Incentives and loans are released according to the plantation 
areas and control of their release is loose: wood production is not the first source of 
profits. Land management for protection against fire, which is costly, is not a priority. 
 
                                                       
67There remains confusion over the terms HTI and HPHTI. In earlier usage HTI was an industrial forest 
plantation where it was possible to distinguish between the differ t intent of setting up the plantation. e.g. 
HTI-trans, HTI-pulp, etc. The suffix was then dropped and industrial forest plantations were referred to as 
HTI. The company is initially granted an SK. HTI. In practice this is equivalent to the granting of a full 
Utilisation Right for an Industrial Forest Plantation or HPHTI, as the right to utilize is ‘automatic’ and thus 
the terms HTI and HPHTI are interchangeable. In the recently issued PP No. 6/99, HTI becomes ‘HPH 
tanam’ a ‘concession for a plantation’. 
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AIII. 5. Strengthen the Legal Framework or Political Reform? 
 
The forest legal framework should set the scene and the principles to fulfil the goal of 
sustainability (and prevent uncontrolled fi es): empirical evidence denies the theory. Three 
recommendations are suggested. 
 
§ Clarify and simplify forest law. 
 
Each year more guidelines and more regulations have been issued without success. The 
result is a complex and murky legal system with poor implementation. Within this 
context, any attempt to improve is sustainable management and fire control is difficult.
 
§ Strengthen the forest institutions to enforce the forest laws.  
 
Thus to reduce fires, increase the means to monitor fires (satellite imagery, GIS
systems) and exert control over concessionaires and people living in or on the edges of 
the forest.  
 
But before we recommend such enforcement we must be sure that the people in charge 
of issuing and applying the rules stand above personal inter sts. 
 
§ More rights must be given to those whose interests lead toward sustainable land management and a 
reduced fire risk.  
 
Inevitably this means granting more rights to the local population. Some stakeholders 
in the existing decision making process put personal interest before the goal of 
sustainable forest management. The result is over-exploitation of the resources, rural 
poverty in the forest areas, mismanagement of the land and increasing fire risks. There 
are contradictory views about forest use and competition between state, rural people 
and industry for access to, and control over, land and forest.  
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Annex IV: TABULATED DATA FROM THE 
CASE STUDIES 
 
 
 
Table IV.1. Area, population, smallholder rubber and areas burnt in 1997 in three Sub-Districts (Tal ng 
Ubi and Gunung Megang Sub-Districts), within Muara Enim District 
 
 
  
Sources 
Talang Ubi  
sub-district 
Gunung 
Megang  
sub-district 
Muara Enim 
District 
(ME) 
South 
Sumatra 
(SS) 
   % 
ME 
 % 
ME 
 %  
SS 
 
Area (ha) 1,2 191 800  20 179 700 19 957 500 8 11 333 907 
Population 1,2 137 229 20   54 466   8 685 831 9  7 593 900 
Population density 1,2          71           30            72              67 
Rubber smallholder area (ha) 1,2   25 693 18   16 634 12 144 419 18     779 920 
Area of rubber smallholder 
plantations reported as burned 
in 1997 (ha) 
3 
4
5 
        
 
316 
   
5 
     
    1 059 
 
16 
     2 243 
     6 609 
 
21       10 540 
 
   ± 40 000 
 
Source: (1) Kabupaten Muara Enim dalam angka, 1997 ; (2) BPS, 1998 ; (3) : 
Dinas Perkebunan Prop. Sumsel (n.d.). Kebun rakyat yang terbakar dalam 
musim kemarau ; (4) : Dinas Perkebunan Kab. Dati II Muara Enim, 1997. 
Data kebakaran kebun dan non kebun sampai dengan tanggal 22 November 
1997 (as of 22 November, 1997) ; (5) According to Gouyon (1999), the total 
area smallholder area accidentally burnt in 1997 is estimated to about 40 
000 ha or 5% of the smallholder plantations area. About half of it or 20 000 
ha was probably old jungle rubber, while 6 000 ha can be estimated to be 
young clones aged 3-4 years in average, and the rest young jungle rubber. 
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Table AIV.2. The ‘sonor sub-districts’ of central and eastern OKI District 
 
Sonor sub-districts  
(kecamatan ) 
Area 
(km
2
) 
Percent 
District 
area 
Population 
(1998) 
Percent 
District 
population 
Population 
density 
 
Pampangan  1 317 6  45 408 4.6 34 
Pedamaran  1 524 7  54 041 5.5 35 
Mesuji  1 698 7.8  97 592 9.9 57 
Pematang Panggang *  2 226 10.3  33 035 3.3 15 
Cengal *  2 878 13.3  33 548 3.4 12 
Tulung Selapan  4 853 22.4  34 473 3.5  7 
Air Sugihan *  2 594 12  33 246 3.4 13 
 Sub-total  
(7 sub-districts) 
17 090 78.8 331 343 33.5 19 
OKI District 
(19 sub-districts) 
21 691 100 989 505 100 46 
 
* kecamatan pembantu (provisional sub-district status) 
Source: Kantor Statistik Kabupaten Dati II Ogan Komering Ilir, 1998. Adapted from Table 8 In, ‘Pemerintah 
daerah tingkat II Ogan Komering Ilir, (1998). Data pokok pembangunan daerah kabupaten daerah tingkat 
II’. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table AIV.3. The relative importance of the sonor rice harvest in OKI and other ‘sonor regencies’ as a total 
and a percentage of overall rice production (R.) 
 
 Source 1991-92 1994-95 1997-98 
  Harveste
d area  
(ha) 
t. 
/ha 
Product. 
(t.) 
Harvested 
area (ha) 
t. 
/ha 
Product. 
(t.) 
Harvested 
area  (ha) 
t. 
/ha 
Product. 
(t.) 
 
OKI sonor 
 
 
(1) 
   
33 223  
  
2.1 
    
69 768  
    
34 660  
  
2.1 
    
72 855  
    
60 456  
  
2.2 
  
133 003  
% R. OKI  23.4   19.9  22.5    18.4  29.9  19.2  
 
R. OKI  
 
 
(2) 
 
139 157 
 
2.5 
   
350 936 
 
153 701 
 
2.5 
   
395 165 
  
202 290  
 
3.3 
  
692 869 
 
4 so.regencies 
  
 
(1) 
   
52 109  
 
2.0 
   
103 832  
    
53 038  
 
2.1 
   
109 207  
    
76 252  
 
2.1 
  
163 850 
% R. province  10.5   6.7 10.7  7.0   - 
 
R. province 
 
 
(3) 
 
494 145 
 
3.1 
 
1 550 937 
  
492 448 
 
3.2 
 
1 557 944 
 
n.a. 
 
n.a. 
 
n.a. 
 
Sources: (1) Head of Sekretariat Satuan Pembina BIMAS, Prop. Sumsel, pers. co ., Pal mbang, 23 March 
1999); (2) Dinas Pertanian Tanaman Pangan, kab. Ogan Komering Ilir, Kayu Agung, 1998; (3) Dinas 
Pertanian Tanaman Pangan, TK I Sumsel, 1998. 
 
75
 
 
 
Annex V: LAND USE IN SOUTH SUMATRA 
 
 
Table AV.1. RTRWP Land classification (1994), land allocation and principal agriculture and land use in 
South Sumatra province  
 
RTRWP 
(1994) 
 Source % 
P 
Area 
 (ha) 
Remarks 
(overlapping) 
Province (P)  (1) 100 10 925 400    
 swamp  ±30     
 dryland  ±70     
Permanent 
Forest* 
 (1) 38.8 4 237 600   Estates, 
Smallholders 
Transmigration 
 NatureReserves  (1)     822 300    
 Protection 
Forest 
(1)     847 300    
 Production 
Forest 
(1)  2 568 000    
     Concession Planted  
 HPH Forest (2)   1 751  700  Nature Reserves 
 Pulp HTI (3)      353  100    213  
381 
Nature Reserves 
and ‘Other Uses’ 
 Timber HTI (3)       291 900     21  
061 
Nature Reserves 
and ‘Other Uses’ 
Convertible 
Product. Forest 
 (1) 7.1    774 100    
Other uses**  (1) 54.1 5 913 700    
Transmigration   allocated developed reserved Permanent Forest 
Nature Reserves 
 (4) 12.2 1 333 958 851 437 482 521  
       
Land allocated  to estates 
(incl. in trans. sites) 
 
(5) 
 
13.1 
 
 1 436 000 
  Permanent Forest 
Transmigration 
Nature Reserves 
HGU (1961-99)  3.3   363 123   (as above) 
Commercial crop plantations (6) 14.1 1 541 593    
Smallholders plantations (6) 10.6   1 155 835  Permanent Forest 
Rubber    7.1   779 920  
Coffee    3.5   256 547  
Company plantations (6)      
Area planted under private scheme    2.2     240 582  Permanent Forest 
Oil palm     186 694  
Rubber      47 554  
Hybrid Coconut        3 961  
PIR BUN/Trans (oil palm, rubber)  1.0     114 173   
State plantations (sugar cane, oil 
palm, rubber) 
 0.3       31 003   
Ricefields (7)   4.3    469 670    
    wet land    379 109   
    dry land      90 561   
 
Sources: (1) Kanwil Kehutanan Sumsel, 1998; (2) See Annex V.3; (3) See Annex V.4; (4)  Kanwil Transmigrasi dan PPH 
(1998); (5)  BPN Sumatera Selatan, April 1999; (6) Laporan tahunan 1997/98, Dinas Perkebunan,  July 1998; (7) Ricefields 
harvested in 1996 (BPS, 1997)     
 
* According to the National Forest Inventory (1997), less than 60 percent of the 3 997 000 ha of Permanent Forest was 
forested  in 1989 (Note that NFI used TGHK figures which differ from RTRWP ones) 
 
** Other uses (APL: Areal penggunaan lain) designs the  lands  lying outside the Forest Estate 
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Annex V.2.  Table listing registered Estate Crops in South Sumatra Province (May 1999) 
 
District Company (PT) Commodity Area (ha) 
OKI Buluh Cawang Plant. oil palm                                                           3 433 
  rubber 1 569 
 Bumi Rambang K.J rubber 2 974 
 Bumi Sawit Permai hybrid coconut 
oil palm 
929 
4 080            
 Gembala Sriwidjaja rubber 1 800 
 Gunung Tua Abadi oil palm 2 415 
 Hortenisia Permai rubber 738 
 Kodrat Aman Jaya oil palm 100 
 Lonsum Indonesia rubber 5 128 
 Pancaroda Utama hybrid coconut 50 
 Rusli Taher rubber 1 156 
 Selapan Jaya (Pedamaran 
Selapan Jaya (Mesuji) 
oil palm 
oil palm 
 2 556 
 18 177 
 Sinar Sasongko oil palm 995 
 Sumber Wangi Alam oil palm 1 300 
 Telaga Hikmah oil palm 2 700 
 Telaga Hikmah oil palm 3 000 
 Tri Kreasi Marga Mulya oil palm 1 869 
 Waymusi Agroindah rubber 6 500 
   61 479 
OKU Gunung Meraksa Jaya oil palm 180 
 Gunung Meraksa Jaya oil palm 388 
 Kud Minanga Ogan oil palm 3 012 
 Laras Astra Kartika oil palm 2 021 
 Minanga Ogan oil palm 6 834 
 Sri Inti Katon rubber 99 
 Sungai Wall Sawitindo oil palm 540 
 Swadaya Corporation rubber 419 
  oil palm 9 963 
   23 456 
MUBA Agro Polindo Sakti oil palm 
rubber 
419        
556 
 Alicia Ind rubber 2 500 
 Moesi Ind,  Pt,Meilania In. oil palm 502 
 Citra Sembawa rubber 384 
 Hassuddin Utama rubber 99 
 Karya Tani Pratama rubber 95 
 Lembu Jaya oil palm 4 770 
 Lubuk Lancang Kuning rubber 500 
 Manunggal Adi Niaga rubber 64 
 Palma Betung Prima rubber 330 
 Panca Tirta B. Agung oil palm 4 000 
 Peconina Baru oil palm 775 
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Estate Crops continued 
 
District Company (PT) Commodity Area (ha) 
 Pinago Utama  oil palm 500 
 Pinang Witmas Sejati oil palm 1 487 
 Pulau Harpindo Mas rubber 64 
 Pulau Hijau rubber 45 
 Sentosa Mulia Bahagia hybrid coconut 4 774 
 Serasan Sekate Nia rubber 95 
 Sumatera Candi  Kencana hybrid coconut  2 200 
   24 159 
MURA Bina Saint Corporation oil palm 4 685 
 Cikencreng rubber 1 186 
 Dendy Marker Indah L. oil palm 2 200 
 Dwi Reksa Usaha Pks oil palm 2 520 
 Haruma Amin rubber 170 
 Hasil Musi Lestari oil palm 9 180 
 Juanda Sawit Lestari oil palm 3 060 
 London Sumatera Ind oil palm 10 107 
   33 108 
Muaraenim Bumi Sawindo Permai oil palm 
rubber 
3 296 
3 000 
 Cipta Futura oil palm 
rubber 
2 019    
2 000 
 Gunung Tua Abadi oil palm 85 
 Sayang Heulang Huda (Pusaka 
Sinar Dian Abd) 
oil palm 627 
 Surya Bumi Agro L. oil palm 3 200 
   14 227 
Lahat Aditarwan oil palm 747 
 Artha Prigel oil palm 1 673 
 Eka Jaya Perkasa oil palm 850 
 Multrada Multi Maju oil palm 5 478           
 Padang Bolak Jaya oil palm 3 236 
 Paradis Maju rubber 12 
 Perjapin Prima oil palm 2 248 
 Trimitra Sumber Perkasa oil palm 2 312 
   16 556 
Bangka Bumi Permai Lestari oil palm 13 080 
 Bumi Permai Surya L. oil palm 440 
 Gunung Maras  Lestari oil palm 5 178 
 Gunung Sawit Bina Lt. oil palm 5 030 
 Leidong West Indonesia oil palm 1 476 
 Sawindo Kencana oil palm 5 350 
 Sumarco M. Indah oil palm 9 500 
 Swarna Nusa Sentosa oil palm 4 200 
 Tata Hamparan Eka P. oil palm 1 200 
   45 454 
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Estate Crops continued 
 
District Company (PT) Commodity Area (ha) 
Belitung Angkasa Puri pepper 60 
 Parit Sembada rubber 3 1 79l 
 Poresta Lestari D.K oil palm 9 800 
 Rebin Mas Jaya oil palm 3 338 
 Sahabat Mewah &Mkmr oil palm  
rubber 
8 057 
2 536 
 Stelindo Wahana Pks oil palm 13 815 
   69 397 
   287 481 
 
 
Summary of Estate Crops 
 
 
District Oil Palm Rubber Coconut Pepper Tea Sugar 
Cane 
OKI 40 625 19 875 979 0 0 11 714 
OKU 23 357 99 0 0 0 0 
MUBA 12 458 4 732 6 974 0 0 0 
MURA 31 752 1 356 0 0 0 0 
Muaraenim 9 227 5 000 0 0 0 0 
Lahat 16 544 12 0 0 1 437 0 
Bangka 45 454 0 0 0 0 0 
Belitung 35 010 34 327 0 60 0 0 
 214 427 65 401 7 953 60 1 437 11 714 
 
 
Summary of Land Use in South Sumatra (ha) 
 
Area of South Sumatra 11 333 900  
Forest Logging Concessions 1 773 616 15.6 percent 
Forest Plantations 684 988 6.0 percent 
Transmigration Sites 1 284 113 11.3 percent 
Estate Crops 300 632 2.7 percent 
 
Source:  Data Satatistik Luas Areal dan Produksi Perkebunan Besar, 1997 DISBUN Tk I  
propinsi Sumatera Selatan 
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An.V.3. Table listing registered logging concessions (HPH) in South Sumatra province as of May 1999 
 
 Logging concessionaires 
HPH 
 
Source: (1) 
Location 
CDK 
 
(1) 
Total 
area 
(ha) 
(1) 
Areas officially 
reported as burned 
(ha) 
(2) 
Logging areas 
in 1997/98 
 (ha)  
(3) 
Duration /  
First year of 
contract 
(1, 3, 4) 
No. 
on 
map 
    until 
1996 
 
in  
1997 
planned 
for 
logging 
report
ed as 
logge
d 
 
a PT. Bumi Pratama Usaha Jaya 
(ex PT. Sylva) 
Lalan  56 000  120 2 400 2 250 09/1997-2017 
(1980) 
b PT. Famili Jaya OKI  57 000  1 215    480    100 06/1985-2005 
c PT. Fatma Bersaudara OKI  51 000     650        0        0 10/1988-2008 
d PT. Kurnia Musi Plywood (ex 
PT. Bumi Raya Utama) 
Lalan 130 000     03/1979-1999 -
extension in 
process- 
(1979) 
e PT. Nindita Bagaskari Lalan  48 100     400        0        0 10/1979-1999 
f PT. Riwayat Musi Corp.  Lalan  85 000       23    700    450 09/1979-1999 
g PT. SBA Wood 
(ex PT. Inwihco) 
OKI 134 200 5 800 20 180 * 1 100    761 07/1992- 012 
(1980-1991) 
h PT. Sentosa Mulia Bahagia 
(ex PT. Sentosa Jaya) 
Lalan, 
OKI 
M. Enim 
 77 000    1 200        0        0 03/1988-2008 
(1988) 
i PT. Sribunian Trading Co. OKI  75 000    1 452 1 300    753 01/1979-2000 
  Sub-total (companies)  713 300 5 800 25 240 5 980 4 314  
j PT. Inhutani V Musi Ilir 
Lalan 
167 550  3 171 1 020 1 017 11/1992- 012 
k PT. Inhutani V  
(ex PT. Daya Penca) 
OKI  87 000      900    161 (03/1978-98) 
l PT. Inhutani V
(ex PT. Kurnia Musi) 2 loc. 
OKI 
MURA 
130 000  3 825   10/1996-2016 
(1981) 
m PT. Inhutani V
(ex PT. Niti Remaja Concern) 
Lalan 
Musi Ilir 
  35 000     10/1996-2016 
(1976) 
n PT. Inhutani V
(ex PT. Padeco/MHP) 
incl. 9 000 ha Acacia mangium 
Musi Ilir   80 000 
 
    1996 -
(1969) 
o PT. Inhutani V
(ex PT. Phala Wana Lestari) 
MURA   68 500     1993 -
(1973) 
p PT. Inhutani V
(ex PT. Sinar Belanti Jaya) 
OKI   78 000     05/1996-2016 
(1974) 
q PT. Inhutani V
(ex PT. Sukses Sumatera 
Timber) 
Lalan 179 000 8 040   530 250 250 08/1991-2011 
(1979) 
r PT. Inhutani V
(ex PT. Sylva) 
Lalan   67 700     1997 -  
(1980) 
s PT. Inhutani V
(ex PT. Tuah Megow) 
MURA   23 916     1996 -
(1973) 
t PT. Inhutani V
(ex PT. Wai Hitam) 
OKI 121 750     1996 -
(1974) 
u PT. Inhutani V
(ex PT. Wisma Lukita) 
Lalan 21 900        
(1970) 
 Sub-total (Inhutani V)   892 766   8 040   7 526 2 170 1 428  
  
TOTAL 
  
1 773 616 
 
13 840 
 
32 766 
 
8 150 
 
5 742 
 
 
(* representing only surveyed area, burned area possibly five times larger according to company staff,  (pers. comm. April 1999) 
 
Sources: (1)  Bidang Pengusahaan Hutan Kanwil Dephutbun Prop. Sumatera Selatan, April 1998 ; (2) Data areal kerja 
HPH/HPTI yang terbakar, Kanwil Kehutanan Sumsel, 18 November 1998 ; (3) Statistik Kehutanan Propinsi Sumatera Selatan 
Tahun 1997/1998 (Realisasi Blok Tebangan HPH),Kanwil Kehutanan Sumsel, 1998; (4) Statistik Dinas Kehutanan Propinsi 
Sumtera Selatan Tahun 1996/1997 
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An.V.4. Table listing registered Forest plantations concessions (HPHTI) i  South Sumatra province as of 
May 1999 
 
No. 
on 
map 
Forest 
plantations 
Location Total 
concession 
area 
Main species Total 
planted 
area in 
June 
1998 
 
Areas 
officially 
reported 
as 
burned 
until 
1996 
Areas 
officially 
reported 
as 
burned 
in  
1997 
Plantation 
years of 
burned 
areas 
/ Remarks 
 
 Sources:  (1) (1) (1, 2, 3) (2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (2) (2) (2) 
PULP WOOD 
A 
 
 
 
I 
II 
III 
PT. Musi Hutan 
Persada 
(SK HPHTI 
29/01/96) 
Benakat-Lemtg. 
Subanjeriji  
Martapura 
OKU,Lahat 
MURA 
M. MUBA, 
M.Enim 
198 741 ha 
  87 354 ha 
  10 305 ha 
296 400 
 
 
 
Acacia 
mangium 
194 364 8 257* 3 157 1990/1991 to  
1996/1997 
 PT. Tunas 
Bentala 
(SK HPHTI Trans 
4000 ha 21/02/92; 
SK HPHTI 5 000 
ha 30/08/90 ;  4 
388 ha ex PT Tuah 
Megow) 
MURA 13 288 Acacia 
mangium 
1 767  101 1993/1994  
1994/1995 
B PT. Pakerin 
(SKHPHTI  43 
380 ha 27/02/98) 
MUBA 43 380 Acacia 
mangium 
17 250 800 6 248 1993/1994  
to 1996/1997 
G PT. SBA Wood 
Industries 
(SKHPHTI 
18/02/98) 
OKI 40  000 
within 
HPH 
Acacia 
mangium 
0  (burned 
HPH 
area) 
Plantation 
planned in 
1999/2000 
 Total  393 068  213 381 9 057 9 506  
TIMBER  
D PT. Wai Hijau 
Hutani 
(SKHPHTI  Trans 
3 700 ha  21/02/92 
; SKHPHTI - 
1/10/91) 
OKI 
MUBA 
21 250 Gmelina 
arborea, 
Acacia 
mangium, 
Paraserianthes 
falcataria 
14 861 8 441 1 567 1990/1991  
to 1994/1995 
 PT. Inhutani V
(ex PT Rimba 
Jaya Borang) 
(Surat Menhut 
29/08/96) 
OKI 
 
 
8 950 Hevea 
brasiliensis, 
Peronema 
canescens, 
Parkia 
speciosa 
200 - - - 
 PT. Inhutani V
(ex PT. Niti 
Remaja,  Padeco 
and Wisma 
Lukita) 
(SKHPHTI 
27/02/98) 
MUBA 261 720 
 
(incl.  
15 000 ha  
PT Vitco 
in Jambi) 
P. canescens  
Swietenia 
mahagani, 
Hopea 
mengarawan, 
Shorea spp. 
6 000 
(incl.  
3 200 ha 
Peronema 
canescens) 
- - - 
 Total  291 920  21 061 8 441 1 567  
Sources: (1) Laporan pembangunan HTI prop. Sumatera Selatan, Tahun anggaran 1998/1999 s/d bulan Juni 1998 ;  
(2) Data areal kerja HPH/HPHTI yang terbakar, Kanwil Dephutbun Prop, Sumsel, 11 November 1998; (3) Inhutani 
V, Palembang (pers. comm., April 1999) 
* about 20 000 ha burnt in 1994, according to Saharjo (1996) 
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An.V.5. Table listing registed Transmigration sites n South Sumatra province as of May 1999 
 
Kabupaten No. on map Location Area (ha) 
OKU 1 Pandan Sari                   2,000 
 2 Peninjauan Baturaja                   3,500 
 3 Batumarta                65,000 
 4 Lubuk Batang                   1,800 
  Bangsa Negara                   3,000 
  Batumarta                15,225 
  Bunga Mayang                    1,460 
  Lubuk Batang                   8,000 
  Marga Madang SK. I                35,000 
  Marga Madang SK. II                25,000 
  Rantau Kumpai                   2,200 
  Rasuan                      650 
  Rasuan Jatisari                   1,200 
  Tanjung Tiga                      500 
   164,535 
OKI 5 Pematang Panggang F                17,000 
 6 Pematang Panggang (Mesuji)                45,000 
 7 Sriguna                 6,000 
 8 Pematang Panggang (Marga Mesuji)                75,375 
 9 Air Sugihan Kiri                44,992 
  Air Sugihan                16,472 
  Pematang Panggang (K. Agung)                30,000 
  Pematang Panggang I                   6,000 
  Way Hitam IV                   7,975 
   248,814 
MUBA 10 Air Sugihan                36,500 
 11 Delta Upang                15,000 
 12 Air Saleh                16,500 
 13 Air Kumbang-Air Padang                13,666 
 14 Delta Telang                40,000 
 15 Karang Agung              176,383 
 16 Pulau Rimau                33,434 
 17 Sungai Lilin                39,500 
 18 Pangkalan Kersik                20,000 
 19 Sekayu Babat Toman                76,741 
  Air Saleh & Sugihan               24,714 
  Cinta Manis                   4,000 
  Rantau Panjang                   3,310 
   499,748 
MURA 20 Bingin Teluk I C                12,975 
 21 Bingin Teluk I B                10,200 
 22 Bingin Teluk I D                15,400 
 23 Lembah Liam                89,300 
 24 Terawas (Air Bal)                27,665 
 25 Kelingi II                76,300 
 26 Kelingi IV D                13,600 
 27 Lahat-Tebing Tinggi                13,047 
  Air Bungin                   4,800 
  Babat Toman IV                12,000 
  Bingin Teluk I C                   3,800 
  Jayaloka                   3,000 
  Ketapat SP I & SP 0                   1,700 
  Ketapat XVI B/I                   7,300 
  Margoyoso                       575 
  Megang Sakti III/IV                      875 
  Muara Beliti III/E                   1,500 
  Ngestiboga                   3,000 
  Ngestiboga II                   4,550 
  Semangus I                   7,000 
  Singkut                   5,000 
  Sukarame Jaya                      500 
  Tebing Tinggi III A/B                   1,200 
   315,287 
Lahat 28 Lahat - Tebing Tinggi                37,900 
  Padang Muara Dua                      610 
  Tanjung Ning                      150 
   38,660 
Bangka 29 Batu Betumpang                   7,500 
 30 Kurau                      600 
  Rias Toboali                   1,800 
   9,900 
Muara Enim  Air Belidah                   6,000 
  Air Limau                      800 
  Mg. Panang Sangang Puluh                   6,000 
  Sugih Waras                   1,379 
  Sukarame                      510 
   14,689 
Total            1,284,133 
Source : Peta Pencadangan Tanah Perkebunan dan Transmigrasi Sumsel, BPN, 1997  
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